refactor(server): split federation routes into cohesive modules (#9)

routes/federation.ts had grown to 7.6k lines, spanning HTTP route
registration, federated identity resolution, ~30 inbound relay event
processors, DM reconciliation, and rate-limiting internals — too large
to review or hold in context, and awkward to change safely.

Split the implementation into 18 focused modules under routes/federation/
(helpers, events/, handlers/) and keep routes/federation.ts as a thin
barrel that re-exports the public API and composes the HTTP registrars
into federationRoutes(). No import paths change anywhere else.

Pure move, no behavior change:
- 61/61 named functions byte-identical; only deltas are 2 dynamic-import
  paths adjusted for the new directory depth
- public export surface unchanged (barrel re-exports all 22 symbols)
- all 30 endpoints preserved (identical verb+path set)
- typecheck, build, and full server suite (790 tests) green

Docs: update federation.md source-file map; add split design doc.
This commit is contained in:
TheZwiss
2026-07-10 02:08:03 +02:00
committed by GitHub
parent 180228f2d1
commit 94fe73522d
21 changed files with 8063 additions and 7620 deletions
@@ -0,0 +1,164 @@
# Design: Split `routes/federation.ts` into cohesive modules
**Date:** 2026-07-10
**Status:** Approved (strategy) — pending implementation plan
**Author:** Lead Developer
## Problem
`packages/server/src/routes/federation.ts` is **7,626 lines** — the largest file in the
codebase by nearly 3×. It bundles at least five unrelated responsibilities:
1. HTTP route registration (`federationRoutes()` alone is ~2,800 lines / 30 endpoints)
2. Federated identity resolution (`resolveLocalUser`, `resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser`, …)
3. ~30 inbound relay event processors (`process*Event`)
4. DM channel / federated-id reconciliation helpers
5. Rate-limiting, nonce, and peer-approval-queue internals
A file this size is unreviewable (the originating complaint) and unsafe to change: any
diff touching it is hard to reason about, and the file is too large to hold in working
memory (human or model) at once.
This is a **structural** problem, not a behavioral one. The fix is to split the file
along its existing responsibility seams — **not** to change any behavior.
## Goals
- Every module has **one clear purpose**, is independently readable (~150850 lines),
and communicates through explicit imports/exports.
- **Zero behavior change.** The ~21,700 lines of existing federation tests are the proof
and must pass unchanged.
- **Zero import-path churn** anywhere else in the codebase or tests.
## Non-Goals (explicitly deferred to a separate follow-up — "Phase C")
- Refactoring or de-duplicating logic *inside* the moved functions.
- Removing intra-function dead branches.
- Renaming symbols or changing signatures.
These are real but must not be mixed into the move: an edit-while-moving diff destroys
`git`'s move detection and re-creates the unreviewability problem. Cleanup, if warranted,
lands afterward as small edits scoped to the now-isolated modules.
## Key findings from analysis
- **No dead top-level code.** All 78 top-level symbols are reachable (self-referenced,
imported by another source module, or exercised by tests). A "prune dead functions"
phase has **no targets** — this is a pure move. (Verified by a per-symbol reference
count across all `packages/**/*.ts`.)
- **Small public surface.** Only **5 symbols** are imported by other *source* files:
`validateOrigin`, `extractDomain`, `backfillReplicatedProfileAssets`,
`sweepDeadIncarnationArtifacts`, `reconcileDriftedDmFederatedIds`, plus `federationRoutes`
(from `index.ts`). Tests import the 22 currently-`export`ed symbols. Everything else is
file-internal.
- **`federationRoutes()` has no function-local shared state.** Its body is a flat list of
`app.<verb>()` registrations; each handler closes only over module-level imports and the
5 module-level rate-limit maps + nonce store. Splitting it into independent registrar
functions requires no hoisting.
- **Build mechanics:** `moduleResolution: "bundler"`, `isolatedModules: true`,
`noUnusedLocals: false`. Importers use explicit `./routes/federation.js` specifiers.
## Strategy: barrel + submodule directory
`routes/federation.ts` **stays as a file** and becomes a thin **barrel**:
- It re-exports the 22 public symbols from their new homes, so every existing
`from '.../routes/federation.js'` import (source **and** test) resolves unchanged.
The one interface (`DmReconcileResult`) is re-exported via `export type { … }`
(required by `isolatedModules`).
- It defines `federationRoutes(app)` as a thin function that calls the six route
registrars in order.
Because importers use the explicit `.js` specifier, the barrel **must** remain a file at
`routes/federation.ts`; the extracted modules live beside it in a new `routes/federation/`
directory (a file and a same-named directory coexist fine on disk and under bundler
resolution).
## Target module layout
```
packages/server/src/routes/
federation.ts ← BARREL: re-exports public API + federationRoutes()
federation/
rateLimits.ts ← rate-limit consts+maps+fns, nonce store, _resetLookupRateBuckets
origin.ts ← validateOrigin, resolveLocalOrigin, sanitizePeer, SanitizedPeer
identity.ts ← extractDomain, getOurIdentityDomain, verifyAttribution,
resolveLocalUser, findFederatedUser,
resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser, backfillHomeUserId
dmChannels.ts ← buildDmChannelPayload, findOrCreateDmChannel,
buildDmMessagePayload, isUrlFromPeer, resolveLocalDmMessage
profile.ts ← hydrateReplicatedUserProfile, downloadProfileAsset,
processProfileUpdateEvent, backfillReplicatedProfileAssets
reconciliation.ts ← DmReconcileResult, reconcileDmChannelFederatedId,
reconcileDriftedDmFederatedIds, sweepDeadIncarnationArtifacts
events/
dmMessages.ts ← processCreate/Update/Delete/ReactionAdd/ReactionRemove Event
membership.ts ← processMemberAdd/MemberRemove/OwnershipTransfer/GroupMetadataUpdate Event
friends.ts ← processFriendRequestCreate/Update/Cancel, FriendAdd/Remove Event
calls.ts ← processDmCallStart/Accept/Reject/End, TypingStart/Stop,
fanOutCallEvent, emitHostFanoutUndeliverable
dmState.ts ← processDmClose/DmReopen/ReadStateUpdate/PresenceUpdate/FileRejected Event
dispatch.ts ← processRelayEvents (imports every processor above)
handlers/
peerHandshake.ts ← POST peer/initiate, peer/accept, peer/ensure, peer/rotate, peer/denied
peerAdmin.ts ← GET peers, reset-events(+ack), peers/:id GET/DELETE/permanent,
peers/:id reset/recheck/rotate
approvals.ts ← approval-requests(+approve/deny), peering-subscriptions,
peering-notifications + queueApprovalRequest,
handleInbound/OutboundApprove, handleInbound/OutboundDeny
relay.ts ← POST identity, relay, epoch, sync
lookup.ts ← POST users/lookup, users/by-home-id
files.ts ← POST verify-attach-proof
```
~19 modules, ~150850 lines each (avg ~400). Route-registration order across registrars
is preserved by calling them in path order; Fastify does not depend on cross-path
registration order, so intra-group reordering (grouping interleaved endpoints) is safe.
### Dependency layering (acyclic)
```
L0 leaves: rateLimits · origin · identity · dmChannels
L1: profile · reconciliation · events/* (use L0)
L2: events/dispatch (uses all events/*)
L3: handlers/* (use L0L2)
L4 barrel: federation.ts (re-exports + calls handlers/*)
```
No leaf imports upward, so no import cycles.
## Correctness / verification strategy
- **Test net:** the full server suite (`pnpm --filter @backspace/server test`, ~30
federation test files / ~21.7k lines) runs after **each** module group is extracted.
Green throughout = behavior preserved.
- **Typecheck + build** (`pnpm -w typecheck && pnpm --filter @backspace/server build`)
after each group catches import/type regressions immediately.
- **Move discipline:** functions are moved **verbatim**. The only permitted edits are
(a) adding `import`/`export` statements, and (b) the barrel re-exports. No logic edits.
- **`git diff -M`** on the final result should render as moves + a small barrel — the
reviewability property we are buying.
## Rollout (phased so each commit is independently verifiable)
- **Phase A — Prune.** *Empty by analysis* (no dead top-level code). Skipped; documented
here so the absence is deliberate, not overlooked.
- **Phase B — Extract (this design).** One commit per module group, tests green at each:
1. Leaf helpers: `rateLimits`, `origin`, `identity`, `dmChannels`
2. `profile`, `reconciliation`
3. `events/*` + `events/dispatch`
4. `handlers/*` + convert `federation.ts` to the barrel
5. Update `docs/systems/federation.md` source-file map
- **Phase C — Cleanup (separate, later, optional).** Intra-module logic simplification,
now reviewable because each concern is isolated in a small file.
## Risks & mitigations
| Risk | Mitigation |
|------|-----------|
| Import cycle between extracted modules | Enforced L0L4 layering; typecheck catches any cycle immediately |
| A test imports a symbol the barrel forgot to re-export | Barrel re-exports the exact set of 22 currently-`export`ed symbols; verified against the export grep |
| `isolatedModules` breaks type re-export | `DmReconcileResult` re-exported via `export type { … }` |
| Route path resolution changes | Barrel stays a file at `routes/federation.ts`; no importer specifier changes |
| Hidden shared local state in `federationRoutes` | Verified none exists (flat `app.<verb>()` body) |
```
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@@ -3,7 +3,15 @@
> **Companion spec:** This document covers **S2S (server-to-server)** federation — the relay protocol, HMAC auth, identity resolution, and background workers. For the **client-side** multi-instance architecture (how the web/desktop app connects to multiple instances, federated account creation, origin-aware routing), see [`client-federation.md`](client-federation.md). Both systems work together.
Source files:
- `packages/server/src/routes/federation.ts` -- API endpoints (peer handshake, relay, sync) + all inbound event processors + identity resolution functions
- `packages/server/src/routes/federation.ts` -- **Barrel** for the federation route subsystem. Re-exports the public API (identity resolution, event processors, reconciliation, `validateOrigin`) so `from '.../routes/federation.js'` imports resolve unchanged, and composes the HTTP registrars into `federationRoutes()`. The implementation lives in `routes/federation/` (split out of the former single 7.6k-line file; see `docs/superpowers/specs/2026-07-10-federation-ts-split-design.md`):
- `routes/federation/rateLimits.ts` -- In-memory sliding-window rate limiters (accept/relay/lookup/ensure) + replay-nonce store + eviction timers
- `routes/federation/origin.ts` -- `validateOrigin`, `resolveLocalOrigin`, `sanitizePeer` (+ `SanitizedPeer` shape)
- `routes/federation/identity.ts` -- Federated identity resolution: `extractDomain`, `getOurIdentityDomain`, `verifyAttribution`, `resolveLocalUser`, `findFederatedUser`, `resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser`, `backfillHomeUserId`
- `routes/federation/dmChannels.ts` -- DM channel/message payload builders, `findOrCreateDmChannel`, `resolveLocalDmMessage`, `isUrlFromPeer`
- `routes/federation/profile.ts` -- Replicated-profile hydration + asset download, `processProfileUpdateEvent`, `backfillReplicatedProfileAssets`
- `routes/federation/reconciliation.ts` -- DM federated-id reconciliation + dead-incarnation artifact sweeps (worker-facing maintenance)
- `routes/federation/events/*.ts` -- Inbound relay event processors, grouped by domain: `dmMessages`, `membership`, `friends`, `calls`, `dmState` (presence/read-state/close/reopen/file-rejected), and `dispatch` (`processRelayEvents`, the fan-out entry point shared by the HTTP relay handler and the initial-sync worker)
- `routes/federation/handlers/*.ts` -- Fastify route registrars, grouped by endpoint concern: `peerHandshake` (initiate/accept/ensure/rotate/denied), `peerAdmin` (peer list/CRUD/reset/recheck/rotate), `approvals` (approval queue + peering subscriptions/notifications + approve/deny helpers), `relay` (identity delete, relay, epoch, sync), `lookup` (user lookups), `attach` (verify-attach-proof, `/api/users/@me/reattach`)
- `packages/server/src/utils/federationAuth.ts` -- HMAC signing, verification, header parsing, `getOurOrigin()`
- `packages/server/src/utils/federationOutbox.ts` -- Event queuing, coalescing, relay payload construction, mutation log, participant/target resolution
- `packages/server/src/utils/federationLookup.ts` -- HMAC-signed remote-user lookups: `lookupRemoteUser` (by username) and `lookupRemoteUserByHomeId` (reverse lookup, used by stub backfill)
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import { getDb, schema } from '../../db/index.js';
import { getOurOrigin } from '../../utils/federationAuth.js';
import { sanitizeUser } from '../../utils/sanitize.js';
import { generateSnowflake } from '../../utils/snowflake.js';
import { connectionManager } from '../../ws/handler.js';
import { getDmMessageWithUser } from '../dm.js';
import { and, desc, eq, inArray, isNull, or } from 'drizzle-orm';
import type { FederatedCallEntry } from '../../ws/handler.js';
import type { DmChannel, DmMessageWithUser } from '@backspace/shared';
/**
* Build the full DM channel payload used by `dm_channel_created` events.
* Hydrates members, fetches the last message, and returns a `DmChannel`-shaped
* object — or `null` when the channel row doesn't exist / is deleted.
*
* An optional `lastMessageOverride` lets callers supply the message object
* directly (e.g. the just-relayed message) instead of querying the DB.
*/
export function buildDmChannelPayload(
channelId: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
lastMessageOverride?: DmMessageWithUser | null,
): DmChannel | null {
const dmChannel = db.select()
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(and(eq(schema.dmChannels.id, channelId), isNull(schema.dmChannels.deletedAt)))
.get();
if (!dmChannel) return null;
const allMemberRows = db.select()
.from(schema.dmMembers)
.where(eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, channelId))
.all();
const memberUserIds = allMemberRows.map(m => m.userId);
const users = memberUserIds.length > 0
? db.select().from(schema.users).where(inArray(schema.users.id, memberUserIds)).all()
: [];
let lastMessage: DmMessageWithUser | null = lastMessageOverride ?? null;
if (!lastMessageOverride) {
const lastMsgRow = db.select({ id: schema.dmMessages.id })
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(eq(schema.dmMessages.dmChannelId, channelId))
.orderBy(desc(schema.dmMessages.createdAt))
.limit(1)
.get();
if (lastMsgRow) {
lastMessage = getDmMessageWithUser(lastMsgRow.id);
}
}
return {
id: dmChannel.id,
ownerId: dmChannel.ownerId ?? null,
federatedId: dmChannel.federatedId ?? null,
createdAt: dmChannel.createdAt,
members: users.map(u => sanitizeUser(u)),
lastMessage,
};
}
// ─── Relay Event Processors ──────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Find or create a local DM channel for a federated DM.
* Uses federated_id for deterministic cross-instance lookup.
*/
export function findOrCreateDmChannel(
federatedId: string,
localUserIds: string[],
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
): string {
// Try to find existing channel by federated ID
const existing = db
.select()
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, federatedId))
.get();
if (existing) {
// Ensure all users are members (they might have been removed)
for (const userId of localUserIds) {
const member = db
.select()
.from(schema.dmMembers)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, existing.id),
eq(schema.dmMembers.userId, userId),
),
)
.get();
if (!member) {
db.insert(schema.dmMembers)
.values({
dmChannelId: existing.id,
userId,
closed: 0,
})
.run();
}
}
// Late-bind: if a FederatedCallEntry exists for this federatedId with null dmChannelId,
// update it now that we have a local channel
connectionManager.lateBindFederatedCall(federatedId, existing.id);
return existing.id;
}
// Create new DM channel with federated ID
const channelId = generateSnowflake();
const now = Date.now();
db.insert(schema.dmChannels)
.values({
id: channelId,
federatedId,
createdAt: now,
})
.run();
for (const userId of localUserIds) {
db.insert(schema.dmMembers)
.values({
dmChannelId: channelId,
userId,
closed: 0,
})
.run();
}
// Late-bind: if a FederatedCallEntry exists for this federatedId with null dmChannelId,
// update it now that we have a local channel
connectionManager.lateBindFederatedCall(federatedId, channelId);
return channelId;
}
/**
* Build a DmMessageWithUser payload for WebSocket broadcasting.
*/
export function buildDmMessagePayload(
messageRow: {
id: string;
dmChannelId: string;
userId: string;
content: string | null;
replyToId: string | null;
editedAt: number | null;
createdAt: number;
},
userRow: typeof schema.users.$inferSelect,
): DmMessageWithUser {
return {
id: messageRow.id,
dmChannelId: messageRow.dmChannelId,
channelId: messageRow.dmChannelId,
userId: messageRow.userId,
content: messageRow.content,
replyToId: messageRow.replyToId,
editedAt: messageRow.editedAt,
createdAt: messageRow.createdAt,
user: sanitizeUser(userRow),
attachments: [],
embeds: [],
reactions: [],
};
}
/**
* Validate that a URL's hostname matches the peer origin's hostname (SSRF protection).
*/
export function isUrlFromPeer(sourceUrl: string, peerOrigin: string): boolean {
try {
const sourceHost = new URL(sourceUrl).hostname;
const peerHost = new URL(peerOrigin).hostname;
return sourceHost === peerHost;
} catch {
return false;
}
}
/**
* Resolve a local DM message from a federation relay event's canonical identity.
* Uses messageHomeInstance to branch the lookup:
* - If the message originated on THIS instance → find by local ID
* - Otherwise → find by sourceInstance + sourceMessageId tracking
* Falls back to relay sender origin when messageHomeInstance is absent (backward compat).
*/
export function resolveLocalDmMessage(
canonicalMessageId: string,
messageHomeInstance: string | undefined,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
): typeof schema.dmMessages.$inferSelect | undefined {
if (messageHomeInstance && messageHomeInstance === getOurOrigin()) {
return db
.select()
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.dmMessages.id, canonicalMessageId),
isNull(schema.dmMessages.sourceInstance),
),
)
.get();
}
const originInstance = messageHomeInstance || sourceInstance;
return db
.select()
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceInstance, originInstance),
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceMessageId, canonicalMessageId),
),
)
.get();
}
@@ -0,0 +1,606 @@
import path from 'node:path';
import { getDb, schema } from '../../../db/index.js';
import { getOurOrigin } from '../../../utils/federationAuth.js';
import { mapCallReasonToEventReason, sendCallRelay } from '../../../utils/federationOutbox.js';
import { generateSnowflake } from '../../../utils/snowflake.js';
import { connectionManager } from '../../../ws/handler.js';
import { and, eq, isNull, or, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import type { CallFanoutFailure } from '../../../utils/federationOutbox.js';
import type { DmRoomMeta, FederatedCallEntry } from '../../../ws/handler.js';
import type { DmCallUndeliverableFailure, FederationRelayEvent, ServerEvent } from '@backspace/shared';
import { extractDomain, resolveLocalUser, resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser, verifyAttribution } from '../identity.js';
export function processDmCallStartEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
undeliverable: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.call?.caller || !event.call.livekitUrl || !event.call.tokens || !event.federatedId) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_call_payload' });
return;
}
// Attribution: caller must belong to source instance
if (!verifyAttribution(event.call.caller.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in dm_call_start: caller=${extractDomain(event.call.caller.homeInstance)} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
// Find local DM channel by federatedId
const channel = db.select({ id: schema.dmChannels.id })
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId))
.get();
// Resolve caller to local stub
const callerStub = resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser(
event.call.caller.homeUserId,
event.call.caller.homeInstance,
db,
{ username: event.call.caller.displayName },
);
if (!callerStub) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'participant_not_found' });
return;
}
const ringedUserIds: string[] = [];
if (channel) {
// ── Path A: DM exists locally ──
const localDmChannelId = channel.id;
const localMembers = db.select({
userId: schema.dmMembers.userId,
homeUserId: schema.users.homeUserId,
homeInstance: schema.users.homeInstance,
})
.from(schema.dmMembers)
.innerJoin(schema.users, eq(schema.dmMembers.userId, schema.users.id))
.where(eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, localDmChannelId))
.all();
for (const member of localMembers) {
const homeUserId = member.homeUserId || member.userId;
// Bug 1 fix: don't ring the caller on this instance
if (homeUserId === event.call.caller.homeUserId) continue;
// #18: skip offline members. Entry-vs-no-entry decision uses the same
// connection-count signal Path B has always used — keeps the two paths
// symmetric in what counts as "ringed."
if (connectionManager.getUserConnections(member.userId).size === 0) continue;
const token = event.call!.tokens![homeUserId];
connectionManager.sendToUser(member.userId, {
type: 'dm_call_incoming',
dmChannelId: localDmChannelId,
federatedCallId: event.federatedId,
callerId: callerStub.id,
callerName: callerStub.displayName ?? callerStub.username,
livekitUrl: event.call!.livekitUrl,
livekitToken: token,
callOrigin: event.call!.caller.homeInstance,
});
ringedUserIds.push(member.userId);
}
if (ringedUserIds.length === 0) {
// #18: no local member was reachable. Do not create a FederatedCallEntry
// (it would strand with no accept/reject path); surface to the caller
// via undeliverable so it can tear down its ring room instead of hanging.
undeliverable.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'no_recipient' });
return;
}
const entry: FederatedCallEntry = {
dmChannelId: localDmChannelId,
federatedId: event.federatedId,
callerId: callerStub.id,
callerHomeUserId: event.call.caller.homeUserId,
federatedCallHost: sourceInstance.startsWith('http') ? sourceInstance : `https://${sourceInstance}`,
livekitUrl: event.call.livekitUrl,
tokens: new Map(Object.entries(event.call.tokens)),
ringedUserIds,
state: 'ringing',
startedAt: Date.now(),
};
connectionManager.createFederatedCall(entry);
} else {
// ── Path B: DM doesn't exist locally — match by participant identity ──
if (!event.call.participants || !Array.isArray(event.call.participants)) {
// Old-format relay without participants — backwards-compatible rejection
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'channel_not_found' });
return;
}
const ourDomain = extractDomain(getOurOrigin());
for (const p of event.call.participants) {
const participantDomain = extractDomain(p.homeInstance);
// Skip the caller — strict match on BOTH homeUserId AND homeInstance
if (p.homeUserId === event.call.caller.homeUserId
&& participantDomain === extractDomain(event.call.caller.homeInstance)) {
continue;
}
// Strict identity resolution: homeUserId is only unique within its homeInstance
const localUser = db.select({ id: schema.users.id, homeUserId: schema.users.homeUserId })
.from(schema.users)
.where(
or(
// Replicated stub or federated account from the participant's home instance
and(
eq(schema.users.homeUserId, p.homeUserId),
sql`replace(replace(coalesce(${schema.users.homeInstance}, ''), 'https://', ''), 'http://', '') = ${participantDomain}`,
),
// Native user whose ID matches and participant's home matches our domain
and(
eq(schema.users.id, p.homeUserId),
isNull(schema.users.homeInstance),
sql`${participantDomain} = ${ourDomain}`,
),
),
)
.get();
if (!localUser) continue;
// Check if user has an active WS connection
const connections = connectionManager.getUserConnections(localUser.id);
if (connections.size === 0) continue;
const homeUserId = localUser.homeUserId || localUser.id;
const token = event.call!.tokens![homeUserId];
if (!token) continue;
connectionManager.sendToUser(localUser.id, {
type: 'dm_call_incoming',
dmChannelId: null,
federatedCallId: event.federatedId,
callerId: callerStub.id,
callerName: callerStub.displayName ?? callerStub.username,
livekitUrl: event.call!.livekitUrl,
livekitToken: token,
callOrigin: event.call!.caller.homeInstance,
});
ringedUserIds.push(localUser.id);
}
if (ringedUserIds.length === 0) {
// No recipient reachable — signal to caller via third ack bucket (#18).
