361 lines
21 KiB
Markdown
361 lines
21 KiB
Markdown
# Plan B — Container Hardening & Real Image Scanning Implementation Plan
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> **For agentic workers:** REQUIRED SUB-SKILL: Use superpowers:subagent-driven-development (recommended) or superpowers:executing-plans to implement this plan task-by-task. Steps use checkbox (`- [ ]`) syntax for tracking.
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**Goal:** Harden the published container image — run it as a non-root user, slim its runtime attack surface, and scan the actual amd64 image for OS/library CVEs before publishing — without breaking existing self-hosters or the multi-arch (amd64+arm64) GHCR publish.
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**Architecture:** Two edits to the runtime layer (`Dockerfile` + a new `docker-entrypoint.sh`) plus a restructure of `docker-publish.yml` so a single-arch amd64 image is built and Trivy-scanned before the multi-arch push. The image scan is **report-only** here (matching Plan A's sequencing); Plan E flips it to blocking. SBOM + SLSA provenance are attached at push time.
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**Tech Stack:** Docker multi-stage build (`node:20-slim`), Docker Buildx + QEMU, GitHub Actions, Aqua Trivy (image + SARIF), `gosu` for privilege drop, better-sqlite3 (prebuilt binary), tsx (runtime TS loader).
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## Global Constraints
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- **This plan builds on Plan A's branch** (`security/scanning-pipeline`); the workflows here are already SHA-pinned. Work branch: `security/container-hardening`.
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- **Do not break existing self-hosters.** The `./data:/app/data` bind mount (`docker-compose.yml:31`) is host-owned; the container must still read/write it after `docker pull` + restart. The non-root switch is handled by an entrypoint that chowns `/app/data` **as root** then drops to the `node` user via `gosu` — so there is **no static `USER` line** (a static `USER` would run the entrypoint unprivileged and make the chown impossible).
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- **Keep `ffmpeg`** (real runtime dependency) and **keep `tsx`** (the `CMD` runs TS via `tsx/esm`). Only `python3 make g++` may leave the runtime stage.
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- **better-sqlite3 must still load.** It is expected to install via its prebuilt binary on `node:20-slim` (glibc) for both amd64 and arm64. If a task's build shows it compiling (needs the toolchain), use the documented fallback (keep the toolchain, OR copy the built module from the builder stage) and report it — do not ship a broken image.
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- **Image scan is report-only in this plan** (`exit-code: '0'` + `continue-on-error: true`, comment `# report-only; enforcement flipped on in Plan E`). Do NOT make it fail the publish here.
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- **trivy-action pinned to `ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25` (# v0.36.0)** — v0.28.0's nested `setup-trivy@v0.2.1` ref is broken (see memory `ci-security-action-gotchas`). SHA-pin any other new action with a `# vX.Y.Z` comment.
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- **Both build paths must keep working:** the GHCR prebuilt-image pull (`docker-compose.yml` `image:`) AND the from-source `docker compose up --build` fallback.
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- **Commit identity:** plain `git commit` (local config = `Jannis Braun <151788261+TheZwiss@users.noreply.github.com>`). NEVER `-c user.email`; never the alxtrading94 email.
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- **Node 20 / pnpm 10.34.3** are the pinned toolchain.
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- **Docker daemon must be running** for Tasks 1 and 2 verification (`docker build` / `buildx --load`). If it is not up, STOP and report — do not mark a Dockerfile task done without a real build+boot.
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---
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### Task 1: Harden the runtime image (non-root via gosu, drop build toolchain)
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**Files:**
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- Create: `docker-entrypoint.sh`
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- Modify: `Dockerfile` (runtime stage, lines 37-97)
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**Interfaces:**
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- Consumes: the existing builder stage output (`/app/packages/web/dist`).
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- Produces: an image that runs `node --import tsx/esm src/index.ts` as the non-root `node` user (uid 1000) with a writable `/app/data`. No code symbols.
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- [ ] **Step 1: Write the entrypoint script**
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Create `docker-entrypoint.sh` at the repo root:
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```sh
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#!/bin/sh
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# Runs as root: make the (bind-mounted, host-owned) data dir writable by the
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# non-root `node` user, then drop privileges via gosu and exec the CMD. This
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# lets the container run as uid 1000 while still owning ./data on hosts where
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# the bind mount was created by a different uid.
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#
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# - Idempotent AND cheap: only chown entries not already node-owned, so after
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# the first boot this is near-instant. A plain `chown -R` over a large
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# uploads/ tree on slow Pi/SD storage would delay startup on EVERY restart.