// The remote processed the event cleanly; this is not a data error, but
// the caller must learn that nobody was rung so it can tear down its
// local ring room instead of hanging 60s waiting for an accept.
undeliverable.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'no_recipient' });
return;
}
const entry: FederatedCallEntry = {
dmChannelId: null,
federatedId: event.federatedId,
callerId: callerStub.id,
callerHomeUserId: event.call.caller.homeUserId,
federatedCallHost: sourceInstance.startsWith('http') ? sourceInstance : `https://${sourceInstance}`,
livekitUrl: event.call.livekitUrl,
tokens: new Map(Object.entries(event.call.tokens)),
ringedUserIds,
state: 'ringing',
startedAt: Date.now(),
};
connectionManager.createFederatedCall(entry);
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processDmCallAcceptEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.call?.acceptor || !event.federatedId) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_call_payload' });
return;
}
if (!verifyAttribution(event.call.acceptor.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
const channel = db.select({ id: schema.dmChannels.id })
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId))
.get();
const dmChannelId = channel?.id;
// Check if we're the HOST (have a VoiceRoom)
const room = dmChannelId ? connectionManager.getRoom(dmChannelId) : undefined;
if (room && room.roomType === 'dm') {
const meta = room.metadata as DmRoomMeta;
if (meta.state === 'ringing') {
connectionManager.activateDmRoom(dmChannelId!);
// Join caller to room
connectionManager.leaveCurrentRoom(meta.callerId);
connectionManager.joinRoom(dmChannelId!, meta.callerId);
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(dmChannelId!, {
type: 'voice_state_update',
channelId: dmChannelId!,
userId: meta.callerId,
action: 'join',
});
}
// Broadcast accepted locally — include federatedCallId so all clients can match
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(dmChannelId!, {
type: 'dm_call_accepted',
dmChannelId: dmChannelId!,
federatedCallId: event.federatedId,
} as ServerEvent);
// Fan out to ALL other remote instances (exclude the one that sent the accept)
const normalizedSource = sourceInstance.startsWith('http') ? sourceInstance : `https://${sourceInstance}`;
const hostCallerId = (room.metadata as DmRoomMeta).callerId;
const localDmId = dmChannelId!;
void fanOutCallEvent(localDmId, event.federatedId, 'dm_call_accept', {
call: { acceptor: event.call.acceptor },
}, normalizedSource, db).then(failures => {
emitHostFanoutUndeliverable(hostCallerId, localDmId, event.federatedId!, 'accept', failures);
}).catch(err =>
console.error('[federation] Fan-out dm_call_accept threw:', err),
);
} else {
// We're a REMOTE instance receiving fan-out — transition local state
const fedCall = connectionManager.getFederatedCall(event.federatedId);
if (fedCall) {
// Only broadcast if transitioning from ringing → active.
// If already active (e.g., we initiated the accept and the host is fanning out back),
// skip the duplicate broadcast to avoid state conflicts on the client.
const wasRinging = fedCall.state === 'ringing';
connectionManager.activateFederatedCall(event.federatedId);
if (wasRinging) {
connectionManager.sendToFederatedCallUsers(event.federatedId, {
type: 'dm_call_accepted',
dmChannelId: fedCall.dmChannelId,
federatedCallId: event.federatedId,
} as ServerEvent);
}
}
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processDmCallRejectEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.call?.rejector || !event.federatedId) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_call_payload' });
return;
}
if (!verifyAttribution(event.call.rejector.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
const channel = db.select({ id: schema.dmChannels.id })
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId))
.get();
const dmChannelId = channel?.id;
const room = dmChannelId ? connectionManager.getRoom(dmChannelId) : undefined;
if (room && room.roomType === 'dm') {
const meta = room.metadata as DmRoomMeta;
const hostCallerId = meta.callerId;
const localDmId = dmChannelId!;
connectionManager.clearVoiceWs(meta.callerId);
connectionManager.destroyRoom(localDmId);
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(localDmId, {
type: 'dm_call_rejected',
dmChannelId: localDmId,
});
const normalizedSource = sourceInstance.startsWith('http') ? sourceInstance : `https://${sourceInstance}`;
void fanOutCallEvent(localDmId, event.federatedId, 'dm_call_end', {
call: { endedBy: event.call.rejector },
}, normalizedSource, db).then(failures => {
emitHostFanoutUndeliverable(hostCallerId, localDmId, event.federatedId!, 'reject', failures);
}).catch(err =>
console.error('[federation] Fan-out dm_call_end (reject) threw:', err),
);
} else {
const fedCall = connectionManager.getFederatedCall(event.federatedId);
if (fedCall) {
connectionManager.sendToFederatedCallUsers(event.federatedId, {
type: 'dm_call_rejected',
dmChannelId: fedCall.dmChannelId,
federatedCallId: event.federatedId,
} as ServerEvent);
connectionManager.clearFederatedCall(event.federatedId);
}
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processDmCallEndEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.call?.endedBy || !event.federatedId) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_call_payload' });
return;
}
if (!verifyAttribution(event.call.endedBy.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
const channel = db.select({ id: schema.dmChannels.id })
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId))
.get();
const dmChannelId = channel?.id;
const room = dmChannelId ? connectionManager.getRoom(dmChannelId) : undefined;
if (room && room.roomType === 'dm') {
const meta = room.metadata as DmRoomMeta;
const hostCallerId = meta.callerId;
const localDmId = dmChannelId!;
connectionManager.clearVoiceWs(meta.callerId);
for (const pid of room.participants) {
connectionManager.clearVoiceUserStatus(pid);
connectionManager.clearVoiceWs(pid);
}
connectionManager.destroyRoom(localDmId);
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(localDmId, {
type: 'dm_call_ended',
dmChannelId: localDmId,
});
const normalizedSource = sourceInstance.startsWith('http') ? sourceInstance : `https://${sourceInstance}`;
void fanOutCallEvent(localDmId, event.federatedId, 'dm_call_end', {
call: { endedBy: event.call.endedBy },
}, normalizedSource, db).then(failures => {
emitHostFanoutUndeliverable(hostCallerId, localDmId, event.federatedId!, 'end', failures);
}).catch(err =>
console.error('[federation] Fan-out dm_call_end threw:', err),
);
} else {
const fedCall = connectionManager.getFederatedCall(event.federatedId);
if (fedCall) {
connectionManager.sendToFederatedCallUsers(event.federatedId, {
type: 'dm_call_ended',
dmChannelId: fedCall.dmChannelId,
federatedCallId: event.federatedId,
} as ServerEvent);
connectionManager.clearFederatedCall(event.federatedId);
}
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processDmTypingStartEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.typing || !event.federatedId) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_typing_payload' });
return;
}
// Look up local channel by federatedId
const channel = db.select()
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId),
isNull(schema.dmChannels.deletedAt),
))
.get();
if (!channel) {
// Channel not bootstrapped yet — discard silently
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Resolve the typing user (read-only — don't create stubs for ephemeral events)
const typingUser = resolveLocalUser(event.typing.homeUserId, db);
if (!typingUser) {
// User stub doesn't exist — discard silently
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Broadcast dm_typing to local DM members (excluding the typer)
const dmMembers = db.select()
.from(schema.dmMembers)
.where(eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, channel.id))
.all();
for (const member of dmMembers) {
if (member.userId !== typingUser.id) {
connectionManager.sendToUser(member.userId, {
type: 'dm_typing',
dmChannelId: channel.id,
userId: typingUser.id,
username: typingUser.username ?? event.typing.username,
});
}
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processDmTypingStopEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.typing || !event.federatedId) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_typing_payload' });
return;
}
// Look up local channel by federatedId
const channel = db.select()
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId),
isNull(schema.dmChannels.deletedAt),
))
.get();
if (!channel) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Resolve the typing user (read-only)
const typingUser = resolveLocalUser(event.typing.homeUserId, db);
if (!typingUser) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Broadcast dm_typing_stop to local DM members
const dmMembers = db.select()
.from(schema.dmMembers)
.where(eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, channel.id))
.all();
for (const member of dmMembers) {
if (member.userId !== typingUser.id) {
connectionManager.sendToUser(member.userId, {
type: 'dm_typing_stop',
dmChannelId: channel.id,
userId: typingUser.id,
});
}
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
/**
* Fan out a call event to all remote instances with DM members,
* optionally excluding the instance that triggered the event.
*/
export async function fanOutCallEvent(
dmChannelId: string,
federatedId: string,
eventType: 'dm_call_accept' | 'dm_call_reject' | 'dm_call_end',
extraFields: Partial<FederationRelayEvent>,
excludeOrigin: string | undefined,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
): Promise<CallFanoutFailure[]> {
const members = db.select({ homeInstance: schema.users.homeInstance })
.from(schema.dmMembers)
.innerJoin(schema.users, eq(schema.dmMembers.userId, schema.users.id))
.where(eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, dmChannelId))
.all();
const ourOrigin = getOurOrigin();
const targets = new Set<string>();
for (const m of members) {
if (m.homeInstance) {
const normalized = m.homeInstance.startsWith('http') ? m.homeInstance : `https://${m.homeInstance}`;
if (normalized !== ourOrigin && normalized !== excludeOrigin) {
targets.add(normalized);
}
}
}
if (targets.size === 0) return [];
const relayEvent: FederationRelayEvent = {
eventType,
messageId: generateSnowflake(),
encryptionVersion: 0,
timestamp: Date.now(),
federatedId,
...extraFields,
} as FederationRelayEvent;
const labelByOrigin = new Map<string, string | null>();
for (const r of db.select({ origin: schema.federationPeers.origin, instanceName: schema.federationPeers.instanceName })
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.all()) {
labelByOrigin.set(r.origin, r.instanceName ?? null);
}
const results = await Promise.all(
Array.from(targets).map(async origin => ({ origin, result: await sendCallRelay(origin, [relayEvent]) })),
);
const failures: CallFanoutFailure[] = [];
for (const { origin, result } of results) {
if (!result.ok) {
console.error(`[federation] Fan-out ${eventType} to ${origin} failed (${result.reason}): ${result.error}`);
failures.push({
origin,
peerLabel: labelByOrigin.get(origin) ?? undefined,
reason: mapCallReasonToEventReason(result.reason),
});
}
}
return failures;
}
/** Emit a non-terminal dm_call_undeliverable for a host-side fan-out failure. */
export function emitHostFanoutUndeliverable(
userId: string,
dmChannelId: string,
federatedId: string,
phase: 'accept' | 'reject' | 'end',
fanoutFailures: CallFanoutFailure[],
): void {
if (fanoutFailures.length === 0) return;
const failures: DmCallUndeliverableFailure[] = fanoutFailures.map(f => ({
reason: f.reason,
peerOrigin: f.origin,
peerLabel: f.peerLabel,
}));
connectionManager.sendToUser(userId, {
type: 'dm_call_undeliverable',
dmChannelId,
federatedCallId: federatedId,
terminal: false,
phase,
failures,
});
}
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
import { getDb } from '../../../db/index.js';
import { and } from 'drizzle-orm';
import type { FederationRelayEvent } from '@backspace/shared';
import { processDmCallAcceptEvent, processDmCallEndEvent, processDmCallRejectEvent, processDmCallStartEvent, processDmTypingStartEvent, processDmTypingStopEvent } from './calls.js';
import { processCreateEvent, processDeleteEvent, processReactionAddEvent, processReactionRemoveEvent, processUpdateEvent } from './dmMessages.js';
import { processDmCloseEvent, processDmReopenEvent, processFileRejectedEvent, processPresenceUpdateEvent, processReadStateUpdateEvent } from './dmState.js';
import { processFriendAddEvent, processFriendRemoveEvent, processFriendRequestCancelEvent, processFriendRequestCreateEvent, processFriendRequestUpdateEvent } from './friends.js';
import { processGroupMetadataUpdateEvent, processMemberAddEvent, processMemberRemoveEvent, processOwnershipTransferEvent } from './membership.js';
import { processProfileUpdateEvent } from '../profile.js';
/**
* Process an array of federation relay events. Used by the HTTP relay endpoint
* and directly by the initial-sync worker (which skips the HTTP round-trip).
*/
export async function processRelayEvents(
events: FederationRelayEvent[],
sourceInstance: string,
peerOrigin: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
): Promise<{
accepted: string[];
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>;
undeliverable: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>;
}> {
const accepted: string[] = [];
const rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }> = [];
const undeliverable: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }> = [];
for (const event of events) {
try {
switch (event.eventType) {
case 'create':
await processCreateEvent(event, sourceInstance, peerOrigin, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'update':
processUpdateEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'delete':
processDeleteEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'reaction_add':
processReactionAddEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'reaction_remove':
processReactionRemoveEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'member_add':
await processMemberAddEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'member_remove':
processMemberRemoveEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'ownership_transfer':
processOwnershipTransferEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'friend_request_create':
await processFriendRequestCreateEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'friend_request_update':
processFriendRequestUpdateEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'friend_request_cancel':
processFriendRequestCancelEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'friend_add':
await processFriendAddEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'friend_remove':
processFriendRemoveEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'file_rejected':
processFileRejectedEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'dm_call_start':
processDmCallStartEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected, undeliverable);
break;
case 'dm_call_accept':
processDmCallAcceptEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'dm_call_reject':
processDmCallRejectEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'dm_call_end':
processDmCallEndEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'dm_typing_start':
processDmTypingStartEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'dm_typing_stop':
processDmTypingStopEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'profile_update':
await processProfileUpdateEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'group_metadata_update':
await processGroupMetadataUpdateEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'presence_update':
processPresenceUpdateEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'read_state_update':
processReadStateUpdateEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'dm_close':
processDmCloseEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
case 'dm_reopen':
processDmReopenEvent(event, sourceInstance, db, accepted, rejected);
break;
default:
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'unknown_event_type' });
break;
}
} catch (err) {
const errMsg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'unknown_error';
console.error(`[federation-relay] Error processing event ${event.messageId}:`, errMsg);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'processing_error' });
}
}
return { accepted, rejected, undeliverable };
}
// ─── Helpers ────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -0,0 +1,573 @@
import path from 'node:path';
import { getDb, schema } from '../../../db/index.js';
import { computeFederatedId } from '../../../utils/federationOutbox.js';
import { deleteAttachmentFiles } from '../../../utils/fileCleanup.js';
import { sanitizeUser } from '../../../utils/sanitize.js';
import { generateSnowflake } from '../../../utils/snowflake.js';
import { connectionManager } from '../../../ws/handler.js';
import { getDmMessageWithUser } from '../../dm.js';
import { and, eq, isNull, or } from 'drizzle-orm';
import type { FederationRelayEvent } from '@backspace/shared';
import { buildDmChannelPayload, buildDmMessagePayload, findOrCreateDmChannel, isUrlFromPeer, resolveLocalDmMessage } from '../dmChannels.js';
import { extractDomain, resolveLocalUser, resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser, verifyAttribution } from '../identity.js';
import { hydrateReplicatedUserProfile } from '../profile.js';
export async function processCreateEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
peerOrigin: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): Promise<void> {
if (!event.message) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_message_payload' });
return;
}
if (!event.participants || event.participants.length < 2) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_participants' });
return;
}
// Attribution: message author must belong to source instance (FED-010)
if (!verifyAttribution(event.message.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in create: message homeInstance=${extractDomain(event.message.homeInstance)} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
// Dedup: check for existing message with same source
const existingMsg = db
.select()
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceInstance, sourceInstance),
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceMessageId, event.messageId),
),
)
.get();
if (existingMsg) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'duplicate' });
return;
}
// Resolve ALL participants to local users, auto-creating replicated stubs
// for remote users that don't have a local record yet. This ensures 1-on-1
// federated DMs work even when the remote user hasn't connected or friended.
const resolvedParticipants: Array<{
localUser: typeof schema.users.$inferSelect;
homeUserId: string;
}> = [];
for (const p of event.participants) {
let localUser = resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser(p.homeUserId, p.homeInstance, db, { username: p.profile?.username, status: p.profile?.status, deleted: p.profile?.deleted });
// Skip deleted identities — don't include tombstoned users in the DM
if (!localUser) continue;
// Hydrate with profile data from the relay event (displayName, avatar, etc.)
if (p.profile) {
localUser = await hydrateReplicatedUserProfile(localUser, p.profile, db);
}
resolvedParticipants.push({ localUser, homeUserId: p.homeUserId });
}
if (resolvedParticipants.length < 2) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'participant_not_found' });
return;
}
// Find the author among the resolved participants
const authorEntry = resolvedParticipants.find(
p => p.homeUserId === event.message!.homeUserId,
);
if (!authorEntry) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'author_not_found' });
return;
}
const authorUser = authorEntry.localUser;
// Resolve local DM channel: group DMs carry a federatedId and the channel
// must already exist (bootstrapped by a prior member_add event); 1-on-1 DMs
// are computed from the pair of home user IDs and created on demand.
let localDmChannelId: string;
if (event.federatedId) {
// Group DM: look up by federated_id (channel must already exist from member_add bootstrap)
const channel = db
.select()
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId),
isNull(schema.dmChannels.deletedAt),
))
.get();
if (!channel) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'channel_not_found' });
return;
}
localDmChannelId = channel.id;
} else {
// 1-on-1 DM: compute federated_id from pair and find/create channel
const federatedId = computeFederatedId(
resolvedParticipants[0]!.homeUserId,
resolvedParticipants[1]!.homeUserId,
);
localDmChannelId = findOrCreateDmChannel(
federatedId,
[resolvedParticipants[0]!.localUser.id, resolvedParticipants[1]!.localUser.id],
db,
);
}
// Insert the message
const localMessageId = generateSnowflake();
db.insert(schema.dmMessages)
.values({
id: localMessageId,
dmChannelId: localDmChannelId,
userId: authorUser.id,
content: event.message.content,
type: event.message.type === 'system' ? 'system' : 'user',
replyToId: null,
createdAt: event.message.createdAt,
editedAt: null,
sourceInstance,
sourceMessageId: event.messageId,
encryptionVersion: 0,
})
.run();
// Create attachment rows and queue file downloads (SSRF-validated).
// Attachment rows are created immediately with filename = sourceUrl so the
// initial WebSocket broadcast includes working remote URLs. The background
// file worker will UPDATE the filename to the local path after download.
if (event.message.attachments && event.message.attachments.length > 0) {
const now = Date.now();
for (const attachment of event.message.attachments) {
if (!isUrlFromPeer(attachment.sourceUrl, peerOrigin)) {
console.warn(
`[federation-relay] Rejecting attachment URL ${attachment.sourceUrl} — hostname does not match peer ${peerOrigin}`,
);
continue;
}
// Create the attachment row with sourceUrl as the interim filename.
// AttachmentRenderer already handles filenames starting with 'http' —
// it uses them as direct URLs. When the file worker downloads the file,
// it updates this row's filename to the local path.
const attachmentId = generateSnowflake();
db.insert(schema.attachments)
.values({
id: attachmentId,
dmMessageId: localMessageId,
uploaderId: null,
filename: attachment.sourceUrl,
originalName: attachment.originalName,
mimetype: attachment.mimetype,
size: attachment.size,
width: attachment.width ?? null,
height: attachment.height ?? null,
duration: attachment.duration ?? null,
playable: attachment.playable ?? null,
thumbnailFilename: null, // Don't copy source thumbnail — it doesn't exist locally
sourceUrl: attachment.sourceUrl,
createdAt: now,
})
.run();
// Queue the background file download
db.insert(schema.federationFileQueue)
.values({
id: generateSnowflake(),
peerOrigin,
dmMessageId: localMessageId,
sourceUrl: attachment.sourceUrl,
originalName: attachment.originalName,
mimetype: attachment.mimetype,
size: attachment.size,
status: 'pending',
nextRetryAt: now,
expiresAt: now + 30 * 86_400_000,
createdAt: now,
})
.run();
}
}
// Broadcast to local WebSocket clients, but skip members whose home instance
// is the source instance — they already have the original message via their
// home instance's WebSocket connection.
const fullMessage = getDmMessageWithUser(localMessageId);
if (fullMessage) {
const dmMembers = db.select()
.from(schema.dmMembers)
.where(eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, localDmChannelId))
.all();
for (const member of dmMembers) {
// If the member closed this DM, reopen it and send dm_channel_created
// so the sidebar resurfaces before the message arrives.
if (member.closed === 1) {
db.update(schema.dmMembers)
.set({ closed: 0 })
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, localDmChannelId),
eq(schema.dmMembers.userId, member.userId),
))
.run();
const payload = buildDmChannelPayload(localDmChannelId, db, fullMessage);
if (payload) {
connectionManager.sendToUser(member.userId, {
type: 'dm_channel_created',
dmChannel: payload,
});
}
}
connectionManager.sendToUser(member.userId, {
type: 'dm_message_created',
message: fullMessage,
});
}
}
// Belt-and-suspenders: clear typing indicator for the author on inbound relay.