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# - Non-fatal: on a bind mount that rejects chown (some CIFS/NFS backings),
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# warn and continue rather than crash-looping under `restart: unless-stopped`
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# (the old root container booted fine on such mounts).
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set -e
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mkdir -p /app/data/uploads
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chown node:node /app/data /app/data/uploads 2>/dev/null || true
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find /app/data ! -user node -exec chown node:node {} + 2>/dev/null || \
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echo "docker-entrypoint: warning: could not chown /app/data; continuing (ensure it is writable by uid 1000)"
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exec gosu node "$@"
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```
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- [ ] **Step 2: Modify the runtime stage's apt-get line**
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In `Dockerfile`, replace the runtime-stage package install (currently line 42-44):
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```dockerfile
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RUN apt-get update && \
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apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends python3 make g++ ffmpeg && \
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rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
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```
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with (drop the C toolchain; keep ffmpeg; add gosu for the privilege drop):
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```dockerfile
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RUN apt-get update && \
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apt-get install -y --no-install-recommends ffmpeg gosu && \
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rm -rf /var/lib/apt/lists/*
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```
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- [ ] **Step 3: Wire the entrypoint + keep the CMD**
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In `Dockerfile`, immediately AFTER the `RUN mkdir -p /app/data/uploads` line (currently line 73) add the entrypoint copy:
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```dockerfile
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# Non-root hardening: copy the privilege-dropping entrypoint. It chowns the
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# data volume as root, then execs the CMD as the unprivileged `node` user.
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COPY docker-entrypoint.sh /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
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RUN chmod +x /usr/local/bin/docker-entrypoint.sh
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```
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Then, at the END of the file, replace the final two lines (currently line 96-97):
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```dockerfile
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WORKDIR /app/packages/server
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CMD ["node", "--import", "tsx/esm", "src/index.ts"]
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```
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with (add the ENTRYPOINT between WORKDIR and CMD; do NOT add a `USER` line):
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```dockerfile
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WORKDIR /app/packages/server
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ENTRYPOINT ["docker-entrypoint.sh"]
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CMD ["node", "--import", "tsx/esm", "src/index.ts"]
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```
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- [ ] **Step 4: Build the native (arm64) image + confirm neither arch needs the toolchain**
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The runtime stage runs its own `pnpm install --prod` (Dockerfile:61), so better-sqlite3/sharp install **per arch**. This host is Apple Silicon (arm64), which is ALSO the Raspberry Pi's arch — the main self-host target — so build the real image **natively for arm64** (fast; a `--platform linux/amd64` build here would emulate the whole Vite build via Rosetta and likely time out). This build both produces the image for the Step 5 boot test AND exercises the arm64 runtime install:
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```bash
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docker buildx build --platform linux/arm64 --load -t backspace:hardening-test --build-arg BACKSPACE_COMMIT=test .
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```
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Watch the better-sqlite3 output: it must use a prebuilt binary (`prebuild-install`), NOT `node-gyp`/compilation. This build may take a few minutes (pnpm install + Vite) — give it an ample timeout or run it in the background so it isn't killed mid-build.
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Then verify the OTHER arch (amd64) toolchain drop with a lightweight, emulated native-module check (no Vite build, so it's quick even under emulation) on `node:20-slim` amd64, which — like the hardened runtime stage — has no `python3/make/g++`:
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```bash
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BSQL=$(grep -A1 'better-sqlite3@' pnpm-lock.yaml | grep -oE '[0-9]+\.[0-9]+\.[0-9]+' | head -1); echo "testing better-sqlite3@$BSQL"
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docker run --rm --platform linux/amd64 node:20-slim sh -c "
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cd /tmp && npm init -y >/dev/null 2>&1 &&
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npm install --no-audit --no-fund better-sqlite3@$BSQL sharp@0.33.5 2>&1 | grep -iE 'prebuild-install|prebuilt|node-gyp|gyp ERR|rebuild' | head -20;
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node -e \"require('better-sqlite3')(':memory:').close(); require('sharp'); console.log('amd64 native modules OK (no toolchain)')\"
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"
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```
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Expected: the native arm64 image builds (better-sqlite3 prebuilt), AND the amd64 test prints `amd64 native modules OK (no toolchain)`. If EITHER arch tries to compile, or the amd64 test errors, STOP — apply the fallback (re-add the toolchain to the runtime apt-get line, OR build the module in the builder stage and `COPY --from=builder`) and report which arch failed, which fallback you used, and why. Do not proceed on a one-arch pass.
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- [ ] **Step 5: Boot the container and verify non-root + data volume + DB**
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Run:
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```bash
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mkdir -p /tmp/bkspace-data
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docker run -d --name bkspace-htest -e JWT_SECRET=testsecret_at_least_32_chars_long_xx -p 3999:3000 -v /tmp/bkspace-data:/app/data backspace:hardening-test
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sleep 12
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echo "--- health ---"; curl -fsS http://localhost:3999/api/health && echo " OK"
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# IMPORTANT: check PID 1 (the actual server), NOT `docker exec ... id`. `docker exec`
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# spawns a NEW process as the image's configured USER (root, since there is no USER
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# line), so `exec ... id` prints uid=0 even when the gosu drop worked. /proc/1/status
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# is the real server process's identity.
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echo "--- server (PID 1) runs as node/uid 1000, not root ---"; docker exec bkspace-htest sh -c "grep '^Uid:' /proc/1/status"
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echo "--- data dir written + owned by node ---"; docker exec bkspace-htest sh -c 'ls -ld /app/data /app/data/uploads'
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echo "--- better-sqlite3 loaded (DB file exists) ---"; docker exec bkspace-htest sh -c 'ls -la /app/data/*.db 2>/dev/null || echo NO_DB'
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echo "--- sharp (native, toolchain-sensitive) loads ---"; docker exec bkspace-htest node -e "require('sharp'); console.log('sharp OK')"
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echo "--- boot logs clean (no EACCES / permission errors from running non-root) ---"; docker logs bkspace-htest 2>&1 | grep -iE 'EACCES|permission denied|EPERM' && echo "PERMISSION ERRORS FOUND" || echo "logs clean"
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```
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Expected: `/api/health` returns ok; `Uid:` line shows `1000 1000 1000 1000` (server runs non-root); `/app/data` + `/app/data/uploads` exist and are `node`-owned; a `.db` file was created (better-sqlite3 loaded and wrote); `sharp OK` prints (the OTHER native module survived the toolchain drop); logs show no permission errors. If any fails, fix before proceeding.
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- [ ] **Step 6: Tear down the test container**
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Run:
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```bash
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docker rm -f bkspace-htest; rm -rf /tmp/bkspace-data
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docker rmi backspace:hardening-test 2>/dev/null || true
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```
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- [ ] **Step 7: Commit**
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```bash
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git add docker-entrypoint.sh Dockerfile
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git commit -m "fix(docker): run container as non-root (gosu) and drop build toolchain from runtime"
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```
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---
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### Task 2: Scan the image before publishing (restructure docker-publish.yml)
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**Files:**
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- Modify: `.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml`
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**Interfaces:**
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- Consumes: the hardened `Dockerfile` from Task 1.
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- Produces: a publish workflow that builds amd64 → Trivy-scans it (report-only) → pushes multi-arch with SBOM + provenance. No code symbols.
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- [ ] **Step 1: Restructure the build/scan/push steps**
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In `.github/workflows/docker-publish.yml`, add `security-events: write` to the top-level `permissions` block (it currently has `contents: read` + `packages: write`):
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```yaml
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permissions:
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contents: read
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packages: write
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security-events: write
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```
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Then replace the single `Build and push (linux/amd64, linux/arm64)` step (currently lines 79-92) with the build → scan → push sequence:
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```yaml
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# Build a single-arch amd64 image and LOAD it into the runner's docker
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# daemon so Trivy can scan the exact artifact before anything is published.
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# A multi-arch manifest cannot be --load'ed, so scanning must happen on a
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# single-arch build first; the multi-arch push below reuses these layers
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# from the buildx cache, so this is cheap.
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- name: Build amd64 image for scanning
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uses: docker/build-push-action@10e90e3645eae34f1e60eeb005ba3a3d33f178e8 # v6.19.2
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with:
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context: .