// This catches the case where the explicit dm_typing_stop relay was lost.
const relayDmMembers = db.select()
.from(schema.dmMembers)
.where(eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, localDmChannelId))
.all();
for (const member of relayDmMembers) {
if (member.userId !== authorUser.id) {
connectionManager.sendToUser(member.userId, {
type: 'dm_typing_stop',
dmChannelId: localDmChannelId,
userId: authorUser.id,
});
}
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processUpdateEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
// Attribution: if homeInstance present, verify it matches source (FED-010)
if (event.message?.homeInstance && !verifyAttribution(event.message.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in update: message homeInstance=${extractDomain(event.message.homeInstance)} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
const localMsg = db
.select()
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceInstance, sourceInstance),
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceMessageId, event.messageId),
),
)
.get();
if (!localMsg) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'unknown_message' });
return;
}
const content = event.message?.content ?? null;
const editedAt = event.message?.editedAt ?? Date.now();
db.update(schema.dmMessages)
.set({ content, editedAt })
.where(eq(schema.dmMessages.id, localMsg.id))
.run();
// Broadcast update to local clients
const authorUser = db
.select()
.from(schema.users)
.where(eq(schema.users.id, localMsg.userId))
.get();
if (authorUser) {
const updatedPayload = buildDmMessagePayload(
{
id: localMsg.id,
dmChannelId: localMsg.dmChannelId,
userId: localMsg.userId,
content,
replyToId: localMsg.replyToId,
editedAt,
createdAt: localMsg.createdAt,
},
authorUser,
);
// Re-fetch reactions and attachments for the complete payload
const reactions = db
.select()
.from(schema.dmReactions)
.where(eq(schema.dmReactions.dmMessageId, localMsg.id))
.all();
const attachments = db
.select()
.from(schema.attachments)
.where(eq(schema.attachments.dmMessageId, localMsg.id))
.all();
updatedPayload.reactions = reactions.map(r => ({
id: r.id,
messageId: r.dmMessageId,
userId: r.userId,
emoji: r.emoji,
createdAt: r.createdAt,
}));
updatedPayload.attachments = attachments.map(a => ({
id: a.id,
messageId: a.dmMessageId ?? a.messageId ?? '',
filename: a.filename,
originalName: a.originalName,
mimetype: a.mimetype,
size: a.size,
thumbnailFilename: a.thumbnailFilename,
width: a.width,
height: a.height,
duration: a.duration,
playable: a.playable ?? null,
createdAt: a.createdAt,
}));
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(localMsg.dmChannelId, {
type: 'dm_message_updated',
message: updatedPayload,
});
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processDeleteEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
// FED-010: delete is safe by design — lookup scoped to sourceInstance+sourceMessageId
const localMsg = db
.select()
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceInstance, sourceInstance),
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceMessageId, event.messageId),
),
)
.get();
if (!localMsg) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'unknown_message' });
return;
}
// Collect attachment filenames before deletion for disk cleanup
const attachmentRows = db
.select({ filename: schema.attachments.filename })
.from(schema.attachments)
.where(eq(schema.attachments.dmMessageId, localMsg.id))
.all();
// Delete attachments, reactions, and message atomically
db.transaction((tx) => {
tx.delete(schema.attachments)
.where(eq(schema.attachments.dmMessageId, localMsg.id))
.run();
tx.delete(schema.dmReactions)
.where(eq(schema.dmReactions.dmMessageId, localMsg.id))
.run();
tx.delete(schema.dmMessages)
.where(eq(schema.dmMessages.id, localMsg.id))
.run();
});
// Clean up files from disk
deleteAttachmentFiles(attachmentRows);
// Broadcast deletion to local clients
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(localMsg.dmChannelId, {
type: 'dm_message_deleted',
messageId: localMsg.id,
dmChannelId: localMsg.dmChannelId,
});
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processReactionAddEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.reaction) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_reaction_payload' });
return;
}
// Attribution: reacting user must belong to source instance (FED-010)
if (!event.reaction.homeInstance || !verifyAttribution(event.reaction.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in reaction_add: reaction homeInstance=${event.reaction.homeInstance ? extractDomain(event.reaction.homeInstance) : 'missing'} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
const canonicalMessageId = event.reaction.messageId ?? event.messageId;
const localMsg = resolveLocalDmMessage(
canonicalMessageId,
event.reaction.messageHomeInstance,
sourceInstance,
db,
);
if (!localMsg) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'unknown_message' });
return;
}
// Resolve the reacting user
const reactingUser = resolveLocalUser(event.reaction.homeUserId, db);
if (!reactingUser) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'user_not_found' });
return;
}
// Dedup: check if this user already reacted with this emoji
const existingReaction = db
.select()
.from(schema.dmReactions)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.dmReactions.dmMessageId, localMsg.id),
eq(schema.dmReactions.userId, reactingUser.id),
eq(schema.dmReactions.emoji, event.reaction.emoji),
),
)
.get();
if (existingReaction) {
// Already exists — treat as accepted (idempotent)
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
const reactionId = generateSnowflake();
const now = event.reaction.createdAt || Date.now();
db.insert(schema.dmReactions)
.values({
id: reactionId,
dmMessageId: localMsg.id,
userId: reactingUser.id,
emoji: event.reaction.emoji,
createdAt: now,
})
.run();
// Broadcast to local clients
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(localMsg.dmChannelId, {
type: 'reaction_added',
messageId: localMsg.id,
reaction: {
id: reactionId,
messageId: localMsg.id,
userId: reactingUser.id,
emoji: event.reaction.emoji,
createdAt: now,
user: sanitizeUser(reactingUser),
},
});
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processReactionRemoveEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.reaction) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_reaction_payload' });
return;
}
// Attribution: reacting user must belong to source instance (FED-010)
if (!event.reaction.homeInstance || !verifyAttribution(event.reaction.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in reaction_remove: reaction homeInstance=${event.reaction.homeInstance ? extractDomain(event.reaction.homeInstance) : 'missing'} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
const canonicalMessageId = event.reaction.messageId ?? event.messageId;
const localMsg = resolveLocalDmMessage(
canonicalMessageId,
event.reaction.messageHomeInstance,
sourceInstance,
db,
);
if (!localMsg) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'unknown_message' });
return;
}
// Resolve the reacting user
const reactingUser = resolveLocalUser(event.reaction.homeUserId, db);
if (!reactingUser) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'user_not_found' });
return;
}
const result = db
.delete(schema.dmReactions)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.dmReactions.dmMessageId, localMsg.id),
eq(schema.dmReactions.userId, reactingUser.id),
eq(schema.dmReactions.emoji, event.reaction.emoji),
),
)
.run();
if (result.changes > 0) {
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(localMsg.dmChannelId, {
type: 'reaction_removed',
messageId: localMsg.id,
userId: reactingUser.id,
emoji: event.reaction.emoji,
});
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
// ─── Membership mutation processors ──────────────────────────────────────────
@@ -0,0 +1,464 @@
import { getDb, schema } from '../../../db/index.js';
import { getOurOrigin } from '../../../utils/federationAuth.js';
import { collectProfileBroadcastTargetIds } from '../../../utils/userDeletion.js';
import { connectionManager } from '../../../ws/handler.js';
import { getDmMessageWithUser } from '../../dm.js';
import { and, eq, isNull } from 'drizzle-orm';
import type { FederationRelayEvent } from '@backspace/shared';
import { buildDmChannelPayload } from '../dmChannels.js';
import { extractDomain, resolveLocalUser } from '../identity.js';
export function processFileRejectedEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
// FED-010: file_rejected is a system event from the rejecting peer — no user attribution to verify
if (!event.attachmentId || !event.rejectionReason) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_file_rejected_payload' });
return;
}
// event.messageId is the original local message ID on THIS (sender) instance
const localMsg = db.select()
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(eq(schema.dmMessages.id, event.messageId))
.get();
if (!localMsg) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'message_not_found' });
return;
}
// Find the attachment — try by sourceUrl matching, then by checking all attachments on the message
const messageAttachments = db.select()
.from(schema.attachments)
.where(eq(schema.attachments.dmMessageId, localMsg.id))
.all();
// Match by filename from the sourceUrl — the remote sends the filename portion
// (e.g., "12345.png") which matches our local attachment's filename.
let matchedAttachment = event.sourceFilename
? messageAttachments.find(a => a.filename === event.sourceFilename)
: undefined;
// Fallback: if only one attachment, use it directly
if (!matchedAttachment && messageAttachments.length === 1) {
matchedAttachment = messageAttachments[0];
}
if (!matchedAttachment) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attachment_not_found' });
return;
}
// Resolve affected user IDs to local usernames
const affectedUsers: Array<{ userId: string; username: string; limit: number }> = [];
for (const remoteUserId of (event.affectedUserIds ?? [])) {
// These are homeUserIds — find the replicated user stub
const user = db.select()
.from(schema.users)
.where(eq(schema.users.homeUserId, remoteUserId))
.get();
if (user) {
affectedUsers.push({
userId: user.id,
username: user.displayName || user.username,
limit: event.rejectionLimit ?? 0,
});
}
}
if (affectedUsers.length === 0) {
// Fallback: if we can't resolve usernames, still accept the event
// but skip the UI update since we can't show meaningful info
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Merge into federation_meta — accumulate rejections from multiple peers
let existingMeta: Array<{ userId: string; username: string; limit: number }> = [];
if (matchedAttachment.federationMeta) {
try {
const parsed = JSON.parse(matchedAttachment.federationMeta);
existingMeta = Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed : [];
} catch { /* ignore parse errors */ }
}
// Add new affected users, avoiding duplicates by userId
const existingUserIds = new Set(existingMeta.map(u => u.userId));
for (const user of affectedUsers) {
if (!existingUserIds.has(user.userId)) {
existingMeta.push(user);
}
}
// Update attachment
db.update(schema.attachments)
.set({
federationStatus: 'remote_partial',
federationMeta: JSON.stringify(existingMeta),
})
.where(eq(schema.attachments.id, matchedAttachment.id))
.run();
// Broadcast dm_message_updated to all DM members (persistent indicator)
const updatedMsg = getDmMessageWithUser(localMsg.id);
if (updatedMsg) {
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(updatedMsg.dmChannelId, {
type: 'dm_message_updated',
message: updatedMsg,
});
// Send targeted toast event to the message author only
connectionManager.sendToUser(localMsg.userId, {
type: 'federation_file_rejected',
messageId: localMsg.id,
dmChannelId: localMsg.dmChannelId,
attachmentId: matchedAttachment.id,
affectedUsers,
});
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
// ─── DM Call Relay Processors ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Inbound presence_update relay handler.
*
* Authority: home instance is exclusive. payload.homeInstance domain MUST equal
* the source peer's domain (attribution check, mirrors profile_update).
*
* Effect on success:
* 1. Update the local stub's status column.
* 2. Broadcast a WS presence_update to local users via collectProfileBroadcastTargetIds
* (friends + DM members + space co-members), so the green dot updates without a
* page refresh on every connected client that knows this user.
*
* Edge cases:
* - No local replica → silently accept (peer broadcasts presence to all peers,
* not all peers have a stub).
* - homeInstance domain mismatch on the existing stub → ignore (collision against
* a stub of a different identity).
* - Invalid status string → reject; sender is buggy, surface for diagnosis.
*/
export function processPresenceUpdateEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
const payload = event.presenceUpdate;
if (!payload) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_presence_update_payload' });
return;
}
const payloadDomain = extractDomain(payload.homeInstance);
const sourceDomain = extractDomain(sourceInstance);
if (payloadDomain !== sourceDomain) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in presence_update: homeInstance=${payloadDomain} source=${sourceDomain}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
if (!payload.status || !['online', 'idle', 'dnd', 'offline'].includes(payload.status)) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'invalid_status' });
return;
}
const localUser = db
.select()
.from(schema.users)
.where(and(
eq(schema.users.homeUserId, payload.homeUserId),
eq(schema.users.isDeleted, 0),
))
.get();
if (!localUser) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
if (localUser.homeInstance && extractDomain(localUser.homeInstance) !== payloadDomain) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Detached accounts are sovereign: the domain now belongs to a different
// incarnation, which must never flip the established account's presence by
// replaying its old homeUserId. Ack (not reject) — the sender considers this
// identity theirs to update; from our side the update simply no-ops.
if (localUser.federationHomeOrphaned === 1) {
console.log(`[federation] Skipping presence_update for detached account ${localUser.id} (home-orphaned)`);
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
db.update(schema.users)
.set({ status: payload.status })
.where(eq(schema.users.id, localUser.id))
.run();
// Broadcast presence_update WS event to local users who care.
const targetUserIds = collectProfileBroadcastTargetIds(localUser.id);
const wsPayload = {
type: 'presence_update' as const,
userId: localUser.id,
status: payload.status,
...(payload.activities && payload.activities.length > 0 ? { activities: payload.activities } : {}),
};
for (const uid of targetUserIds) {
connectionManager.sendToUser(uid, wsPayload);
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
// ─── Dead-Incarnation Startup Sweep ─────────────────────────────────────────
export function processReadStateUpdateEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.federatedId || !event.readState) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_read_state_payload' });
return;
}
// Find the local DM channel by federatedId
const channel = db.select({ id: schema.dmChannels.id })
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId),
isNull(schema.dmChannels.deletedAt),
))
.get();
if (!channel) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'channel_not_found' });
return;
}
// Resolve the user locally
const localUser = resolveLocalUser(event.readState.user.homeUserId, db);
if (!localUser) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'user_not_found' });
return;
}
// Translate messageRef to a local message ID
const { sourceInstance: refSource, sourceMessageId: refId } = event.readState.messageRef;
let localMessageId: string;
const ourOrigin = getOurOrigin();
if (extractDomain(refSource) === extractDomain(ourOrigin)) {
// The message originated on this instance — refId IS our local ID
localMessageId = refId;
} else {
// Look up the relayed copy by source coordinates
const localMsg = db.select({ id: schema.dmMessages.id })
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceInstance, refSource),
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceMessageId, refId),
))
.get();
if (!localMsg) {
// Message relay hasn't arrived yet — silently discard
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
localMessageId = localMsg.id;
}
// Write/update read state using timestamp-only LWW
const existing = db.select()
.from(schema.readStates)
.where(and(
eq(schema.readStates.userId, localUser.id),
eq(schema.readStates.channelId, channel.id),
))
.get();
if (existing) {
if (event.timestamp > existing.updatedAt) {
db.update(schema.readStates)
.set({ lastReadMessageId: localMessageId, updatedAt: event.timestamp })
.where(and(
eq(schema.readStates.userId, localUser.id),
eq(schema.readStates.channelId, channel.id),
))
.run();
}
} else {
db.insert(schema.readStates).values({
userId: localUser.id,
channelId: channel.id,
lastReadMessageId: localMessageId,
updatedAt: event.timestamp,
}).run();
}
// Echo channel_ack to the user's local WebSocket connections (multi-tab sync)
connectionManager.sendToUser(localUser.id, {
type: 'channel_ack',
channelId: channel.id,
messageId: localMessageId,
});
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processDmCloseEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.federatedId || !event.dmCloseReopen) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_dm_close_payload' });
return;
}
// Find the local DM channel by federatedId
const channel = db.select({ id: schema.dmChannels.id })
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId),
isNull(schema.dmChannels.deletedAt),
))
.get();
if (!channel) {
// Channel doesn't exist locally — silently accept
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Resolve the user locally
const localUser = resolveLocalUser(event.dmCloseReopen.homeUserId, db);
if (!localUser) {
// User not found locally — silently accept
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Verify user is a DM member
const membership = db.select()
.from(schema.dmMembers)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, channel.id),
eq(schema.dmMembers.userId, localUser.id),
))
.get();
if (!membership) {
// Not a member — silently accept
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Set closed = 1
db.update(schema.dmMembers)
.set({ closed: 1 })
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, channel.id),
eq(schema.dmMembers.userId, localUser.id),
))
.run();
// Broadcast dm_channel_closed to local connections of this user
connectionManager.sendToUser(localUser.id, {
type: 'dm_channel_closed',
dmChannelId: channel.id,
});
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processDmReopenEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.federatedId || !event.dmCloseReopen) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_dm_reopen_payload' });
return;
}
// Find the local DM channel by federatedId
const channel = db.select({ id: schema.dmChannels.id })
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId),
isNull(schema.dmChannels.deletedAt),
))
.get();
if (!channel) {
// Channel doesn't exist locally — silently accept
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Resolve the user locally
const localUser = resolveLocalUser(event.dmCloseReopen.homeUserId, db);
if (!localUser) {
// User not found locally — silently accept
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Verify user is a DM member
const membership = db.select()
.from(schema.dmMembers)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, channel.id),
eq(schema.dmMembers.userId, localUser.id),
))
.get();
if (!membership) {
// Not a member — silently accept
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Set closed = 0
db.update(schema.dmMembers)
.set({ closed: 0 })
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, channel.id),
eq(schema.dmMembers.userId, localUser.id),
))
.run();
// Build full DM channel payload and broadcast dm_channel_created
const payload = buildDmChannelPayload(channel.id, db);
if (payload) {
connectionManager.sendToUser(localUser.id, {
type: 'dm_channel_created',
dmChannel: payload,
});
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,433 @@
import { getDb, schema } from '../../../db/index.js';
import { getOurOrigin, normalizeOriginForCompare } from '../../../utils/federationAuth.js';
import { sanitizeUser } from '../../../utils/sanitize.js';
import { generateSnowflake } from '../../../utils/snowflake.js';
import { connectionManager } from '../../../ws/handler.js';
import { and, eq, or } from 'drizzle-orm';
import type { FederationRelayEvent } from '@backspace/shared';
import { extractDomain, resolveLocalUser, resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser, verifyAttribution } from '../identity.js';
import { hydrateReplicatedUserProfile } from '../profile.js';
export async function processFriendRequestCreateEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): Promise<void> {
if (!event.friendship) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_friendship_payload' });
return;
}
const { from, to } = event.friendship;
// Attribution: sender must belong to source instance (FED-010)
if (!verifyAttribution(from.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in friend_request_create: from homeInstance=${extractDomain(from.homeInstance)} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
// Self-target guard (defense-in-depth): from-identity must not equal to-identity.
// Sender's local cannot_friend_self check should catch this, but the receiver must not trust it.
if (
from.homeUserId === to.homeUserId &&
normalizeOriginForCompare(from.homeInstance) === normalizeOriginForCompare(to.homeInstance)
) {
console.warn(`[federation] Self-target friend_request_create rejected: homeUserId=${from.homeUserId} homeInstance=${extractDomain(from.homeInstance)} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'self_target_invalid' });
return;
}
// Resolve the sender (create stub if needed — they're on a remote instance)
const fromUserResolved = resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser(from.homeUserId, from.homeInstance, db, { username: event.friendship.fromProfile?.username, status: event.friendship.fromProfile?.status, deleted: event.friendship.fromProfile?.deleted });
if (!fromUserResolved) {
// Sender's identity has been deleted — silently accept to drop the event
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
let fromUser = await hydrateReplicatedUserProfile(fromUserResolved, event.friendship.fromProfile, db);
// Resolve the recipient — must be a local user on this instance
const toUser = resolveLocalUser(to.homeUserId, db);
if (!toUser) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'recipient_not_found' });
return;
}
// Idempotency: if already friends, accept as no-op
const existingFriend = db
.select()
.from(schema.friends)
.where(
or(
and(eq(schema.friends.userId, fromUser.id), eq(schema.friends.friendId, toUser.id)),
and(eq(schema.friends.userId, toUser.id), eq(schema.friends.friendId, fromUser.id)),
),
)
.get();
if (existingFriend) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Idempotency: a pending request in EITHER direction makes this event a no-op.
// Forward (from→to): re-delivery of an event we've already processed.
// Reverse (to→from): the local user has already sent a request TO this remote sender.
// Race window: both sides click "add friend" near-simultaneously. Each sender's both-direction
// check passes locally (no rows yet anywhere). When the events cross, each receiver must
// treat the reverse-direction collision as idempotent — otherwise both instances end up
// with two opposite-direction pending rows for the same logical pair. Mirror the
// sender-side both-direction check (`incoming_request_exists` in social.ts).
const existingRequest = db
.select()
.from(schema.friendRequests)
.where(
and(
or(
and(eq(schema.friendRequests.fromId, fromUser.id), eq(schema.friendRequests.toId, toUser.id)),
and(eq(schema.friendRequests.fromId, toUser.id), eq(schema.friendRequests.toId, fromUser.id)),
),
eq(schema.friendRequests.status, 'pending'),
),
)
.get();
if (existingRequest) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Create the friend request
const id = generateSnowflake();
const now = event.friendship.createdAt || Date.now();
db.insert(schema.friendRequests)
.values({
id,
fromId: fromUser.id,
toId: toUser.id,
status: 'pending',
createdAt: now,
})
.run();
// Broadcast to the recipient
connectionManager.sendToUser(toUser.id, {
type: 'friend_request_received',
request: {
id,
fromId: fromUser.id,
toId: toUser.id,
status: 'pending' as const,
createdAt: now,
user: sanitizeUser(fromUser),
},
});
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processFriendRequestUpdateEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.friendship || !event.friendship.status) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_friendship_payload' });
return;
}
const { from, to, status } = event.friendship;
// Attribution: recipient (acceptor/decliner) must belong to source instance (FED-010)
if (!verifyAttribution(to.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in friend_request_update: to homeInstance=${extractDomain(to.homeInstance)} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
// Resolve the sender — must be a local user (the one who sent the original request)
const fromUser = resolveLocalUser(from.homeUserId, db);
if (!fromUser) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'sender_not_found' });
return;
}
// Resolve the recipient (create stub if needed — they're on the remote instance)
const toUser = resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser(to.homeUserId, to.homeInstance, db, { username: event.friendship.toProfile?.username, status: event.friendship.toProfile?.status, deleted: event.friendship.toProfile?.deleted });
if (!toUser) {
// Recipient's identity has been deleted — accept idempotently to drop the event
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Find the pending request
const pendingRequest = db
.select()
.from(schema.friendRequests)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.friendRequests.fromId, fromUser.id),
eq(schema.friendRequests.toId, toUser.id),
eq(schema.friendRequests.status, 'pending'),
),
)
.get();
if (!pendingRequest) {
// Accept idempotently — friend_add may have arrived first
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Update request status
db.update(schema.friendRequests)
.set({ status: status as string })
.where(eq(schema.friendRequests.id, pendingRequest.id))
.run();
if (status === 'accepted') {
const now = event.friendship.createdAt || Date.now();
connectionManager.sendToUser(fromUser.id, {
type: 'friend_request_accepted',
friend: {
...sanitizeUser(toUser),
addedAt: now,
},
requestId: pendingRequest.id,
});
} else if (status === 'declined') {
connectionManager.sendToUser(fromUser.id, {
type: 'friend_request_declined',
requestId: pendingRequest.id,
userId: toUser.id,
});
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processFriendRequestCancelEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.friendship) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_friendship_payload' });
return;
}
const { from, to } = event.friendship;
// Attribution: sender must belong to source instance (FED-010)
if (!verifyAttribution(from.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in friend_request_cancel: from homeInstance=${extractDomain(from.homeInstance)} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
// Resolve both users — must both exist locally for there to be a pending request
const fromUser = resolveLocalUser(from.homeUserId, db);
const toUser = resolveLocalUser(to.homeUserId, db);
if (!fromUser || !toUser) {
// Accept idempotently — if either user doesn't exist, there's nothing to cancel
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Find the pending request
const pendingRequest = db
.select()
.from(schema.friendRequests)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.friendRequests.fromId, fromUser.id),
eq(schema.friendRequests.toId, toUser.id),
eq(schema.friendRequests.status, 'pending'),
),
)
.get();
if (!pendingRequest) {
// Accept idempotently — already cancelled or never existed
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Delete the request
db.delete(schema.friendRequests)
.where(eq(schema.friendRequests.id, pendingRequest.id))
.run();
// Broadcast to the recipient
connectionManager.sendToUser(toUser.id, {
type: 'friend_request_cancelled',
requestId: pendingRequest.id,
userId: fromUser.id,
});
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export async function processFriendAddEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): Promise<void> {
if (!event.friendship) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_friendship_payload' });
return;
}
const { from, to } = event.friendship;
// Attribution: acceptor must belong to source instance (FED-010)
if (!verifyAttribution(to.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in friend_add: to homeInstance=${extractDomain(to.homeInstance)} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
// Resolve both users (create stubs if needed) and hydrate with profile data
const fromUserResolved = resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser(from.homeUserId, from.homeInstance, db, { username: event.friendship.fromProfile?.username, status: event.friendship.fromProfile?.status, deleted: event.friendship.fromProfile?.deleted });
if (!fromUserResolved) {
// One party's identity is deleted — accept idempotently to drop the event
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
let fromUser = await hydrateReplicatedUserProfile(fromUserResolved, event.friendship.fromProfile, db);
const toUserResolved = resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser(to.homeUserId, to.homeInstance, db, { username: event.friendship.toProfile?.username, status: event.friendship.toProfile?.status, deleted: event.friendship.toProfile?.deleted });
if (!toUserResolved) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
let toUser = await hydrateReplicatedUserProfile(toUserResolved, event.friendship.toProfile, db);
// Idempotency: if friendship already exists, accept as no-op
const existingFriend = db
.select()
.from(schema.friends)
.where(
or(
and(eq(schema.friends.userId, fromUser.id), eq(schema.friends.friendId, toUser.id)),
and(eq(schema.friends.userId, toUser.id), eq(schema.friends.friendId, fromUser.id)),
),
)
.get();
if (existingFriend) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Insert friendship row
const now = event.friendship.createdAt || Date.now();
db.insert(schema.friends)
.values({
userId: fromUser.id,
friendId: toUser.id,
createdAt: now,
})
.run();
// Auto-resolve any pending friend request between these users to 'accepted'
// (handles friend_add arriving before friend_request_update)
db.update(schema.friendRequests)
.set({ status: 'accepted' })
.where(
and(
or(
and(eq(schema.friendRequests.fromId, fromUser.id), eq(schema.friendRequests.toId, toUser.id)),
and(eq(schema.friendRequests.fromId, toUser.id), eq(schema.friendRequests.toId, fromUser.id)),
),
eq(schema.friendRequests.status, 'pending'),
),
)
.run();
// Determine which user is local and broadcast to them
const ourOrigin = getOurOrigin();
const localUser = from.homeInstance === ourOrigin ? fromUser : toUser;
const remoteUser = from.homeInstance === ourOrigin ? toUser : fromUser;
connectionManager.sendToUser(localUser.id, {
type: 'friend_request_accepted',
friend: {
...sanitizeUser(remoteUser),
addedAt: now,
},
// Use empty string for requestId since the request may not exist locally yet
requestId: '',
});
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processFriendRemoveEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.friendship) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_friendship_payload' });
return;
}
const { from, to } = event.friendship;
// Attribution: at least one side must belong to source instance (FED-010)
if (!verifyAttribution(from.homeInstance, sourceInstance) && !verifyAttribution(to.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in friend_remove: from homeInstance=${extractDomain(from.homeInstance)} to homeInstance=${extractDomain(to.homeInstance)} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
// Resolve both users — must both exist locally for there to be a friendship
const fromUser = resolveLocalUser(from.homeUserId, db);
const toUser = resolveLocalUser(to.homeUserId, db);
if (!fromUser || !toUser) {
// Accept idempotently — if either user doesn't exist locally, nothing to remove
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Delete friendship in both directions
db.delete(schema.friends)
.where(
or(
and(eq(schema.friends.userId, fromUser.id), eq(schema.friends.friendId, toUser.id)),
and(eq(schema.friends.userId, toUser.id), eq(schema.friends.friendId, fromUser.id)),
),
)
.run();
// Determine which user is local (the one whose home instance is NOT the source)
// The removing user is on the source instance; broadcast to the other user
const ourOrigin = getOurOrigin();
const localUser = from.homeInstance === ourOrigin ? fromUser : toUser;
const removingUser = from.homeInstance === ourOrigin ? toUser : fromUser;
connectionManager.sendToUser(localUser.id, {
type: 'friend_removed',
userId: removingUser.id,
});
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,851 @@
import path from 'node:path';
import { getDb, schema } from '../../../db/index.js';
import { canonicalizeHomeInstance, getOurOrigin, normalizeOriginForCompare } from '../../../utils/federationAuth.js';
import { deleteUploadFile } from '../../../utils/fileCleanup.js';
import { sanitizeUser } from '../../../utils/sanitize.js';
import { generateSnowflake } from '../../../utils/snowflake.js';
import { connectionManager } from '../../../ws/handler.js';
import { GROUP_DM_NAME_MAX_LENGTH, GROUP_DM_NAME_MIN_LENGTH } from '@backspace/shared/src/constants.js';
import { and, eq, inArray, or } from 'drizzle-orm';
import type { DmChannel, DmMessageWithUser, FederationRelayEvent } from '@backspace/shared';
import { extractDomain, resolveLocalUser, resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser, verifyAttribution } from '../identity.js';
import { downloadProfileAsset, processProfileUpdateEvent } from '../profile.js';
export async function processMemberAddEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): Promise<void> {
if (!event.federatedId || !event.membership?.user) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_membership_payload' });
return;
}
// Idempotency: a prior delivery of this exact event has already been processed.
// The system message we persist below carries `(source_instance, source_message_id)`
// and is guarded by `idx_dm_messages_source_unique`, so presence of a row here is
// proof the event's side-effects are already in place. Accept silently to prevent
// outbox retries and initial-sync replay from creating duplicate system messages.
const existingSysMsg = db
.select({ id: schema.dmMessages.id })
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceInstance, sourceInstance),
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceMessageId, event.messageId),
))
.get();
if (existingSysMsg) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Look up local channel by federated_id
let channel = db
.select()
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId))
.get();
let bootstrapped = false;
// Bootstrap: channel doesn't exist yet — create from group metadata
if (!channel && event.group) {
// Attribution: only the owner's instance can bootstrap a group (FED-010)
if (event.group.owner && !verifyAttribution(event.group.owner.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in member_add bootstrap: owner homeInstance=${extractDomain(event.group.owner.homeInstance)} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
const channelId = generateSnowflake();
const now = Date.now();
// Resolve owner — create a replicated stub if unknown
let ownerId: string | null = null;
if (event.group.owner) {
const ownerLocal = resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser(event.group.owner.homeUserId, event.group.owner.homeInstance, db, { username: event.group.owner.profile?.username, status: event.group.owner.profile?.status, deleted: event.group.owner.profile?.deleted });
ownerId = ownerLocal?.id ?? null;
}
// Group metadata snapshot. Older peers omit these fields — fall back
// to safe defaults (null name/icon, metadataUpdatedAt=0). When an icon
// URL is present, mirror processGroupMetadataUpdateEvent and try to
// download a local copy; on failure, persist the absolute URL.
const bootstrapName = event.group.name ?? null;
const bootstrapIconUrl = event.group.icon ?? null;
const bootstrapMetadataUpdatedAt = event.group.metadataUpdatedAt ?? 0;
let bootstrapResolvedIcon: string | null = bootstrapIconUrl;
if (bootstrapIconUrl !== null) {
const localFile = await downloadProfileAsset(bootstrapIconUrl, sourceInstance);
bootstrapResolvedIcon = localFile ?? bootstrapIconUrl;
}
db.insert(schema.dmChannels)
.values({
id: channelId,
federatedId: event.federatedId,
ownerId,
ownerHomeUserId: event.group.owner?.homeUserId ?? null,
// Canonicalize on storage so future authority comparisons against
// `sourceInstance` (always a full URL) match cleanly. Defensive: older
// peers may have sent a bare host on the wire.
ownerHomeInstance: canonicalizeHomeInstance(event.group.owner?.homeInstance) ?? null,
createdAt: now,
name: bootstrapName,
icon: bootstrapResolvedIcon,
metadataUpdatedAt: bootstrapMetadataUpdatedAt,
})
.run();
// Add all roster members — create replicated user stubs for any
// participants from remote instances that haven't been seen before.
for (const member of event.group.members) {
const rosterUser = resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser(member.homeUserId, member.homeInstance, db, { username: member.profile?.username, status: member.profile?.status, deleted: member.profile?.deleted });
// Skip deleted identities — tombstoned users can't be added to a DM
if (!rosterUser) continue;
const existing = db.select().from(schema.dmMembers)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, channelId),
eq(schema.dmMembers.userId, rosterUser.id),
)).get();
if (!existing) {
db.insert(schema.dmMembers).values({
dmChannelId: channelId,
userId: rosterUser.id,
closed: 0,
}).run();
}
}
channel = db.select().from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.id, channelId)).get();
console.log(`[federation] Bootstrapped group DM channel ${channelId} (federated_id: ${event.federatedId})`);
bootstrapped = true;
}
if (!channel) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'channel_not_found' });
return;
}
// Authority note: any HMAC-verified peer can relay member_add events.
// The HMAC signature proves the event came from a trusted peer.
// The attribution check below still validates that addedBy belongs to the source instance.
// Attribution: adder must belong to source instance (FED-010)
if (event.membership.addedBy && !verifyAttribution(event.membership.addedBy.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in member_add: addedBy homeInstance=${extractDomain(event.membership.addedBy.homeInstance)} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
// Cancel soft-delete if channel was pending GC
if (channel.deletedAt) {
db.update(schema.dmChannels)
.set({ deletedAt: null })
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.id, channel.id))
.run();
}
// Resolve the added user — create a replicated stub if unknown
const localUser = resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser(
event.membership.user.homeUserId,
event.membership.user.homeInstance,
db,
{ username: event.membership.user.profile?.username, status: event.membership.user.profile?.status, deleted: event.membership.user.profile?.deleted },
);
if (!localUser) {
// The user's identity has been deleted — don't add a tombstoned user to the DM
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'participant_not_found' });
return;
}
// Enforce max 10 members
const memberCount = db.select()
.from(schema.dmMembers)
.where(eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, channel.id))
.all().length;
if (memberCount >= 10) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'max_members_exceeded' });
return;
}
// Add member (idempotent)
const existingMember = db.select().from(schema.dmMembers)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, channel.id),
eq(schema.dmMembers.userId, localUser.id),
)).get();
if (!existingMember) {
db.insert(schema.dmMembers).values({
dmChannelId: channel.id,
userId: localUser.id,
closed: 0,
}).run();
}
// Insert system message for member addition — tagged with (sourceInstance, sourceMessageId)
// so subsequent deliveries of the same event are deduplicated at the top of this function.
// The tag is applied in both the bootstrap and incremental paths, because bootstrap replays
// would otherwise find the channel already present and fall through to the incremental path,
// creating spurious system messages (the exact bug this fixes).
const actorUser = event.membership.addedBy
? resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser(event.membership.addedBy.homeUserId, event.membership.addedBy.homeInstance, db, { username: event.membership.addedBy.profile?.username, status: event.membership.addedBy.profile?.status, deleted: event.membership.addedBy.profile?.deleted })
: null;
const actorId = actorUser?.id ?? localUser.id;
const addBaseName = localUser.username?.includes('@') ? localUser.username.split('@')[0] : (localUser.username ?? 'Unknown');
const addSysMsgId = generateSnowflake();
const addSysCreatedAt = Date.now();
const addSysContent = JSON.stringify({
event: 'member_added',
targetUserId: localUser.id,
targetDisplayName: localUser.displayName ?? addBaseName,
});
db.insert(schema.dmMessages).values({
id: addSysMsgId,
dmChannelId: channel.id,
userId: actorId,
content: addSysContent,
type: 'system',
createdAt: addSysCreatedAt,
sourceInstance,
sourceMessageId: event.messageId,
}).run();
const systemMessagePayload = {
id: addSysMsgId,
dmChannelId: channel.id,
userId: actorId,
content: addSysContent,
type: 'system' as const,
createdAt: addSysCreatedAt,
sourceInstance,
sourceMessageId: event.messageId,
editedAt: null,
replyToId: null,
user: actorUser ? sanitizeUser(actorUser) : sanitizeUser(localUser),
attachments: [],
embeds: [],
reactions: [],
};
if (bootstrapped) {
// Bootstrap: send dm_channel_created to home-local members only (prevents
// duplicate sidebar entries for users connected to multiple instances).
// Include the system message we just persisted as lastMessage so the sidebar
// preview and unread calculation use the same anchor as future messages.
const memberRows = db.select()
.from(schema.dmMembers)
.where(eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, channel.id))
.all();
const memberUserIds = memberRows.map(m => m.userId);
const memberUsers = memberUserIds.length > 0
? db.select().from(schema.users).where(inArray(schema.users.id, memberUserIds)).all()
: [];
const bootstrapResult = {
id: channel.id,
federatedId: channel.federatedId,
ownerId: channel.ownerId,
createdAt: channel.createdAt,
members: memberUsers.map(u => sanitizeUser(u)),
lastMessage: systemMessagePayload,
};
const bootstrapOrigin = getOurOrigin();
for (const mu of memberUsers) {
const muHome = mu.homeInstance
? (mu.homeInstance.startsWith('http') ? mu.homeInstance : `https://${mu.homeInstance}`)
: bootstrapOrigin; // null homeInstance = native local user
if (muHome !== bootstrapOrigin) continue;
connectionManager.sendToUser(mu.id, {
type: 'dm_channel_created',
dmChannel: bootstrapResult as unknown as DmChannel,
});
}
} else {
// Incremental: channel already exists for local members, so broadcast the
// structural change (dm_member_added) and the chat message.
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(channel.id, {
type: 'dm_message_created',
message: systemMessagePayload as unknown as DmMessageWithUser,
});
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(channel.id, {
type: 'dm_member_added',
dmChannelId: channel.id,
user: sanitizeUser(localUser),
});
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processMemberRemoveEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.federatedId || !event.membership?.user) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_membership_payload' });
return;
}
// Attribution: for self-leave, user must belong to source instance (FED-010)
if (event.membership.reason === 'leave' && !verifyAttribution(event.membership.user.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in member_remove: user homeInstance=${extractDomain(event.membership.user.homeInstance)} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
// Idempotency: skip if this exact event has already been processed.
// See `processMemberAddEvent` for the rationale — deduplicates retries and
// initial-sync replay so we don't insert duplicate leave/kick system messages
// or re-trigger broadcast and soft-delete side-effects.
const existingSysMsg = db
.select({ id: schema.dmMessages.id })
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceInstance, sourceInstance),
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceMessageId, event.messageId),
))
.get();
if (existingSysMsg) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
const channel = db
.select()
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId))
.get();
if (!channel) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Validate authority: owner's instance for kicks, any instance for self-leave.
//
// `sourceInstance` arrives as a full URL from `federationWorker.ts` (always
// `getOurOrigin()` on the sender). `channel.ownerHomeInstance`, however, can be
// stored either as a bare host (from `users.homeInstance`, written by
// `resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser` and by group DM ownership transfers to a
// federated user) OR as a full URL (group DM creation / transfers to a local
// user, which fall back to `domainOrigin = getOurOrigin()`). Strict equality
// here mis-fires for the bare-vs-full mismatch — see the historical bug entry
// in `docs/systems/dm-system.md`. Always compare through
// `normalizeOriginForCompare`, matching the established pattern for federation
// authority checks.
if (event.membership.reason !== 'leave' && channel.ownerHomeInstance &&
normalizeOriginForCompare(sourceInstance) !== normalizeOriginForCompare(channel.ownerHomeInstance)) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'unauthorized_source' });
return;
}
const localUser = resolveLocalUser(event.membership.user.homeUserId, db);
if (!localUser) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Insert system message for member leaving (before deletion so the broadcast
// still reaches the departing user's connections). Tagged with source for dedup.
const leaveBaseName = localUser.username?.includes('@') ? localUser.username.split('@')[0] : (localUser.username ?? 'Unknown');
const leaveSysMsgId = generateSnowflake();
const leaveSysCreatedAt = Date.now();
const leaveSysContent = JSON.stringify({
event: 'member_removed',
targetUserId: localUser.id,
targetDisplayName: localUser.displayName ?? leaveBaseName,
reason: event.membership?.reason ?? 'leave',
});
db.insert(schema.dmMessages).values({
id: leaveSysMsgId,
dmChannelId: channel.id,
userId: localUser.id,
content: leaveSysContent,
type: 'system',
createdAt: leaveSysCreatedAt,
sourceInstance,
sourceMessageId: event.messageId,
}).run();
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(channel.id, {
type: 'dm_message_created',
message: {
id: leaveSysMsgId,
dmChannelId: channel.id,
userId: localUser.id,
content: leaveSysContent,
type: 'system',
createdAt: leaveSysCreatedAt,
sourceInstance,
sourceMessageId: event.messageId,
editedAt: null,
replyToId: null,
user: sanitizeUser(localUser),
attachments: [],
embeds: [],
reactions: [],
} as unknown as DmMessageWithUser,
});
// Remove member (idempotent)
db.delete(schema.dmMembers)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, channel.id),
eq(schema.dmMembers.userId, localUser.id),
))
.run();
// Clean up read states
db.delete(schema.readStates)
.where(and(
eq(schema.readStates.userId, localUser.id),
eq(schema.readStates.channelId, channel.id),
))
.run();
// Broadcast to local WebSocket clients
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(channel.id, {
type: 'dm_member_removed',
dmChannelId: channel.id,
userId: localUser.id,
});
// Check if zero local members remain — begin soft-delete GC
const remaining = db.select()
.from(schema.dmMembers)
.where(eq(schema.dmMembers.dmChannelId, channel.id))
.all();
if (remaining.length === 0) {
db.update(schema.dmChannels)
.set({ deletedAt: Date.now() })
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.id, channel.id))
.run();
console.log(`[federation] Group DM ${channel.id} has no local members, soft-deleted for GC`);
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
export function processOwnershipTransferEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): void {
if (!event.federatedId || !event.ownership) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_ownership_payload' });
return;
}
// Attribution: previous owner must belong to source instance (FED-010)
if (event.ownership.previousOwner && !verifyAttribution(event.ownership.previousOwner.homeInstance, sourceInstance)) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in ownership_transfer: previousOwner homeInstance=${extractDomain(event.ownership.previousOwner.homeInstance)} source=${extractDomain(sourceInstance)}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
// Idempotency: reject replay of a transfer we've already processed. Critical here
// because a stale replay could otherwise overwrite a newer owner (e.g. A->B then
// B->A, then A->B arrives again and clobbers). See `processMemberAddEvent`.
const existingSysMsg = db
.select({ id: schema.dmMessages.id })
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceInstance, sourceInstance),
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceMessageId, event.messageId),
))
.get();
if (existingSysMsg) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
const channel = db
.select()
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId))
.get();
if (!channel) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Validate authority: only the current owner's instance can transfer ownership.
//
// See the matching note in `processMemberRemoveEvent`: `sourceInstance` is
// always a full URL but `channel.ownerHomeInstance` can be bare or full.