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platforms: linux/amd64
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load: true
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push: false
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tags: backspace:scan
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build-args: |
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BACKSPACE_COMMIT=${{ steps.meta_commit.outputs.commit }}
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cache-from: type=gha
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cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
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- name: Trivy image scan (report-only)
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uses: aquasecurity/trivy-action@ed142fd0673e97e23eac54620cfb913e5ce36c25 # v0.36.0
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continue-on-error: true # report-only; enforcement flipped on in Plan E
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with:
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scan-type: image
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image-ref: backspace:scan
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ignore-unfixed: true
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format: sarif
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output: trivy-image.sarif
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severity: HIGH,CRITICAL
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- name: Upload Trivy image SARIF
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if: always()
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uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@02c5e83432fe5497fd85b873b6c9f16a8578e1d9 # v3.37.0
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with:
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sarif_file: trivy-image.sarif
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category: trivy-image
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# Publish the multi-arch image. Reuses the amd64 layers built above via the
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# gha cache. Attaches an SBOM and SLSA provenance attestation to the image.
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- name: Build and push (linux/amd64, linux/arm64)
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uses: docker/build-push-action@10e90e3645eae34f1e60eeb005ba3a3d33f178e8 # v6.19.2
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with:
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context: .
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platforms: linux/amd64,linux/arm64
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push: true
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tags: ${{ steps.docker_meta.outputs.tags }}
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labels: ${{ steps.docker_meta.outputs.labels }}
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build-args: |
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BACKSPACE_COMMIT=${{ steps.meta_commit.outputs.commit }}
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sbom: true
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provenance: true
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cache-from: type=gha
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cache-to: type=gha,mode=max
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```
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- [ ] **Step 2: Validate the workflow**
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Run:
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```bash
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actionlint .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml
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```
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Expected: exit 0, no output.
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- [ ] **Step 3: Confirm all actions still SHA-pinned**
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Run:
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```bash
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grep -rnE 'uses: +[^ ]+@' .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml | grep -vE '@[0-9a-f]{40}' && echo "UNPINNED FOUND" || echo "All actions pinned to SHA"
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```
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Expected: `All actions pinned to SHA`.
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- [ ] **Step 4: Locally reproduce the build→load→scan path**
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This proves the new build→load→scan logic works without publishing anything (requires Docker daemon + local Trivy: `brew install trivy` if absent). Build native (arm64) here to avoid emulation — the scan mechanism is arch-independent; CI scans the amd64 image natively on GitHub's runners:
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```bash
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docker buildx build --platform linux/arm64 --load -t backspace:scan --build-arg BACKSPACE_COMMIT=test .
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trivy image --severity HIGH,CRITICAL --ignore-unfixed backspace:scan | tail -25
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docker rmi backspace:scan
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```
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Expected: the image builds + loads, and Trivy scans it and prints a summary (findings are fine — the scan is report-only; we just need it to RUN). Note accurately in the report: only the **amd64** image is Trivy-scanned; the published **arm64** image ships unscanned (acceptable for this plan). The multi-arch push + SBOM/provenance path cannot be exercised without publishing — it is verified by review + a maintainer `workflow_dispatch` run; the amd64 layers are gha-cache reused on the push, but the **arm64 layers build cold** there (so the push is not "free").
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- [ ] **Step 5: Commit**
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```bash
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git add .github/workflows/docker-publish.yml
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git commit -m "ci(docker): scan the amd64 image before publish; attach SBOM + provenance"
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```
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---
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### Task 3: Document the container hardening
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**Files:**
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- Modify: `docs/systems/deployment.md`
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- Modify: `docs/systems/security-scanning.md`
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**Interfaces:**
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- Consumes: the changes from Tasks 1-2.
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- Produces: an upgrade/migration note + an updated pipeline reference. No code symbols.
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- [ ] **Step 1: Add a container-hardening + migration note to deployment.md AND correct now-false ownership statements**
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Read `docs/systems/deployment.md` first to match its structure. Then:
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(a) Add a subsection (place it near the Docker/image content) with this content:
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```markdown
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### Container hardening (non-root)
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The runtime image runs as the unprivileged `node` user (uid 1000), not root. On
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container start, `docker-entrypoint.sh` runs as root only long enough to `chown`
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the `./data` bind mount to `node` (only entries not already node-owned, so it is
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near-instant after the first boot), then drops privileges via `gosu` and execs the
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server. The build toolchain (`python3`/`make`/`g++`) is not installed in the
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runtime stage — `better-sqlite3` and `sharp` load from prebuilt binaries — which
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shrinks the runtime attack surface. `ffmpeg` remains (a real runtime dependency).
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The published image carries an SBOM and SLSA provenance attestation, and the
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amd64 image is scanned by Trivy before publish (report-only). Note: only the
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amd64 image is scanned; the arm64 image is published unscanned.