// Normalize both sides through `normalizeOriginForCompare` so we don't reject
// legitimate back-and-forth transfers that wrote a bare host into the column.
if (channel.ownerHomeInstance &&
normalizeOriginForCompare(sourceInstance) !== normalizeOriginForCompare(channel.ownerHomeInstance)) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'unauthorized_source' });
return;
}
// Resolve new owner to local user. If the new owner's identity has been
// deleted, we cannot complete the transfer — reject so the event can be
// retried or dropped by the sender.
const newOwnerLocal = resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser(
event.ownership.newOwner.homeUserId,
event.ownership.newOwner.homeInstance,
db,
{ username: event.ownership.newOwner.profile?.username, status: event.ownership.newOwner.profile?.status, deleted: event.ownership.newOwner.profile?.deleted },
);
if (!newOwnerLocal) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'participant_not_found' });
return;
}
// Canonicalize to a full origin URL on storage so future authority checks
// can compare cleanly against `sourceInstance` (also a full URL). Mirrors
// the canonicalization performed in `transferGroupDmOwnership` on the
// sender side. Falls back to the wire value if normalization yields null
// (shouldn't happen for valid events; defensive).
const canonicalOwnerHome =
canonicalizeHomeInstance(event.ownership.newOwner.homeInstance) ?? event.ownership.newOwner.homeInstance;
db.update(schema.dmChannels)
.set({
ownerId: newOwnerLocal.id,
ownerHomeUserId: event.ownership.newOwner.homeUserId,
ownerHomeInstance: canonicalOwnerHome,
})
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.id, channel.id))
.run();
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(channel.id, {
type: 'dm_owner_updated',
dmChannelId: channel.id,
newOwnerId: newOwnerLocal.id,
newOwnerHomeUserId: event.ownership.newOwner.homeUserId,
newOwnerHomeInstance: canonicalOwnerHome,
});
const prevOwnerLocal = event.ownership.previousOwner
? resolveLocalUser(event.ownership.previousOwner.homeUserId, db)
: null;
const ownerSysMsgId = generateSnowflake();
const ownerSysCreatedAt = Date.now();
const newOwnerBaseName = newOwnerLocal?.username?.includes('@') ? newOwnerLocal.username.split('@')[0] : (newOwnerLocal?.username ?? 'Unknown');
const prevOwnerId = prevOwnerLocal?.id ?? channel.ownerId ?? 'system';
const ownerSysContent = JSON.stringify({
event: 'owner_changed',
newOwnerId: newOwnerLocal.id,
newOwnerDisplayName: newOwnerLocal.displayName ?? newOwnerBaseName,
});
db.insert(schema.dmMessages).values({
id: ownerSysMsgId,
dmChannelId: channel.id,
userId: prevOwnerId,
content: ownerSysContent,
type: 'system',
createdAt: ownerSysCreatedAt,
sourceInstance,
sourceMessageId: event.messageId,
}).run();
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(channel.id, {
type: 'dm_message_created',
message: {
id: ownerSysMsgId,
dmChannelId: channel.id,
userId: prevOwnerId,
content: ownerSysContent,
type: 'system',
createdAt: ownerSysCreatedAt,
sourceInstance,
sourceMessageId: event.messageId,
editedAt: null,
replyToId: null,
user: prevOwnerLocal ? sanitizeUser(prevOwnerLocal) : undefined,
attachments: [],
embeds: [],
reactions: [],
} as unknown as DmMessageWithUser,
});
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
// ─── Friend Event Processors ─────────────────────────────────────────────────
/**
* Inbound group_metadata_update relay handler.
*
* Authority: only the group's owner instance may mutate name/icon. We compare
* `extractDomain(sourceInstance)` with `extractDomain(channel.ownerHomeInstance)`;
* any other peer relaying this event is treated as an attribution mismatch
* (mirrors the strict check in processProfileUpdateEvent).
*
* Receiver hardening: never trust the wire payload's bounds — re-validate name
* length and icon URL scheme. A malicious or buggy peer cannot push us past
* the same constraints we enforce in PATCH /api/dm/:id.
*
* Side-effects on success:
* 1. dm_channels.{name,icon,metadataUpdatedAt} updated in a single tx.
* 2. One or two `dm_messages` system rows inserted (name_changed / icon_changed),
* each tagged with `(sourceInstance, sourceMessageId)` using the dedup-suffix
* scheme `${event.messageId}:name` / `${event.messageId}:icon`. This mirrors
* processMemberAddEvent's idempotency contract — a retry of the same wire
* event must not insert a second row.
* 3. dm_channel_updated WS broadcast to local members.
* 4. dm_message_created WS broadcast for each new system message.
* 5. Old local icon file is unlinked from disk if it changed away from a local
* filename (same precedent as the local PATCH endpoint).
*/
export async function processGroupMetadataUpdateEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): Promise<void> {
if (!event.federatedId) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_federated_id' });
return;
}
// Lookup channel by federated_id. Missing → idempotent accept (this peer has
// no replica of the channel, nothing to update).
const channel = db
.select()
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.federatedId, event.federatedId))
.get();
if (!channel) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Authority: only the owner's home instance can mutate group metadata.
if (extractDomain(sourceInstance) !== extractDomain(channel.ownerHomeInstance ?? '')) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
// Receiver hardening — payload validation. Don't trust remote peers to
// respect our bounds; a peer bug or malicious actor must not be able to
// push values our local PATCH endpoint would have rejected.
const metadata = event.metadata;
if (!metadata) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_metadata_payload' });
return;
}
if (metadata.name !== null) {
const trimmedLength = metadata.name.trim().length;
if (trimmedLength < GROUP_DM_NAME_MIN_LENGTH || trimmedLength > GROUP_DM_NAME_MAX_LENGTH) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'invalid_payload' });
return;
}
}
if (metadata.icon !== null && !(metadata.icon.startsWith('http://') || metadata.icon.startsWith('https://'))) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'invalid_payload' });
return;
}
// Version check: stale or duplicate timestamp → silent accept.
if (metadata.metadataUpdatedAt <= (channel.metadataUpdatedAt ?? 0)) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Diff against stored row — if neither field actually changed, no-op.
const nameChanged = metadata.name !== channel.name;
const iconChanged = metadata.icon !== channel.icon;
if (!nameChanged && !iconChanged) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Idempotency pre-check: if either system message already exists under
// `(sourceInstance, sourceMessageId)`, this event was already processed.
// Mirrors processMemberAddEvent's dedup contract — outbox retries and
// initial-sync replay must not double-insert.
const nameMessageId = `${event.messageId}:name`;
const iconMessageId = `${event.messageId}:icon`;
const existingNameRow = nameChanged
? db
.select({ id: schema.dmMessages.id })
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceInstance, sourceInstance),
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceMessageId, nameMessageId),
))
.get()
: null;
const existingIconRow = iconChanged
? db
.select({ id: schema.dmMessages.id })
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(and(
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceInstance, sourceInstance),
eq(schema.dmMessages.sourceMessageId, iconMessageId),
))
.get()
: null;
// If every changed field already has its corresponding system row, the
// entire event has been applied — accept silently.
if (
(!nameChanged || existingNameRow)
&& (!iconChanged || existingIconRow)
) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// ── Resolve icon: download to local upload dir, fall back to absolute URL ──
let resolvedIcon: string | null = metadata.icon;
if (iconChanged && metadata.icon !== null) {
const localFile = await downloadProfileAsset(metadata.icon, sourceInstance);
resolvedIcon = localFile ?? metadata.icon;
}
// Resolve actor → local user id for the system-message foreign key.
// Falls back to channel.ownerId if the actor stub can't be created (e.g.
// tombstoned identity); the system message still has to render somewhere.
const actorParticipant = metadata.actor;
let actorUserId: string | null = null;
if (actorParticipant) {
const actorUser = resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser(
actorParticipant.homeUserId,
actorParticipant.homeInstance,
db,
{ username: actorParticipant.profile?.username, status: actorParticipant.profile?.status, deleted: actorParticipant.profile?.deleted },
);
actorUserId = actorUser?.id ?? null;
}
if (!actorUserId) {
actorUserId = channel.ownerId;
}
if (!actorUserId) {
// No owner user row to attach a system message to — extremely unusual,
// bail out cleanly without persisting anything.
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'actor_not_found' });
return;
}
const oldName = channel.name;
const oldIcon = channel.icon;
type SystemMessageRow = { id: string; sourceMessageId: string; content: string; createdAt: number };
const sysMessageRows: SystemMessageRow[] = [];
// Single transaction: channel update + system message insert(s).
db.transaction((tx) => {
tx.update(schema.dmChannels)
.set({
name: metadata.name,
icon: resolvedIcon,
metadataUpdatedAt: metadata.metadataUpdatedAt,
})
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.id, channel.id))
.run();
if (nameChanged && !existingNameRow) {
const sysId = generateSnowflake();
const content = JSON.stringify({ event: 'name_changed', oldName, newName: metadata.name });
tx.insert(schema.dmMessages).values({
id: sysId,
dmChannelId: channel.id,
userId: actorUserId,
content,
type: 'system',
sourceInstance,
sourceMessageId: nameMessageId,
createdAt: metadata.metadataUpdatedAt,
}).run();
sysMessageRows.push({
id: sysId,
sourceMessageId: nameMessageId,
content,
createdAt: metadata.metadataUpdatedAt,
});
}
if (iconChanged && !existingIconRow) {
const sysId = generateSnowflake();
const content = JSON.stringify({ event: 'icon_changed' });
tx.insert(schema.dmMessages).values({
id: sysId,
dmChannelId: channel.id,
userId: actorUserId,
content,
type: 'system',
sourceInstance,
sourceMessageId: iconMessageId,
createdAt: metadata.metadataUpdatedAt,
}).run();
sysMessageRows.push({
id: sysId,
sourceMessageId: iconMessageId,
content,
createdAt: metadata.metadataUpdatedAt,
});
}
});
// ── Broadcast channel update to local members ──
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(channel.id, {
type: 'dm_channel_updated',
dmChannelId: channel.id,
name: metadata.name,
icon: resolvedIcon,
});
// ── Broadcast each new system message ──
const actorRow = db.select().from(schema.users).where(eq(schema.users.id, actorUserId)).get();
const sanitizedActor = actorRow ? sanitizeUser(actorRow) : undefined;
for (const sys of sysMessageRows) {
connectionManager.sendToDmMembers(channel.id, {
type: 'dm_message_created',
message: {
id: sys.id,
dmChannelId: channel.id,
userId: actorUserId,
content: sys.content,
type: 'system',
createdAt: sys.createdAt,
sourceInstance,
sourceMessageId: sys.sourceMessageId,
editedAt: null,
replyToId: null,
user: sanitizedActor,
attachments: [],
embeds: [],
reactions: [],
} as DmMessageWithUser,
});
}
// ── Cleanup old local icon file ──
// Mirrors the local PATCH precedent (dm.ts:1595): only unlink when the
// previous icon was a bare local filename (i.e. we own the file on disk).
// Absolute URLs point at remote files we never owned.
if (iconChanged && oldIcon && !oldIcon.startsWith('http://') && !oldIcon.startsWith('https://') && oldIcon !== resolvedIcon) {
deleteUploadFile(oldIcon);
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,890 @@
import path from 'node:path';
import { getDb, schema } from '../../../db/index.js';
import { authenticate, requireAdmin } from '../../../utils/auth.js';
import { buildFederationHeaders, generateHmacSecret, getOurOrigin } from '../../../utils/federationAuth.js';
import { getInstanceId } from '../../../utils/federationEpoch.js';
import { onPeerActivated } from '../../../utils/federationPeerActivation.js';
import { generateSnowflake } from '../../../utils/snowflake.js';
import { connectionManager } from '../../../ws/handler.js';
import { and, desc, eq, inArray, isNull, or } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
import type { ApprovalRequestSubscriberSummary, PeeringTriggerReason } from '@backspace/shared';
import type { FastifyInstance, FastifyReply } from 'fastify';
import { resolveLocalOrigin, sanitizePeer } from '../origin.js';
/**
* Queue an inbound peer/accept request for local-admin approval.
*
* Called from `/peer/accept` when:
* (a) `autoAcceptPeering=0` and no `pending`/`awaiting_approval` peer row
* exists for the source origin (first-contact request from remote), OR
* (b) the receiver is in `awaiting_approval` for this origin but the
* inbound `/peer/accept` cannot be cryptographically verified
* (token absent or mismatched) — see spec §3.5.
*
* Generates a fresh single-use approval token, upserts the
* `peer_approval_requests` row, notifies admins, and returns 202 with the
* token in the body. The initiator stores the token alongside its
* `awaiting_approval` row so a future `/peer/accept` from this side's
* `/approve` endpoint can verify mutual admin approval.
*/
export function queueApprovalRequest(
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
reply: FastifyReply,
sourceOrigin: string,
hmacSecret: string,
reqInstanceName: string | null,
): FastifyReply {
const now = Date.now();
const THIRTY_DAYS_MS = 30 * 24 * 60 * 60 * 1000;
const approvalToken = randomBytes(32).toString('hex');
const existingRequest = db
.select({ id: schema.peerApprovalRequests.id })
.from(schema.peerApprovalRequests)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalRequests.origin, sourceOrigin))
.get();
if (existingRequest) {
db.update(schema.peerApprovalRequests)
.set({
instanceName: reqInstanceName,
hmacSecret,
requestedAt: now,
expiresAt: now + THIRTY_DAYS_MS,
approvalToken,
})
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalRequests.id, existingRequest.id))
.run();
} else {
db.insert(schema.peerApprovalRequests)
.values({
id: generateSnowflake(),
origin: sourceOrigin,
instanceName: reqInstanceName,
hmacSecret,
requestedAt: now,
expiresAt: now + THIRTY_DAYS_MS,
approvalToken,
})
.run();
}
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({
type: 'federation_approval_request_received' as const,
origin: sourceOrigin,
instanceName: reqInstanceName ?? undefined,
});
return reply.code(202).send({
queued: true,
message: 'Request queued for admin approval',
approvalToken,
});
}
/**
* Inbound approve — admin accepts a remote instance's peering request.
* Generates fresh HMAC, sends `/peer/accept` to the remote, and on success
* activates the peer locally. Preserves the historical behavior verbatim;
* extracted from the route handler so the dispatcher can branch on direction.
*/
export async function handleInboundApprove(
approvalReq: typeof schema.peerApprovalRequests.$inferSelect,
localOrigin: string,
reply: FastifyReply,
): Promise<FastifyReply> {
const db = getDb();
const id = approvalReq.id;
const existingPeer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, approvalReq.origin))
.get();
if (existingPeer && existingPeer.status === 'active') {
db.delete(schema.peerApprovalRequests)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalRequests.id, id))
.run();
return reply.code(200).send({ success: true, peer: sanitizePeer(existingPeer) });
}
if (existingPeer) {
db.delete(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, existingPeer.id))
.run();
}
const hmacSecret = generateHmacSecret();
const peerId = generateSnowflake();
const now = Date.now();
db.insert(schema.federationPeers).values({
id: peerId,
origin: approvalReq.origin,
instanceName: approvalReq.instanceName,
hmacSecret,
status: 'pending',
createdAt: now,
}).run();
try {
const instanceName = db
.select({ name: schema.instanceSettings.instanceName })
.from(schema.instanceSettings)
.where(eq(schema.instanceSettings.id, 1))
.get()?.name ?? undefined;
const response = await fetch(`${approvalReq.origin}/api/federation/peer/accept`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
sourceOrigin: localOrigin,
hmacSecret,
instanceName,
instanceId: getInstanceId(),
// Forward the stored token (issued in our 202 response when the
// remote first sent /peer/accept). Lets the remote verify mutual
// admin approval. Spec §3.7.
...(approvalReq.approvalToken ? { approvalToken: approvalReq.approvalToken } : {}),
}),
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
});
if (response.status === 202) {
// Remote instance also has autoAcceptPeering off — they queued our request.
// Don't activate our peer. Set to awaiting_approval until their admin also approves.
// Capture the approval token they returned so the next inbound
// /peer/accept (when their admin approves) can be verified. §3.7.
let returnedToken: string | null = null;
try {
const body = (await response.json()) as { approvalToken?: string };
if (typeof body?.approvalToken === 'string' && body.approvalToken.length > 0) {
returnedToken = body.approvalToken;
}
} catch {
// Non-JSON / empty body — legacy peer.
}
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({ status: 'awaiting_approval', approvalToken: returnedToken })
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.run();
// Delete the approval request since we already acted on it
db.delete(schema.peerApprovalRequests)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalRequests.id, id))
.run();
return reply.code(200).send({
success: true,
awaitingRemoteApproval: true,
message: 'Remote instance also requires admin approval. Your request has been queued on their side.',
});
}
if (!response.ok) {
let errorMessage = `Remote instance rejected handshake (HTTP ${response.status})`;
try {
const body = await response.json() as { error?: string };
if (body.error) errorMessage = body.error;
} catch { /* ignore */ }
db.delete(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.run();
return reply.code(502).send({ error: errorMessage, statusCode: 502 });
}
// Parse the remote's instanceName and instanceId (epoch) from the response
// body so the federation panel renders a friendly label and we record the
// peer's authenticated epoch baseline. Tolerate omission and non-JSON
// bodies — same pattern as performHandshake and /peer/initiate.
let remoteInstanceName: string | null = null;
let remoteInstanceId: string | null = null;
try {
const body = (await response.json()) as { instanceName?: string | null; instanceId?: string | null };
if (typeof body?.instanceName === 'string' && body.instanceName.length > 0) {
remoteInstanceName = body.instanceName;
}
if (typeof body?.instanceId === 'string' && body.instanceId.length > 0) {
remoteInstanceId = body.instanceId;
}
} catch {
// Non-JSON body — leave null.
}
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({ status: 'active', lastSeenAt: now, instanceName: remoteInstanceName, peerInstanceId: remoteInstanceId, approvalToken: null })
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.run();
db.delete(schema.peerApprovalRequests)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalRequests.id, id))
.run();
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
onPeerActivated(peerId, 'approval_handshake').catch(err =>
console.error('[federation] onPeerActivated from /approval-requests/:id/approve failed:', err)
);
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.get();
return reply.code(200).send({ success: true, peer: peer ? sanitizePeer(peer) : undefined });
} catch (err: unknown) {
db.delete(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.run();
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Unknown error';
if (err instanceof DOMException && err.name === 'TimeoutError') {
return reply.code(504).send({
error: 'Remote instance did not respond within 10 seconds',
statusCode: 504,
});
}
return reply.code(502).send({
error: `Failed to reach remote instance: ${message}`,
statusCode: 502,
});
}
}
/**
* Outbound approve — admin authorizes the local instance to peer with a
* remote that one or more of its users have requested. Generates fresh HMAC,
* sends `/peer/accept` to the remote, and:
* - 200 → activate peer; `onPeerActivated` runs and (per Task 6) fans out
* approved-notifications to outbound subscribers and cascade-deletes the
* queue row. The handler MUST NOT duplicate that cleanup.
* - 202 → remote also gates; transition to `awaiting_approval`, capture
* the returned token, leave the queue row + subscribers untouched (they
* wait for the remote admin to approve and the eventual full activation
* to fan out via `onPeerActivated`).
* - 4xx/5xx/network → clean up the peer row we created; leave the queue
* row alone so the admin can retry.
*/
export async function handleOutboundApprove(
approvalReq: typeof schema.peerApprovalRequests.$inferSelect,
localOrigin: string,
reply: FastifyReply,
): Promise<FastifyReply> {
const db = getDb();
const hmacSecret = generateHmacSecret();
const peerId = generateSnowflake();
const now = Date.now();
// Insert the peer row in 'pending' so failure paths roll back cleanly.
db.insert(schema.federationPeers).values({
id: peerId,
origin: approvalReq.origin,
instanceName: approvalReq.instanceName,
hmacSecret,
status: 'pending',
createdAt: now,
}).run();
const instanceName = db
.select({ name: schema.instanceSettings.instanceName })
.from(schema.instanceSettings)
.where(eq(schema.instanceSettings.id, 1))
.get()?.name ?? undefined;
let response: Response;
try {
response = await fetch(`${approvalReq.origin}/api/federation/peer/accept`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
sourceOrigin: localOrigin,
hmacSecret,
instanceName,
instanceId: getInstanceId(),
// No approvalToken — outbound rows are admin-initiated locally; we
// hold no prior token from the remote and rely on the remote's own
// autoAcceptPeering setting to decide 200 vs 202.
}),
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
});
} catch (err: unknown) {
db.delete(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.run();
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Unknown error';
if (err instanceof DOMException && err.name === 'TimeoutError') {
return reply.code(504).send({
error: 'Remote instance did not respond within 10 seconds',
statusCode: 504,
});
}
return reply.code(503).send({
error: `Remote instance unreachable: ${message}`,
statusCode: 503,
});
}
if (response.status === 202) {
// Remote also gates new peers. Capture the approval token they returned
// so the next inbound /peer/accept (when the remote admin approves) can
// verify mutual admin approval. The outbound queue row and its
// subscribers REMAIN — `onPeerActivated` is NOT called here; subscribers
// wait for the eventual activation (fanout happens then).
let returnedToken: string | null = null;
try {
const body = (await response.json()) as { approvalToken?: string };
if (typeof body?.approvalToken === 'string' && body.approvalToken.length > 0) {
returnedToken = body.approvalToken;
}
} catch {
// Non-JSON / empty body — legacy peer with no token to capture.
}
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({ status: 'awaiting_approval', approvalToken: returnedToken })
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.run();
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.get();
return reply.code(200).send({
success: true,
peerStatus: 'awaiting_approval' as const,
awaitingRemoteApproval: true,
message: 'Remote instance also requires admin approval. Your request has been queued on their side.',
peer: peer ? sanitizePeer(peer) : undefined,
});
}
if (!response.ok) {
let errorMessage = `Remote instance rejected handshake (HTTP ${response.status})`;
try {
const body = await response.json() as { error?: string };
if (body.error) errorMessage = body.error;
} catch { /* ignore */ }
// Clean up the peer row we created. Leave the outbound queue row alone
// so the admin can retry without re-collecting subscribers.
db.delete(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.run();
return reply.code(502).send({
error: errorMessage,
statusCode: 502,
remoteStatus: response.status,
});
}
// 200 — peer activated. Capture remote's instanceName for the friendly label
// and instanceId (epoch) for the authenticated baseline.
let remoteInstanceName: string | null = approvalReq.instanceName;
let remoteInstanceId: string | null = null;
try {
const body = (await response.json()) as { instanceName?: string | null; instanceId?: string | null };
if (typeof body?.instanceName === 'string' && body.instanceName.length > 0) {
remoteInstanceName = body.instanceName;
}
if (typeof body?.instanceId === 'string' && body.instanceId.length > 0) {
remoteInstanceId = body.instanceId;
}
} catch {
// Non-JSON body — keep approvalReq.instanceName (may be null).
}
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({
status: 'active',
lastSeenAt: now,
instanceName: remoteInstanceName,
peerInstanceId: remoteInstanceId,
approvalToken: null,
})
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.run();
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
// onPeerActivated runs fanoutOutboundSubscribers (Task 6) which:
// - inserts kind='approved' notifications for each subscriber,
// - sends `peering_notification_received` WS to each subscriber,
// - cascade-deletes the parent + subscriber rows.
// Do NOT duplicate any of that here — it would double-notify and corrupt
// the queue.
onPeerActivated(peerId, 'approval_handshake').catch(err =>
console.error('[federation] onPeerActivated from outbound /approval-requests/:id/approve failed:', err)
);
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.get();
return reply.code(200).send({
success: true,
peerStatus: 'active' as const,
peer: peer ? sanitizePeer(peer) : undefined,
});
}
/**
* Inbound deny — admin rejects a remote instance's peering request. Fires
* the existing /peer/denied notification to the remote, marks any local
* peer row as `rejected`, and clears the queue row. Preserves historical
* behavior verbatim.
*/
export async function handleInboundDeny(
approvalReq: typeof schema.peerApprovalRequests.$inferSelect,
reply: FastifyReply,
): Promise<FastifyReply> {
const db = getDb();
const id = approvalReq.id;
// Inbound rows always carry hmacSecret (CHECK constraint enforces this).
// If it's somehow null, we cannot sign /peer/denied — surface clearly.
if (!approvalReq.hmacSecret) {
return reply.code(500).send({
error: 'Inbound approval request is missing hmacSecret — cannot deliver /peer/denied notification.',
statusCode: 500,
});
}
const ourOrigin = getOurOrigin();
const denialBody = JSON.stringify({
origin: ourOrigin,
reason: 'denied_by_admin' as const,
message: 'Request denied by admin',
});
const headers = buildFederationHeaders(denialBody, approvalReq.hmacSecret, ourOrigin);
let notificationSent = false;
try {
const response = await fetch(`${approvalReq.origin}/api/federation/peer/denied`, {
method: 'POST',
headers,
body: denialBody,
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
});
notificationSent = response.ok;
} catch {
// Network error
}
if (!notificationSent) {
return reply.code(502).send({
error: 'Denial notification could not be delivered to the remote instance. The request is still pending — you can retry or wait for it to expire.',
statusCode: 502,
});
}
const existingPeer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, approvalReq.origin))
.get();
if (!existingPeer) {
db.insert(schema.federationPeers).values({
id: generateSnowflake(),
origin: approvalReq.origin,
instanceName: approvalReq.instanceName,
hmacSecret: approvalReq.hmacSecret,
status: 'rejected',
createdAt: Date.now(),
}).run();
} else if (existingPeer.status !== 'active') {
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({ status: 'rejected' })
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, existingPeer.id))
.run();
}
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
db.delete(schema.peerApprovalRequests)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalRequests.id, id))
.run();
return reply.code(200).send({ success: true });
}
/**
* Outbound deny — admin refuses local users' peering request. Fans out
* `kind='denied'` notifications to each subscriber and cascade-deletes the
* parent (which clears subscribers via FK cascade). No remote network call
* — outbound rows have no /peer/denied counterpart on the wire (the remote
* never knew we were considering this).
*/
export async function handleOutboundDeny(
approvalReq: typeof schema.peerApprovalRequests.$inferSelect,
reply: FastifyReply,
): Promise<FastifyReply> {
const db = getDb();
const subscribers = db
.select()
.from(schema.peerApprovalSubscribers)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.requestId, approvalReq.id))
.all();
const now = Date.now();
for (const sub of subscribers) {
db.insert(schema.peerApprovalNotifications)
.values({
id: generateSnowflake(),
userId: sub.userId,
kind: 'denied',
peerOrigin: approvalReq.origin,
triggerReason: sub.triggerReason,
triggerTarget: sub.triggerTarget,
createdAt: now,
readAt: null,
})
.run();
connectionManager.sendToUser(sub.userId, {
type: 'peering_notification_received' as const,
kind: 'denied',
});
// Subscriber row is about to cascade-delete; refresh the user's pending list.
connectionManager.sendToUser(sub.userId, {
type: 'peering_subscription_changed' as const,
});
}
// Cascade-delete clears subscribers via onDelete: 'cascade'.
db.delete(schema.peerApprovalRequests)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalRequests.id, approvalReq.id))
.run();
// Tell admins the queue changed.
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
if (subscribers.length > 0) {
console.log(
`[federation] handleOutboundDeny denied ${subscribers.length} subscriber notification${subscribers.length === 1 ? '' : 's'} for ${approvalReq.origin}`,
);
}
return reply.code(200).send({ success: true });
}
export function registerApprovalRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): void {
// ─── GET /api/federation/approval-requests ─────────────────────────────────
app.get(
'/api/federation/approval-requests',
{ preHandler: [authenticate, requireAdmin] },
async (_request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
const requests = db
.select({
id: schema.peerApprovalRequests.id,
origin: schema.peerApprovalRequests.origin,
direction: schema.peerApprovalRequests.direction,
instanceName: schema.peerApprovalRequests.instanceName,
requestedAt: schema.peerApprovalRequests.requestedAt,
expiresAt: schema.peerApprovalRequests.expiresAt,
})
.from(schema.peerApprovalRequests)
.orderBy(desc(schema.peerApprovalRequests.requestedAt))
.all();
// For outbound rows, fetch subscriber summaries (joined with users for username).
// Inbound rows have no subscriber concept; field is omitted in their response.
const outboundIds = requests.filter(r => r.direction === 'outbound').map(r => r.id);
const subscribersByRequestId = new Map<string, ApprovalRequestSubscriberSummary[]>();
if (outboundIds.length > 0) {
const rows = db
.select({
requestId: schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.requestId,
userId: schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.userId,
username: schema.users.username,
triggerReason: schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.triggerReason,
triggerTarget: schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.triggerTarget,
})
.from(schema.peerApprovalSubscribers)
.innerJoin(schema.users, eq(schema.users.id, schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.userId))
.where(inArray(schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.requestId, outboundIds))
.all();
for (const row of rows) {
const arr = subscribersByRequestId.get(row.requestId) ?? [];
arr.push({
userId: row.userId,
username: row.username,
triggerReason: row.triggerReason as PeeringTriggerReason,
triggerTarget: row.triggerTarget,
});
subscribersByRequestId.set(row.requestId, arr);
}
}
return reply.code(200).send({
requests: requests.map(r =>
r.direction === 'outbound'
? { ...r, subscribers: subscribersByRequestId.get(r.id) ?? [] }
: r,
),
});
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/approval-requests/:id/approve ───────────────────
// Direction-branched: inbound rows complete the existing accept-handshake
// path (preserved verbatim); outbound rows initiate /peer/accept against
// the remote, capturing 200/202 outcomes and leaving the queue intact on
// failure so the admin can retry.
app.post<{ Params: { id: string } }>(
'/api/federation/approval-requests/:id/approve',
{ preHandler: [authenticate, requireAdmin] },
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
const { id } = request.params;
const approvalReq = db
.select()
.from(schema.peerApprovalRequests)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalRequests.id, id))
.get();
if (!approvalReq) {
return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'Approval request not found', statusCode: 404 });
}
let localOrigin: string;
try {
localOrigin = resolveLocalOrigin();
} catch {
return reply.code(500).send({
error: 'Cannot determine local instance origin. Set the DOMAIN environment variable.',
statusCode: 500,
});
}
if (approvalReq.direction === 'outbound') {
return await handleOutboundApprove(approvalReq, localOrigin, reply);
}
return await handleInboundApprove(approvalReq, localOrigin, reply);
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/approval-requests/:id/deny ───────────────────────
// Direction-branched: inbound rows hit the remote's /peer/denied endpoint
// (existing behavior preserved); outbound rows fan out denied notifications
// to subscribers and cascade-delete the queue row.
app.post<{ Params: { id: string } }>(
'/api/federation/approval-requests/:id/deny',
{ preHandler: [authenticate, requireAdmin] },
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
const { id } = request.params;
const approvalReq = db
.select()
.from(schema.peerApprovalRequests)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalRequests.id, id))
.get();
if (!approvalReq) {
return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'Approval request not found', statusCode: 404 });
}
if (approvalReq.direction === 'outbound') {
return await handleOutboundDeny(approvalReq, reply);
}
return await handleInboundDeny(approvalReq, reply);
},
);
// ─── GET /api/federation/peering-subscriptions ─────────────────────────────
// User-facing: list the requesting user's pending outbound peering
// subscriber rows joined to their parent peer_approval_requests. Used by the
// pending-peering UI surface to show "you have a peering with X waiting on
// your admin's approval" rows.
app.get(
'/api/federation/peering-subscriptions',
{ preHandler: [authenticate] },
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
const userId = request.userId;
const rows = db
.select({
id: schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.id,
requestId: schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.requestId,
peerOrigin: schema.peerApprovalRequests.origin,
peerInstanceName: schema.peerApprovalRequests.instanceName,
triggerReason: schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.triggerReason,
triggerTarget: schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.triggerTarget,
createdAt: schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.createdAt,
})
.from(schema.peerApprovalSubscribers)
.innerJoin(
schema.peerApprovalRequests,
eq(schema.peerApprovalRequests.id, schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.requestId),
)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.userId, userId))
.orderBy(desc(schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.createdAt))
.all();
return reply.send({ subscriptions: rows });
},
);
// ─── DELETE /api/federation/peering-subscriptions/:id ──────────────────────
// User-facing: cancel one of the requesting user's pending peering
// subscriptions. Authorization: subscriber.userId must match request.userId.
// If this was the last subscriber for its parent request, the parent
// cascade-deletes too (avoids zombie outbound rows in the admin queue).
// No notification is created for the canceller (per spec §4.3 (iii)).
app.delete<{ Params: { id: string } }>(
'/api/federation/peering-subscriptions/:id',
{ preHandler: [authenticate] },
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
const { id } = request.params;
const userId = request.userId;
const sub = db
.select()
.from(schema.peerApprovalSubscribers)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.id, id))
.get();
if (!sub) {
return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'subscription_not_found', statusCode: 404 });
}
if (sub.userId !== userId) {
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'forbidden', statusCode: 403 });
}
db.delete(schema.peerApprovalSubscribers)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.id, id))
.run();
// If the row we just removed was the last subscriber on its parent
// peer_approval_request, cascade-delete the parent. The admin queue
// refreshes via federation_peers_changed.
const remaining = db
.select({ id: schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.id })
.from(schema.peerApprovalSubscribers)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalSubscribers.requestId, sub.requestId))
.all();
if (remaining.length === 0) {
db.delete(schema.peerApprovalRequests)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalRequests.id, sub.requestId))
.run();
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
}
connectionManager.sendToUser(userId, { type: 'peering_subscription_changed' as const });
return reply.send({ success: true });
},
);
// ─── GET /api/federation/peering-notifications ─────────────────────────────
// User-facing: list the requesting user's terminal-state peering
// notifications (kind='approved'|'denied'|'expired'). Optional ?unread=1
// filter narrows to rows where readAt IS NULL. Ordered DESC by createdAt
// (newest first).
app.get<{ Querystring: { unread?: string } }>(
'/api/federation/peering-notifications',
{ preHandler: [authenticate] },
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
const userId = request.userId;
const unread = request.query?.unread === '1';
const whereClause = unread
? and(
eq(schema.peerApprovalNotifications.userId, userId),
isNull(schema.peerApprovalNotifications.readAt),
)
: eq(schema.peerApprovalNotifications.userId, userId);
const notifications = db
.select({
id: schema.peerApprovalNotifications.id,
kind: schema.peerApprovalNotifications.kind,
peerOrigin: schema.peerApprovalNotifications.peerOrigin,
triggerReason: schema.peerApprovalNotifications.triggerReason,
triggerTarget: schema.peerApprovalNotifications.triggerTarget,
createdAt: schema.peerApprovalNotifications.createdAt,
readAt: schema.peerApprovalNotifications.readAt,
})
.from(schema.peerApprovalNotifications)
.where(whereClause)
.orderBy(desc(schema.peerApprovalNotifications.createdAt))
.all();
return reply.send({ notifications });
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/peering-notifications/:id/read ───────────────────
// User-facing: mark a single peering notification as read. Authorization:
// notification.userId must match request.userId.
app.post<{ Params: { id: string } }>(
'/api/federation/peering-notifications/:id/read',
{ preHandler: [authenticate] },
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
const { id } = request.params;
const userId = request.userId;
const notif = db
.select()
.from(schema.peerApprovalNotifications)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalNotifications.id, id))
.get();
if (!notif) {
return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'notification_not_found', statusCode: 404 });
}
if (notif.userId !== userId) {
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'forbidden', statusCode: 403 });
}
db.update(schema.peerApprovalNotifications)
.set({ readAt: Date.now() })
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalNotifications.id, id))
.run();
return reply.send({ success: true });
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/peering-notifications/read-all ───────────────────
// User-facing: mark all the requesting user's unread peering notifications
// as read. Already-read rows are NOT touched (their readAt is preserved).
// Returns the count of rows affected for UI feedback.
app.post(
'/api/federation/peering-notifications/read-all',
{ preHandler: [authenticate] },
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
const userId = request.userId;
const result = db
.update(schema.peerApprovalNotifications)
.set({ readAt: Date.now() })
.where(
and(
eq(schema.peerApprovalNotifications.userId, userId),
isNull(schema.peerApprovalNotifications.readAt),
),
)
.run();
return reply.send({ success: true, count: result.changes });
},
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,348 @@
import path from 'node:path';
import { config } from '../../../config.js';
import { getDb, getRawDb, schema } from '../../../db/index.js';
import { authenticate } from '../../../utils/auth.js';
import { fetchHomeProfileByHomeId, verifyAttachProofWithPeer } from '../../../utils/federationAttach.js';
import { buildFederationHeaders, getOurOrigin, parseFederationHeaders, verifyPeerSignature } from '../../../utils/federationAuth.js';
import { sanitizeUser } from '../../../utils/sanitize.js';
import { collectProfileBroadcastTargetIds } from '../../../utils/userDeletion.js';
import { connectionManager } from '../../../ws/handler.js';
import { and, eq, isNull, or } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
import type { DmChannel } from '@backspace/shared';
import type { FastifyInstance, FastifyReply } from 'fastify';
import { buildDmChannelPayload } from '../dmChannels.js';
import { extractDomain } from '../identity.js';
import { downloadProfileAsset } from '../profile.js';
import { isLookupRateLimited, isNonceDuplicate } from '../rateLimits.js';
import { reconcileDmChannelFederatedId } from '../reconciliation.js';
import type { DmReconcileResult } from '../reconciliation.js';
export function registerAttachRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): void {
// ─── POST /api/federation/verify-attach-proof ───────────────────────────────
// Server-to-server: verify a one-time attach-proof token minted by
// /api/auth/attach-proof (re-attach spec §3.1). The token is single-use (an
// atomic claim guarantees only one concurrent verification can win) and is
// bound to the CALLING peer's domain — the binding is checked against the
// authenticated peer row (extractDomain(peer.origin)), NEVER trusted from the
// request body. This is the anti-replay control: a compromised requester
// cannot redeem a token minted for a different peer. The response is HMAC-
// signed (epoch pattern) so the caller can trust the identity it carries; all
// failure modes fail closed to a signed { valid: false }.
app.post<{ Body: { token?: unknown } }>(
'/api/federation/verify-attach-proof',
{ bodyLimit: 4 * 1024 },
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
const rawDb = getRawDb();
// 1. Verify HMAC headers (mirror by-home-id / users-lookup).
const fedHeaders = parseFederationHeaders(request.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>);
if (!fedHeaders) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Missing or malformed federation headers', statusCode: 401 });
}
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, fedHeaders.origin))
.get();
if (!peer || peer.status !== 'active') {
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'Unknown or inactive peer', statusCode: 403 });
}
if (isLookupRateLimited(peer.origin)) {
return reply.code(429).header('Retry-After', '60').send({ error: 'Rate limit exceeded', statusCode: 429 });
}
const bodyString = JSON.stringify(request.body);
if (!verifyPeerSignature(bodyString, fedHeaders.signature, fedHeaders.timestamp, fedHeaders.nonce, peer)) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Invalid signature', statusCode: 401 });
}
// Replay protection
if (fedHeaders.nonce) {
if (isNonceDuplicate(peer.origin, fedHeaders.nonce)) {
return reply.code(409).send({ error: 'Duplicate nonce — possible replay', statusCode: 409 });
}
} else if (peer.nonceSupported) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Nonce required — peer previously supported nonces', statusCode: 401 });
}
// 2. Sign every downstream response with the peer's shared secret so the
// caller can trust the identity (or the fail-closed verdict) it carries.
const sendSigned = (payload: { valid: false } | { valid: true; homeUserId: string; username: string }): FastifyReply => {
const responseBody = JSON.stringify(payload);
const sigHeaders = buildFederationHeaders(responseBody, peer.hmacSecret, getOurOrigin());
reply.headers({
'X-Federation-Signature': sigHeaders['X-Federation-Signature'],
'X-Federation-Timestamp': sigHeaders['X-Federation-Timestamp'],
'X-Federation-Nonce': sigHeaders['X-Federation-Nonce'],
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
});
return reply.code(200).send(responseBody);
};
// 3. Validate the token shape (64 hex chars, as minted by attach-proof).
const rawToken = (request.body as { token?: unknown } | null)?.token;
if (typeof rawToken !== 'string' || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(rawToken)) {
return sendSigned({ valid: false });
}
// 4. Atomic single-use claim. The domain binding is server-side: the
// token's target_domain must equal the AUTHENTICATED peer's domain, never
// a value from the request body. Concurrent verifications cannot both win
// because only the first UPDATE that flips used_at from NULL matches.
const peerDomain = extractDomain(peer.origin).toLowerCase();
const now = Date.now();
const claimed = rawDb.prepare(`
UPDATE federation_attach_proofs
SET used_at = ?
WHERE token = ? AND used_at IS NULL AND expires_at > ? AND lower(target_domain) = ?
RETURNING home_user_id
`).get(now, rawToken, now, peerDomain) as { home_user_id: string } | undefined;
if (!claimed) {
return sendSigned({ valid: false });
}
// 5. Re-confirm the home user is still native (not tombstoned, not turned
// into a replicated stub) since the token was minted.
const homeUser = db
.select()
.from(schema.users)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.users.id, claimed.home_user_id),
eq(schema.users.isDeleted, 0),
isNull(schema.users.homeInstance),
),
)
.get();
if (!homeUser) {
return sendSigned({ valid: false });
}
return sendSigned({ valid: true, homeUserId: homeUser.id, username: homeUser.username });
},
);
// ─── POST /api/users/@me/reattach ────────────────────────────────────────────
// Owner-initiated exception to the detach invariant (re-attach spec §3.2).
// Requires BOTH identities: the session proves the detached account (local
// password authority), the one-time token — verified with the home peer over
// signed S2S — proves the new home account. Registered here rather than in
// users.ts because it consumes federation-internal machinery (peer HMAC
// channel, profile fetch, asset download). URL path stays /api/users/@me/*.
app.post<{ Body: { token?: unknown } }>('/api/users/@me/reattach', {
preHandler: authenticate,
config: { rateLimit: { max: 5, timeWindow: '15 minutes' } },
}, async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
const rawDb = getRawDb();
const rawToken = (request.body as { token?: unknown } | null)?.token;
if (typeof rawToken !== 'string' || !/^[0-9a-f]{64}$/i.test(rawToken)) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'token is required (64-char hex)', statusCode: 400 });
}
// Guard 1: session user must be a LIVE detached federated account. A missing
// or tombstoned row is a 404 (nothing to re-attach); a live non-detached /
// native account is a 403 (re-attach is meaningless — it already syncs).
const detached = db.select().from(schema.users).where(eq(schema.users.id, request.userId)).get();
if (!detached || detached.isDeleted === 1) {
return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'User not found', statusCode: 404 });
}
if (!detached.homeInstance || detached.federationHomeOrphaned !== 1) {
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'Only detached accounts can re-attach', statusCode: 403 });
}
// Guard 2: the home domain must be an ACTIVE peer — the proof is only as
// trustworthy as the S2S channel it is verified over.
const homeDomain = extractDomain(detached.homeInstance).toLowerCase();
const normPeer = (origin: string) => extractDomain(origin).toLowerCase();
const peerRow = db.select().from(schema.federationPeers).all()
.find(p => normPeer(p.origin) === homeDomain && p.status === 'active');
if (!peerRow) {
return reply.code(409).send({ error: 'Home instance is not an active peer', statusCode: 409 });
}
// Guard 3: verify the one-time proof with the home instance (fails closed).
const verified = await verifyAttachProofWithPeer(peerRow, rawToken);
if (!verified.valid) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Attach proof could not be verified', statusCode: 401 });
}
// Guard 4: if the new identity already has a local row for this domain, it
// MUST be a replicated stub (the merge source, §3.3). A real account holding
// it means state corruption — abort loudly, do not merge.
const normHome = `lower(replace(replace(coalesce(home_instance, ''), 'https://', ''), 'http://', ''))`;
const existingRow = rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT id, password_hash FROM users
WHERE home_user_id = ? AND ${normHome} = ? AND is_deleted = 0 AND id != ?