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**Minimum Docker version:** the attestation-bearing multi-arch image requires a
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reasonably modern Docker to `pull` cleanly (Docker Engine 24+ recommended).
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Very old daemons (≤ 20.10) may mishandle the `unknown/unknown` attestation
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manifests. New installs via `install.sh` (get.docker.com) are fine.
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**Upgrade note for existing self-hosters:** on the first start of the hardened
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image, the contents of your host `./data` directory are chowned to uid 1000. This
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is expected and idempotent. If you previously accessed `./data` on the host as a
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different user, adjust host-side access accordingly. `./restore.sh` continues to
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work — it swaps files inside a throwaway root container, and root can rewrite the
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now uid-1000-owned files.
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```
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(b) Correct the two statements that this change makes false (the data dir is no
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longer root-owned):
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- The seed-admin line (around `deployment.md:170`): change
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`writes it to `data/seed-admin-rotated.txt` (mode `0600`, root-owned via the bind-mount)`
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→ `... (mode `0600`, owned by the container's runtime user uid 1000 via the bind-mount)`.
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- The Restore intro (around `deployment.md:252`): change
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`Because `data/` (including `backspace.db` and `data/backups/`) is **container-owned (root)** via the bind-mount`
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→ `... is **container-owned (uid 1000)** via the bind-mount`. (The throwaway
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root `alpine` container still performs the swap — root can rewrite uid-1000
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files — so the mechanism description after it stays correct.)
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**Maintainer release-gate (record it, do not action it here):** before the first
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`v*` tag that ships this image, do a real `docker compose pull && docker compose
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up -d` on both an amd64 host and the arm64 Pi to confirm the attestation-bearing
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image pulls on the actual deployment Docker versions.
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- [ ] **Step 2: Reflect the image scan in security-scanning.md**
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In `docs/systems/security-scanning.md`, update the supply-chain line about SBOM/provenance (currently "**will be** attached ... not yet live") to reflect that image scanning + SBOM + provenance now exist in `docker-publish.yml` (report-only image scan; SBOM + provenance attached at push). Add `docker-publish.yml` to the workflow table with trigger "tag push / manual" and result "image scan (report-only) + SBOM + provenance".
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- [ ] **Step 3: Verify the docs reference reality**
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Run:
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```bash
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grep -q 'non-root' docs/systems/deployment.md && grep -q 'provenance' docs/systems/security-scanning.md && echo "docs updated"
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```
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Expected: `docs updated`.
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- [ ] **Step 4: Commit**
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```bash
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git add docs/systems/deployment.md docs/systems/security-scanning.md
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git commit -m "docs(docker): document non-root runtime, data-volume migration, and image scan"
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```
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---
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## Self-Review Notes
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- **Spec coverage (WS2):** non-root USER via gosu (Task 1) ✓; slim runtime / drop toolchain with prebuilt-binary verification + fallback (Task 1) ✓; keep ffmpeg + tsx (Task 1 / constraints) ✓; bind-mount chown migration (Task 1 entrypoint + Task 3 doc) ✓; restructure to single-arch load → scan → multi-arch push (Task 2) ✓; SBOM + provenance (Task 2) ✓; image scan report-only, flips in Plan E (Task 2 + constraints) ✓.
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- **Deferred by design:** flipping the image scan to blocking → Plan E. Desktop, web/CSP/CORS → Plans C/D.
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- **Risk-managed:** the toolchain removal is verified by a real build that must show better-sqlite3 using a prebuilt binary; a fallback is defined if it compiles. The non-root switch is verified by asserting `uid=1000` at runtime and a successful `./data` write + DB creation. Multi-arch push + SBOM/provenance is review-plus-workflow_dispatch verified (cannot be exercised without publishing).
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- **Enforcement stays OFF** — image scan is `continue-on-error` + `severity`-limited to HIGH/CRITICAL for the report; no build-failing gate added here.
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- **Adversarial pre-execution review folded in:** the non-root verification now checks `/proc/1/status` (not `docker exec … id`, which spawns a new root process and would false-fail); BOTH arches are built to verify the toolchain drop (arm64 is the release-hard-fail path); the entrypoint chown is idempotent-cheap + non-fatal (Pi/CIFS safety); a `sharp` native-load smoke check + EACCES log scan were added; now-false `deployment.md` ownership statements are corrected; and an SBOM/provenance min-Docker floor + a maintainer pull-test release-gate are documented (attestation-bearing images can trip very old Docker on the `pull` path).
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