`).get(verified.homeUserId, homeDomain, detached.id) as { id: string; password_hash: string } | undefined;
if (existingRow && existingRow.password_hash !== '!federation-replicated') {
console.error(`[federation] Re-attach conflict: identity ${verified.homeUserId}@${homeDomain} held by non-stub account ${existingRow.id}`);
return reply.code(409).send({ error: 'The new identity is already bound to another account on this instance', statusCode: 409 });
}
// Username: adopt the new home base when it differs (existing collision-suffix
// scheme). Usernames are not identity, so a base match keeps the current handle.
const currentBase = detached.username.includes('@')
? detached.username.slice(0, detached.username.indexOf('@'))
: detached.username;
let newUsername = detached.username;
const newBase = verified.username.toLowerCase();
if (newBase !== currentBase.toLowerCase()) {
let candidate = `${newBase}@${homeDomain}`;
let attempt = 0;
while (rawDb.prepare(`SELECT 1 FROM users WHERE username = ? AND id != ?`).get(candidate, detached.id)) {
attempt++;
candidate = `${newBase}_${attempt}@${homeDomain}`;
if (attempt > 10) {
candidate = `${newBase}_${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}@${homeDomain}`;
break;
}
}
newUsername = candidate;
}
// Merge + re-bind, atomically. All users.id FK repointing lives here; dedupe
// rows that would collide on a composite PK / unique index BEFORE repointing
// (spec §3.3). The stub row is the only source — a real account holding the
// identity was already rejected by guard 4.
const dmReconcileResults: DmReconcileResult[] = [];
rawDb.transaction(() => {
if (existingRow) {
const stubId = existingRow.id;
const targetId = detached.id;
// dm_members (composite PK dm_channel_id+user_id → dedupe): drop the
// stub's membership where the detached row is already a member.
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM dm_members WHERE user_id = ? AND dm_channel_id IN (SELECT dm_channel_id FROM dm_members WHERE user_id = ?)`).run(stubId, targetId);
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE dm_members SET user_id = ? WHERE user_id = ?`).run(targetId, stubId);
// dm_messages / messages (RESTRICT FK, no unique on user_id → straight repoint).
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE dm_messages SET user_id = ? WHERE user_id = ?`).run(targetId, stubId);
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE messages SET user_id = ? WHERE user_id = ?`).run(targetId, stubId);
// attachments.uploader_id (plain text column, NO FK, no unique → straight
// repoint). A replicated stub that uploaded a DM/channel attachment would
// otherwise leave uploader_id dangling at the deleted stub's id — broken
// attribution.
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE attachments SET uploader_id = ? WHERE uploader_id = ?`).run(targetId, stubId);
// dm_reactions (dedupe on dm_message_id+emoji per user).
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM dm_reactions WHERE user_id = ? AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM dm_reactions r2 WHERE r2.user_id = ? AND r2.dm_message_id = dm_reactions.dm_message_id AND r2.emoji = dm_reactions.emoji)`).run(stubId, targetId);
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE dm_reactions SET user_id = ? WHERE user_id = ?`).run(targetId, stubId);
// reactions (dedupe on message_id+emoji per user).
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM reactions WHERE user_id = ? AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM reactions r2 WHERE r2.user_id = ? AND r2.message_id = reactions.message_id AND r2.emoji = reactions.emoji)`).run(stubId, targetId);
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE reactions SET user_id = ? WHERE user_id = ?`).run(targetId, stubId);
// friends (composite PK user_id+friend_id → dedupe both directions, then
// repoint, then drop any self-friendship the repoint created).
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM friends WHERE user_id = ? AND friend_id IN (SELECT friend_id FROM friends WHERE user_id = ?)`).run(stubId, targetId);
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM friends WHERE friend_id = ? AND user_id IN (SELECT user_id FROM friends WHERE friend_id = ?)`).run(stubId, targetId);
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE friends SET user_id = ? WHERE user_id = ?`).run(targetId, stubId);
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE friends SET friend_id = ? WHERE friend_id = ?`).run(targetId, stubId);
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM friends WHERE user_id = friend_id`).run();
// friend_requests (unique on neither col alone; repoint both, drop self-rows).
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE friend_requests SET from_id = ? WHERE from_id = ?`).run(targetId, stubId);
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE friend_requests SET to_id = ? WHERE to_id = ?`).run(targetId, stubId);
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM friend_requests WHERE from_id = to_id`).run();
// read_states (composite PK user_id+channel_id → dedupe).
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM read_states WHERE user_id = ? AND channel_id IN (SELECT channel_id FROM read_states WHERE user_id = ?)`).run(stubId, targetId);
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE read_states SET user_id = ? WHERE user_id = ?`).run(targetId, stubId);
// dm_channels.owner_id (plain text column, NO FK → straight repoint).
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE dm_channels SET owner_id = ? WHERE owner_id = ?`).run(targetId, stubId);
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM users WHERE id = ?`).run(stubId);
}
// Group-DM ownership continuity: channels the OLD identity owned keep
// authority under the NEW identity (owner_home_user_id is the S2S
// authority key, not a users.id FK).
const normOwnerHome = `lower(replace(replace(coalesce(owner_home_instance, ''), 'https://', ''), 'http://', ''))`;
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE dm_channels SET owner_home_user_id = ? WHERE owner_home_user_id = ? AND ${normOwnerHome} = ?`)
.run(verified.homeUserId, detached.homeUserId, homeDomain);
// Re-bind. profile_updated_at is nulled so the home's next profile_update
// (any version) tier-1 matches and applies (the accept-and-skip guards
// only fire on federation_home_orphaned = 1).
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE users SET home_user_id = ?, federation_home_orphaned = 0, username = ?, profile_updated_at = NULL WHERE id = ?`)
.run(verified.homeUserId, newUsername, detached.id);
// Reconcile the account's 1-on-1 DM channels: the home_user_id just
// changed, so every 1-on-1 federatedId derived from it is now stale.
// Re-key or merge each into its new-identity channel so history stays a
// single conversation (reattach-dm-reconcile spec §3.2). Group DMs (UUID
// federatedId / != 2 members) are skipped by the helper.
const oneOnOne = rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT c.id FROM dm_channels c
WHERE c.deleted_at IS NULL
AND c.federated_id IS NOT NULL
AND EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM dm_members m WHERE m.dm_channel_id = c.id AND m.user_id = ?)
AND (SELECT count(*) FROM dm_members m2 WHERE m2.dm_channel_id = c.id) = 2
`).all(detached.id) as Array<{ id: string }>;
for (const c of oneOnOne) {
// A merge earlier in this loop may have deleted this id — reconcile
// returns noop for a missing/mutated channel, so the loop is convergent.
const result = reconcileDmChannelFederatedId(rawDb, c.id);
if (result.action !== 'noop') dmReconcileResults.push(result);
}
})();
// Best-effort initial profile pull (spec §3.2 step 4). Failure is fine — the
// account is re-attached; the next relay fills the profile.
const home = await fetchHomeProfileByHomeId(peerRow, verified.homeUserId);
if (home) {
let avatar: string | null = null;
let banner: string | null = null;
if (home.profile.avatar) {
const url = home.profile.avatar.startsWith('http') ? home.profile.avatar : `${peerRow.origin}/api/uploads/${home.profile.avatar}`;
avatar = (await downloadProfileAsset(url, peerRow.origin)) ?? url;
}
if (home.profile.banner) {
const url = home.profile.banner.startsWith('http') ? home.profile.banner : `${peerRow.origin}/api/uploads/${home.profile.banner}`;
banner = (await downloadProfileAsset(url, peerRow.origin)) ?? url;
}
db.update(schema.users).set({
displayName: home.profile.displayName ?? home.username,
avatar,
banner,
avatarColor: home.profile.avatarColor ?? detached.avatarColor,
bio: home.profile.bio,
}).where(eq(schema.users.id, detached.id)).run();
}
const updated = db.select().from(schema.users).where(eq(schema.users.id, detached.id)).get()!;
console.log(`[federation] Re-attached account ${updated.id} (${updated.username}): ${detached.homeUserId}${verified.homeUserId} @ ${homeDomain}`);
// Broadcast to friends / DM / space co-members + all self connections.
const targetIds = collectProfileBroadcastTargetIds(updated.id);
targetIds.add(updated.id);
for (const uid of targetIds) {
connectionManager.sendToUser(uid, { type: 'user_updated' as const, user: sanitizeUser(updated, uid === updated.id) });
}
// Push DM-list refresh for reconciled channels to affected local members so
// the merged/re-keyed conversation replaces the split without a reload
// (reattach-dm-reconcile spec §3.4). Reuses existing events, no new type:
// - merged: dm_channel_closed removes the stale source entry; dm_channel_created
// (full DmChannel payload — the client handler reads dmChannel.members) resurfaces
// the surviving target with its merged history.
// - rekeyed: dm_channel_created upserts the channel by id (spaceStore.addDmChannel
// replaces by id), refreshing the now-stale federatedId in place. dm_channel_updated
// would only patch name/icon, not federatedId, so it cannot heal the client here.
for (const r of dmReconcileResults) {
const targetPayload = buildDmChannelPayload(r.targetChannelId, db);
for (const uid of r.affectedUserIds) {
if (r.action === 'merged') {
connectionManager.sendToUser(uid, { type: 'dm_channel_closed' as const, dmChannelId: r.channelId });
}
if (targetPayload) {
connectionManager.sendToUser(uid, { type: 'dm_channel_created' as const, dmChannel: targetPayload });
}
}
}
return reply.code(200).send({ success: true, user: sanitizeUser(updated, true) });
});
}
@@ -0,0 +1,190 @@
import { getDb, schema } from '../../../db/index.js';
import { parseFederationHeaders, verifyPeerSignature } from '../../../utils/federationAuth.js';
import { and, eq, isNull, or } from 'drizzle-orm';
import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { isLookupRateLimited, isNonceDuplicate } from '../rateLimits.js';
export function registerLookupRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): void {
// ─── POST /api/federation/users/lookup ─────────────────────────────────────
// Server-to-server: resolve a username on this instance to its canonical
// (homeUserId, profile snapshot). Used by another instance to construct a
// friend_request_create event without requiring a federated user account.
//
// Returns 200 with profile snapshot for native users (regardless of the
// user's `discoverable` setting — exact-handle resolution).
// Returns 404 for tombstoned users, replicated stubs, or unknown usernames.
app.post<{ Body: { username?: unknown } }>(
'/api/federation/users/lookup',
{ bodyLimit: 4 * 1024 },
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
// 1. Verify HMAC (mirror relay endpoint)
const fedHeaders = parseFederationHeaders(request.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>);
if (!fedHeaders) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Missing or malformed federation headers', statusCode: 401 });
}
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, fedHeaders.origin))
.get();
if (!peer || peer.status !== 'active') {
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'Unknown or inactive peer', statusCode: 403 });
}
if (isLookupRateLimited(peer.origin)) {
return reply.code(429).header('Retry-After', '60').send({ error: 'Rate limit exceeded', statusCode: 429 });
}
const bodyString = JSON.stringify(request.body);
if (!verifyPeerSignature(bodyString, fedHeaders.signature, fedHeaders.timestamp, fedHeaders.nonce, peer)) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Invalid signature', statusCode: 401 });
}
// 1b. Nonce-based replay protection
if (fedHeaders.nonce) {
if (isNonceDuplicate(peer.origin, fedHeaders.nonce)) {
return reply.code(409).send({ error: 'Duplicate nonce — possible replay', statusCode: 409 });
}
} else if (peer.nonceSupported) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Nonce required — peer previously supported nonces', statusCode: 401 });
}
// 2. Validate body
const rawUsername = (request.body as { username?: unknown } | null)?.username;
if (typeof rawUsername !== 'string') {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'username is required (string)', statusCode: 400 });
}
const username = rawUsername.trim().toLowerCase();
if (!username) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'username is required', statusCode: 400 });
}
// 3. Native-only lookup with isDeleted filter; discoverable is NOT consulted.
const user = db
.select()
.from(schema.users)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.users.username, username),
eq(schema.users.isDeleted, 0),
isNull(schema.users.homeInstance),
),
)
.get();
if (!user) {
return reply.code(404).send({ found: false, code: 'user_not_found' });
}
return reply.code(200).send({
found: true,
user: {
homeUserId: user.id,
username: user.username,
profile: {
displayName: user.displayName,
avatar: user.avatar,
avatarColor: user.avatarColor,
banner: user.banner,
bio: user.bio,
status: user.status as 'online' | 'idle' | 'dnd' | 'offline' | null,
},
},
});
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/users/by-home-id ──────────────────────────────────
// Server-to-server: reverse-lookup a homeUserId to its canonical username +
// profile snapshot. Used by the stub-username backfill worker on peers that
// hold legacy snowflake-named replicas of users now visible by their real
// handle. Same auth+rate-limit shape as /users/lookup.
app.post<{ Body: { homeUserId?: unknown } }>(
'/api/federation/users/by-home-id',
{ bodyLimit: 4 * 1024 },
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
// 1. Verify HMAC headers
const fedHeaders = parseFederationHeaders(request.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>);
if (!fedHeaders) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Missing or malformed federation headers', statusCode: 401 });
}
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, fedHeaders.origin))
.get();
if (!peer || peer.status !== 'active') {
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'Unknown or inactive peer', statusCode: 403 });
}
if (isLookupRateLimited(peer.origin)) {
return reply.code(429).header('Retry-After', '60').send({ error: 'Rate limit exceeded', statusCode: 429 });
}
const bodyString = JSON.stringify(request.body);
if (!verifyPeerSignature(bodyString, fedHeaders.signature, fedHeaders.timestamp, fedHeaders.nonce, peer)) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Invalid signature', statusCode: 401 });
}
// Replay protection
if (fedHeaders.nonce) {
if (isNonceDuplicate(peer.origin, fedHeaders.nonce)) {
return reply.code(409).send({ error: 'Duplicate nonce — possible replay', statusCode: 409 });
}
} else if (peer.nonceSupported) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Nonce required — peer previously supported nonces', statusCode: 401 });
}
// 2. Validate body
const rawId = (request.body as { homeUserId?: unknown } | null)?.homeUserId;
if (typeof rawId !== 'string' || rawId.trim().length === 0) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'homeUserId is required (string)', statusCode: 400 });
}
const homeUserId = rawId.trim();
// 3. Native-only lookup. Match by id (canonical native id) OR home_user_id
// (backfilled column natives carry to satisfy tier-1 lookups). Excludes
// tombstoned and replicated stubs.
const user = db
.select()
.from(schema.users)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.users.isDeleted, 0),
isNull(schema.users.homeInstance),
or(eq(schema.users.id, homeUserId), eq(schema.users.homeUserId, homeUserId)),
),
)
.get();
if (!user) {
return reply.code(200).send({ found: false });
}
return reply.code(200).send({
found: true,
user: {
homeUserId: user.homeUserId ?? user.id,
username: user.username,
profile: {
displayName: user.displayName,
avatar: user.avatar,
avatarColor: user.avatarColor,
status: user.status as 'online' | 'idle' | 'dnd' | 'offline' | null,
banner: user.banner,
bio: user.bio,
},
},
});
},
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,426 @@
import path from 'node:path';
import { getDb, schema } from '../../../db/index.js';
import { authenticate, requireAdmin } from '../../../utils/auth.js';
import { buildFederationHeaders, generateHmacSecret } from '../../../utils/federationAuth.js';
import { onPeerDeactivated } from '../../../utils/federationPeerActivation.js';
import { probePeerReachable, recoverOrDetectReset } from '../../../utils/federationRecovery.js';
import { homeInstanceMatch } from '../../../utils/federationReset.js';
import { connectionManager } from '../../../ws/handler.js';
import { and, eq, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { resolveLocalOrigin, sanitizePeer } from '../origin.js';
export function registerPeerAdminRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): void {
// ─── GET /api/federation/peers ─────────────────────────────────────────────
// Admin-only: list all federation peers (hmacSecret excluded).
app.get(
'/api/federation/peers',
{ preHandler: [authenticate, requireAdmin] },
async (_request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
const peers = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.all();
return reply.code(200).send({ peers: peers.map(sanitizePeer) });
},
);
// ─── GET /api/federation/reset-events ──────────────────────────────────────
// Admin-only: the durable reset journal + per-origin orphaned real accounts,
// for the "Reset cleanup" admin surface (instance-epoch self-healing §6.4).
// Read-only; disposition actions reuse the existing one-click Re-peer (reset
// + initiate) and the existing DELETE /api/admin/users/:id (full-purge Remove).
app.get(
'/api/federation/reset-events',
{ preHandler: [authenticate, requireAdmin] },
async (_request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
const events = db.select().from(schema.federationResetEvents).all();
const result = events.map((ev) => {
const accounts = db
.select({
id: schema.users.id,
username: schema.users.username,
displayName: schema.users.displayName,
avatarColor: schema.users.avatarColor,
})
.from(schema.users)
.where(and(
eq(schema.users.federationHomeOrphaned, 1),
eq(schema.users.isDeleted, 0),
homeInstanceMatch(ev.origin),
))
.all();
const orphanedAccounts = accounts.map((a) => {
const ownedSpaces = db
.select({ id: schema.spaces.id, name: schema.spaces.name })
.from(schema.spaces)
.where(eq(schema.spaces.ownerId, a.id))
.all();
const spaceMemberCount = db
.select({ n: sql<number>`count(*)` })
.from(schema.spaceMembers)
.where(eq(schema.spaceMembers.userId, a.id))
.get()?.n ?? 0;
const messageCount = db
.select({ n: sql<number>`count(*)` })
.from(schema.messages)
.where(eq(schema.messages.userId, a.id))
.get()?.n ?? 0;
return { ...a, ownedSpaces, spaceMemberCount, messageCount };
});
return {
origin: ev.origin,
deadEpoch: ev.deadEpoch,
newEpoch: ev.newEpoch,
detectedAt: ev.detectedAt,
resolvedAt: ev.resolvedAt,
stubCount: ev.stubCount,
orphanedAccountCount: ev.orphanedAccountCount,
acknowledgedAt: ev.acknowledgedAt,
orphanedAccounts,
};
});
return reply.code(200).send({ events: result });
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/reset-events/acknowledge ─────────────────────────
// Admin-only: dismiss a reset event from the admin banner. Purely
// informational state — detached accounts stay detached and functional;
// acknowledging just stops the surface from re-listing them (detach spec §4.6).
app.post<{ Body: { origin: string } }>(
'/api/federation/reset-events/acknowledge',
{ preHandler: [authenticate, requireAdmin] },
async (request, reply) => {
const { origin } = request.body;
if (!origin || typeof origin !== 'string') {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'origin is required', statusCode: 400 });
}
const db = getDb();
const existing = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationResetEvents)
.where(eq(schema.federationResetEvents.origin, origin))
.get();
if (!existing) {
return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'No reset event for this origin', statusCode: 404 });
}
if (existing.acknowledgedAt === null) {
db.update(schema.federationResetEvents)
.set({ acknowledgedAt: Date.now() })
.where(eq(schema.federationResetEvents.origin, origin))
.run();
}
return reply.code(200).send({ success: true });
},
);
// ─── DELETE /api/federation/peers/:id ──────────────────────────────────────
// Admin-only: revoke a federation peer and clean up its outbox.
app.delete<{ Params: { id: string } }>(
'/api/federation/peers/:id',
{ preHandler: [authenticate, requireAdmin] },
async (request, reply) => {
const { id } = request.params;
const db = getDb();
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, id))
.get();
if (!peer) {
return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'Peer not found', statusCode: 404 });
}
// Revoke the peer
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({ status: 'revoked' })
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, id))
.run();
onPeerDeactivated(id, 'admin_revoked').catch(err =>
console.error('[federation] onPeerDeactivated from admin revoke failed:', err),
);
// Delete all outbox entries for this peer
db.delete(schema.federationOutbox)
.where(eq(schema.federationOutbox.peerId, id))
.run();
return reply.code(200).send({ success: true });
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/peers/:id/reset ──────────────────────────────────
// Admin-only: reset a peer that has transitioned to needs_attention.
// Deletes the local peer row (cascade-deletes outbox entries via FK).
// Admin must re-initiate peering out of band after reset.
app.post<{ Params: { id: string } }>(
'/api/federation/peers/:id/reset',
{ preHandler: [authenticate, requireAdmin] },
async (request, reply) => {
const { id } = request.params;
const db = getDb();
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, id))
.get();
if (!peer) {
return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'Peer not found', statusCode: 404 });
}
if (peer.status !== 'needs_attention') {
return reply.code(400).send({
error: 'Reset is only available for peers in the needs_attention state. Use revoke for active peers.',
statusCode: 400,
});
}
// Cascade-delete handles federation_outbox entries (FK onDelete: 'cascade').
db.delete(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, id))
.run();
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
return reply.code(200).send({ success: true });
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/peers/:id/recheck ────────────────────────────────
// Admin-only: run an immediate reachability probe on an unreachable peer.
// On success the peer transitions to active (outbox flushes on the next tick).
app.post<{ Params: { id: string } }>(
'/api/federation/peers/:id/recheck',
{ preHandler: [authenticate, requireAdmin] },
async (request, reply) => {
const { id } = request.params;
const db = getDb();
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, id))
.get();
if (!peer) {
return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'Peer not found', statusCode: 404 });
}
if (peer.status !== 'unreachable') {
return reply.code(400).send({
error: 'Recheck is only available for unreachable peers.',
statusCode: 400,
});
}
const probe = await probePeerReachable(peer.origin);
if (probe.reachable) {
const outcome = await recoverOrDetectReset(peer, probe);
if (outcome === 'reset_detected') {
// The peer is a new incarnation on the same domain. It was routed to
// needs_attention (detection-only, no rekey) and must NOT be recovered
// to active until an admin re-peers through the authenticated path.
return reply.code(200).send({ recovered: false, status: 'needs_attention' });
}
return reply.code(200).send({ recovered: true, status: 'active' });
}
// Probe failed — advance pacing so a manual attempt stays consistent with
// the recovery worker's schedule.
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({ probeAttempts: peer.probeAttempts + 1, lastProbeAt: Date.now() })
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peer.id))
.run();
return reply.code(200).send({ recovered: false, status: 'unreachable' });
},
);
// ─── PATCH /api/federation/peers/:id ────────────────────────────────────────
// Admin-only: update peer settings (e.g. auto-rotation interval).
app.patch<{ Params: { id: string }; Body: { autoRotateIntervalDays?: number } }>(
'/api/federation/peers/:id',
{ preHandler: [authenticate, requireAdmin] },
async (request, reply) => {
const { id } = request.params;
const db = getDb();
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, id))
.get();
if (!peer) {
return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'Peer not found', statusCode: 404 });
}
const updateData: Record<string, number> = {};
if (request.body.autoRotateIntervalDays !== undefined) {
const interval = Number(request.body.autoRotateIntervalDays);
if (isNaN(interval) || !Number.isInteger(interval) || interval < 1 || interval > 365) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'autoRotateIntervalDays must be an integer between 1 and 365', statusCode: 400 });
}
updateData.autoRotateIntervalDays = interval;
}
if (Object.keys(updateData).length === 0) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'No valid fields to update', statusCode: 400 });
}
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set(updateData)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, id))
.run();
const updated = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, id))
.get();
return reply.code(200).send({ peer: sanitizePeer(updated!) });
},
);
// ─── DELETE /api/federation/peers/:id/permanent ─────────────────────────────
// Admin-only: permanently delete a revoked peer record.
app.delete<{ Params: { id: string } }>(
'/api/federation/peers/:id/permanent',
{ preHandler: [authenticate, requireAdmin] },
async (request, reply) => {
const { id } = request.params;
const db = getDb();
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, id))
.get();
if (!peer) {
return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'Peer not found', statusCode: 404 });
}
if (peer.status !== 'revoked') {
return reply.code(400).send({
error: 'Only revoked peers can be permanently deleted. Revoke the peer first.',
statusCode: 400,
});
}
db.delete(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, id))
.run();
return reply.code(200).send({ success: true });
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/peers/:id/rotate ──────────────────────────────────
// Admin-only: trigger immediate secret rotation for a peer.
app.post<{ Params: { id: string } }>(
'/api/federation/peers/:id/rotate',
{ preHandler: [authenticate, requireAdmin] },
async (request, reply) => {
const { id } = request.params;
const db = getDb();
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, id))
.get();
if (!peer) {
return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'Peer not found', statusCode: 404 });
}
if (peer.status !== 'active') {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'Can only rotate secrets for active peers', statusCode: 400 });
}
if (peer.pendingHmacSecret) {
return reply.code(409).send({
error: 'A secret rotation is already in progress — wait for it to complete',
statusCode: 409,
});
}
const newSecret = generateHmacSecret();
let localOrigin: string;
try {
localOrigin = resolveLocalOrigin();
} catch {
return reply.code(500).send({
error: 'Cannot determine local instance origin. Set the DOMAIN environment variable.',
statusCode: 500,
});
}
// Send rotation request to peer, signed with the CURRENT (old) secret
try {
const rotateBody = JSON.stringify({ newSecret });
const headers = buildFederationHeaders(rotateBody, peer.hmacSecret, localOrigin);
const response = await fetch(`${peer.origin}/api/federation/peer/rotate`, {
method: 'POST',
headers,
body: rotateBody,
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
});
if (!response.ok) {
let errorMessage = `Remote instance rejected rotation (HTTP ${response.status})`;
try {
const body = await response.json() as { error?: string };
if (body.error) errorMessage = body.error;
} catch { /* ignore parse failures */ }
return reply.code(502).send({ error: errorMessage, statusCode: 502 });
}
// Store pending secret locally AFTER remote peer confirms acceptance
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({
pendingHmacSecret: newSecret,
secretRotationAt: Date.now(),
})
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peer.id))
.run();
console.log(`[federation] Secret rotation initiated with peer ${peer.origin}`);
return reply.code(200).send({ success: true, gracePeriodMs: 900_000 });
} catch (err: unknown) {
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Unknown error';
if (err instanceof DOMException && err.name === 'TimeoutError') {
return reply.code(504).send({
error: 'Remote instance did not respond within 10 seconds',
statusCode: 504,
});
}
return reply.code(502).send({
error: `Failed to reach remote instance: ${message}`,
statusCode: 502,
});
}
},
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,777 @@
import path from 'node:path';
import { getDb, schema } from '../../../db/index.js';
import { authenticate, requireAdmin } from '../../../utils/auth.js';
import { generateHmacSecret, parseFederationHeaders, verifyPeerSignature } from '../../../utils/federationAuth.js';
import { fetchPeerEpoch, getInstanceId } from '../../../utils/federationEpoch.js';
import { onPeerActivated } from '../../../utils/federationPeerActivation.js';
import { markPeerReset } from '../../../utils/federationReset.js';
import { generateSnowflake } from '../../../utils/snowflake.js';
import { connectionManager } from '../../../ws/handler.js';
import { and, eq, inArray, or } from 'drizzle-orm';
import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { queueApprovalRequest } from './approvals.js';
import { resolveLocalOrigin, sanitizePeer, validateOrigin } from '../origin.js';
import { isAcceptRateLimited, isEnsureRateLimited } from '../rateLimits.js';
export function registerPeerHandshakeRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): void {
// ─── POST /api/federation/peer/initiate ────────────────────────────────────
// Admin-only: start a peering handshake with a remote instance.
app.post<{ Body: { remoteOrigin: string } }>(
'/api/federation/peer/initiate',
{ preHandler: [authenticate, requireAdmin] },
async (request, reply) => {
const { remoteOrigin: rawOrigin } = request.body ?? {};
if (!rawOrigin || typeof rawOrigin !== 'string') {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'remoteOrigin is required', statusCode: 400 });
}
const remoteOrigin = validateOrigin(rawOrigin);
if (!remoteOrigin) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'remoteOrigin must be a valid HTTPS URL (HTTP is only allowed for localhost)', statusCode: 400 });
}
const db = getDb();
// Check if a peer already exists for this origin
const existing = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, remoteOrigin))
.get();
if (existing) {
if (existing.status === 'active') {
return reply.code(200).send({ peer: sanitizePeer(existing) });
}
if (existing.status === 'pending') {
return reply.code(409).send({
error: 'A peering handshake with this instance is already in progress',
statusCode: 409,
});
}
if (existing.status === 'awaiting_approval') {
return reply.code(409).send({
error: "A peering handshake with this instance is awaiting the remote admin's approval",
statusCode: 409,
});
}
// Every remaining terminal/parked state is safe to clear and re-initiate
// from — falling through here (rather than to the db.insert below) is what
// keeps this route from violating UNIQUE(origin) and 500-ing.
// - revoked: local admin revoked; re-initiate cleanly.
// - rejected: a prior attempt was rejected; allow the local admin's
// authenticated retry (mirrors revoked).
// - needs_attention: this IS the one-click Re-peer step (resetPeer +
// initiate). Deleting the row here is equivalent to the documented
// reset: the reset-heal snapshot lives on users.federation_heal_pending
// (not the peer row) and the federation_reset_events journal is designed
// to survive peer-row deletion (design §4.2/§6.1), and onPeerActivated
// after the fresh handshake re-triggers the heal — so no recovery state
// is lost by removing the local needs_attention peer row here.
if (
existing.status === 'revoked' ||
existing.status === 'rejected' ||
existing.status === 'needs_attention'
) {
db.delete(schema.federationPeers).where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, existing.id)).run();
}
}
let localOrigin: string;
try {
localOrigin = resolveLocalOrigin();
} catch {
return reply.code(500).send({
error: 'Cannot determine local instance origin. Set the DOMAIN environment variable.',
statusCode: 500,
});
}
// Prevent self-peering
if (localOrigin === remoteOrigin) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'Cannot peer with yourself', statusCode: 400 });
}
const hmacSecret = generateHmacSecret();
const peerId = generateSnowflake();
const now = Date.now();
// Store peer as pending
db.insert(schema.federationPeers).values({
id: peerId,
origin: remoteOrigin,
hmacSecret,
status: 'pending',
createdAt: now,
}).run();
// Initiate the server-to-server handshake
try {
const response = await fetch(`${remoteOrigin}/api/federation/peer/accept`, {
method: 'POST',
headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
sourceOrigin: localOrigin,
hmacSecret,
instanceName: db
.select({ name: schema.instanceSettings.instanceName })
.from(schema.instanceSettings)
.where(eq(schema.instanceSettings.id, 1))
.get()?.name ?? undefined,
instanceId: getInstanceId(),
}),
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
});
if (response.status === 202) {
// Remote instance queued our request for admin approval
// (autoAcceptPeering is off on their side). Do NOT activate the
// local peer — mirror the auto-peer flow in federationPeering.ts
// by transitioning the pending record to awaiting_approval.
// Capture the approval token they returned so the next inbound
// /peer/accept (when their admin approves) can be verified. §3.7.
let returnedToken: string | null = null;
try {
const body = (await response.json()) as { approvalToken?: string };
if (typeof body?.approvalToken === 'string' && body.approvalToken.length > 0) {
returnedToken = body.approvalToken;
}
} catch {
// Non-JSON / empty body — legacy peer.
}
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({ status: 'awaiting_approval', approvalToken: returnedToken })
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.run();
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.get();
if (!peer) {
return reply.code(500).send({ error: 'Failed to read peer after queuing', statusCode: 500 });
}
return reply.code(202).send({ peer: sanitizePeer(peer) });
}
if (!response.ok) {
// Read the body exactly ONCE here — response.json()/text() consumes the
// stream, so both the honest-409 branch and the generic branch below
// share this single parse (no double-read of the same Response).
const rawBody = await response.text().catch(() => '');
let parsed: { error?: string; code?: string } = {};
try { parsed = JSON.parse(rawBody) as { error?: string; code?: string }; } catch { /* non-JSON body */ }
// Responder honestly refused: it already holds peering for us and will
// not rekey (anti-hijack). Do NOT create a conflicting row — delete the
// pending row so our slot stays clean and the remote's own later Re-peer
// can land on a fresh responder slot. Surface an actionable reason.
if (response.status === 409 && parsed.code === 'PEER_EXISTS_RESET_REQUIRED') {
db.delete(schema.federationPeers).where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId)).run();
return reply.code(409).send({
error: 'The remote instance still holds stale peering for you. Ask its admin to reset (or Re-peer) their side, then try again.',
code: 'PEER_EXISTS_RESET_REQUIRED',
statusCode: 409,
});
}
const errorMessage = parsed.error || `Remote instance rejected peering (HTTP ${response.status})`;
// Clean up the pending peer
db.delete(schema.federationPeers).where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId)).run();
return reply.code(502).send({ error: errorMessage, statusCode: 502 });
}
// Remote accepted — activate the peer. Parse the remote's instanceName
// and instanceId (epoch) from the response body so the federation panel
// renders a friendly label and we record the peer's authenticated
// epoch baseline. Tolerate omission and non-JSON bodies.
let remoteInstanceName: string | null = null;
let remoteInstanceId: string | null = null;
try {
const body = (await response.json()) as { instanceName?: string | null; instanceId?: string | null };
if (typeof body?.instanceName === 'string' && body.instanceName.length > 0) {
remoteInstanceName = body.instanceName;
}
if (typeof body?.instanceId === 'string' && body.instanceId.length > 0) {
remoteInstanceId = body.instanceId;
}
} catch {
// Non-JSON body — leave null.
}
// The responder returned 200 → it claims it adopted our secret. PROVE it
// with a signed round-trip before trusting the peering (catches BUG-1: a
// responder that reported success without adopting, and any residual
// desync). fetchPeerEpoch signs with the just-negotiated secret; a desync
// → 401/403 → null. Park the peer in needs_attention instead of falsely
// activating so the admin sees "re-peer incomplete", not a dead-active row.
const verifiedEpoch = await fetchPeerEpoch({ origin: remoteOrigin, hmacSecret });
if (!verifiedEpoch) {
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({ status: 'needs_attention', needsAttentionReason: 'repeer_incomplete', lastSeenAt: Date.now() })
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.run();
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
const parked = db.select().from(schema.federationPeers).where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId)).get();
return reply.code(200).send({ peer: parked ? sanitizePeer(parked) : null, verified: false });
}
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
// The baseline is trust-consequential (design §9 — a poisoned baseline can drive
// a spurious heal), so store the epoch we cryptographically verified via the signed
// /epoch round-trip, not the unverified handshake-response body. They are normally
// identical; the verified one is authoritative if they ever differ.
.set({ status: 'active', lastSeenAt: Date.now(), instanceName: remoteInstanceName, peerInstanceId: verifiedEpoch, needsAttentionReason: null, approvalToken: null })
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.run();
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
onPeerActivated(peerId, 'initiate_accepted').catch(err =>
console.error('[federation] onPeerActivated from /peer/initiate failed:', err)
);
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId))
.get();
if (!peer) {
return reply.code(500).send({ error: 'Failed to read peer after activation', statusCode: 500 });
}
return reply.code(200).send({ peer: sanitizePeer(peer), verified: true });
} catch (err: unknown) {
// Clean up the pending peer on network/timeout errors
db.delete(schema.federationPeers).where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peerId)).run();
const message = err instanceof Error ? err.message : 'Unknown error';
if (err instanceof DOMException && err.name === 'TimeoutError') {
return reply.code(504).send({
error: 'Remote instance did not respond within 10 seconds',
statusCode: 504,
});
}
return reply.code(502).send({
error: `Failed to reach remote instance: ${message}`,
statusCode: 502,
});
}
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/peer/accept ──────────────────────────────────────
// Server-to-server: accept a peering request from a remote instance.
// No JWT auth — this is first contact. Rate-limited by IP.
app.post<{ Body: { sourceOrigin: string; challenge?: string; hmacSecret: string; instanceName?: string; instanceId?: string; approvalToken?: string } }>(
'/api/federation/peer/accept',
async (request, reply) => {
const clientIp = request.ip;
if (isAcceptRateLimited(clientIp)) {
return reply.code(429).send({
error: 'Too many peering requests — try again later',
statusCode: 429,
});
}
const { sourceOrigin: rawOrigin, hmacSecret, instanceName: reqInstanceName, instanceId: reqInstanceId, approvalToken: inboundToken } = request.body ?? {};
if (!rawOrigin || typeof rawOrigin !== 'string') {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'sourceOrigin is required', statusCode: 400 });
}
if (!hmacSecret || typeof hmacSecret !== 'string') {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'hmacSecret is required', statusCode: 400 });
}
const sourceOrigin = validateOrigin(rawOrigin);
if (!sourceOrigin) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'sourceOrigin must be a valid HTTPS URL (HTTP is only allowed for localhost)', statusCode: 400 });
}
const db = getDb();
const settings = db
.select({
instanceName: schema.instanceSettings.instanceName,
autoAcceptPeering: schema.instanceSettings.autoAcceptPeering,
})
.from(schema.instanceSettings)
.where(eq(schema.instanceSettings.id, 1))
.get();
const ourInstanceName = settings?.instanceName ?? null;
const ourInstanceId = getInstanceId();
const autoAccept = settings?.autoAcceptPeering ?? 1;
// ── autoAcceptPeering gate ──────────────────────────────────────────
// When auto-accept is disabled, only allow incoming accept requests
// that correspond to a local pending peer (i.e., a local admin
// initiated the handshake). Unsolicited requests are rejected.
if (autoAccept === 0) {
// Check if the local admin already initiated or approved peering with this origin.
// 'pending' = admin used peer/initiate (handshake in progress)
// 'awaiting_approval' = admin approved an earlier request, handshake was sent,
// remote queued it (202). Now the remote admin approved too and is handshaking
// back to us. We should accept — both admins have approved.
const localPending = db
.select({ id: schema.federationPeers.id })
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, sourceOrigin),
inArray(schema.federationPeers.status, ['pending', 'awaiting_approval']),
),
)
.get();
if (!localPending) {
// Check if this origin is blocked (previously denied)
const blockedPeer = db
.select({ id: schema.federationPeers.id })
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, sourceOrigin),
eq(schema.federationPeers.status, 'rejected'),
),
)
.get();
if (blockedPeer) {
return reply.code(403).send({
error: 'This instance requires manual peering approval',
code: 'PEERING_REQUIRES_APPROVAL',
statusCode: 403,
});
}
return queueApprovalRequest(db, reply, sourceOrigin, hmacSecret, reqInstanceName ?? null);
}
}
// Check if peer already exists
const existing = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, sourceOrigin))
.get();
if (existing) {
if (existing.status === 'active' || existing.status === 'needs_attention') {
// Idempotent — already peered (or peering is in needs_attention state).
// In both cases we refuse to overwrite hmac_secret via this
// unauthenticated endpoint. An unauthenticated caller cannot
// prove prior trust, and needs_attention means "we don't know
// why this broke" — letting an unauthenticated request flip it
// to active with a new secret defeats the purpose.
//
// Legitimate recovery path: local admin clicks "Reset peering" →
// row is deleted → remote's /peer/accept then lands on a
// non-existent row and the normal handshake path runs.
//
// Detection-only: if the inbound epoch differs from our trusted
// baseline, the peer is a NEW incarnation on the same domain (a
// wipe-and-reinstall). Route it to needs_attention + snapshot +
// journal — but STILL return 409 (PEER_EXISTS_RESET_REQUIRED) and
// STILL do not rekey. The anti-hijack guard above is preserved
// verbatim; detection never grants capability.
if (reqInstanceId && existing.peerInstanceId && reqInstanceId !== existing.peerInstanceId) {
markPeerReset(existing.id, sourceOrigin, existing.peerInstanceId, reqInstanceId);
}
// Anti-hijack: we did NOT adopt the caller's secret. Report that
// honestly (409) instead of a false success (was 200 {accepted:true}),
// so the initiator does not false-activate into a permanent HMAC
// desync. Legacy initiators read only response.ok → they fail loudly
// (never a silent desync); new initiators special-case this code.
return reply.code(409).send({
accepted: false,
code: 'PEER_EXISTS_RESET_REQUIRED',
error: 'This instance already holds peering for you; its admin must reset that peering before a new handshake can be accepted.',
instanceName: ourInstanceName,
instanceId: ourInstanceId,
statusCode: 409,
});
}
if (existing.status === 'revoked') {
return reply.code(403).send({
error: 'Peering with this instance has been revoked',
statusCode: 403,
});
}
if (existing.status === 'rejected') {
// A remote admin manually initiated peering with us after we
// previously auto-rejected them. Override rejected → active.
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({
hmacSecret,
instanceName: reqInstanceName ?? null,
peerInstanceId: reqInstanceId ?? null,
status: 'active',
lastSeenAt: Date.now(),
})
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, existing.id))
.run();
// Broadcast activation to all connected local users
for (const uid of connectionManager.getAllOnlineUserIds()) {
connectionManager.sendToUser(uid, {
type: 'federation_peer_active' as const,
peerOrigin: sourceOrigin,
});
}
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
onPeerActivated(existing.id, 'accept_rejected_override').catch(err =>
console.error('[federation] onPeerActivated from /peer/accept (rejected override) failed:', err)
);
return reply.code(200).send({ accepted: true, instanceName: ourInstanceName, instanceId: ourInstanceId });
}
if (existing.status === 'awaiting_approval') {
// Spec §3.5: token verification gates the awaiting_approval → active
// promotion. Without proof the inbound came from the remote's
// /approve endpoint, an adversarial timing-knowledge attack or a
// bug-prone background code path could falsely flip this row to
// active. The token is single-use entropy issued in the 202 we
// returned when the remote's outbound /peer/accept first hit our
// queue — only their /approve endpoint forwards it.
const tokenValid =
typeof existing.approvalToken === 'string' &&
existing.approvalToken.length > 0 &&
existing.approvalToken === inboundToken;
if (tokenValid) {
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({
hmacSecret,
instanceName: reqInstanceName ?? null,
peerInstanceId: reqInstanceId ?? null,
status: 'active',
lastSeenAt: Date.now(),
approvalToken: null,
})
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, existing.id))
.run();
// Clean up any stale approval-request row for this origin (e.g.,
// queued debris from a prior bypass attempt that did not promote).
db.delete(schema.peerApprovalRequests)
.where(eq(schema.peerApprovalRequests.origin, sourceOrigin))
.run();
for (const uid of connectionManager.getAllOnlineUserIds()) {
connectionManager.sendToUser(uid, {
type: 'federation_peer_active' as const,
peerOrigin: sourceOrigin,
});
}
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
onPeerActivated(existing.id, 'accept_awaiting_approval').catch(err =>
console.error('[federation] onPeerActivated from /peer/accept (awaiting_approval) failed:', err)
);
return reply.code(200).send({ accepted: true, instanceName: ourInstanceName, instanceId: ourInstanceId });
}
// Token absent or mismatched. Cannot prove mutual approval.
if (autoAccept === 1) {
// We accept any inbound anyway — promoting here is no weaker than
// accepting a fresh handshake from a new peer. Clear the stored
// token (moot now) and proceed.
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({
hmacSecret,
instanceName: reqInstanceName ?? null,
peerInstanceId: reqInstanceId ?? null,
status: 'active',
lastSeenAt: Date.now(),
approvalToken: null,
})
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, existing.id))
.run();
for (const uid of connectionManager.getAllOnlineUserIds()) {
connectionManager.sendToUser(uid, {
type: 'federation_peer_active' as const,
peerOrigin: sourceOrigin,
});
}
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
onPeerActivated(existing.id, 'accept_awaiting_approval_fallback').catch(err =>
console.error('[federation] onPeerActivated from /peer/accept (awaiting_approval fallback) failed:', err)
);
return reply.code(200).send({ accepted: true, instanceName: ourInstanceName, instanceId: ourInstanceId });
}
// autoAccept=0 + unverifiable inbound → queue as new approval-request.
// Existing awaiting_approval row stays untouched; the new approval-
// request lets the local admin decide whether to honor this inbound.
return queueApprovalRequest(db, reply, sourceOrigin, hmacSecret, reqInstanceName ?? null);
}
// Pending — update with new secret and activate
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({
hmacSecret,
instanceName: reqInstanceName ?? null,
peerInstanceId: reqInstanceId ?? null,
status: 'active',
lastSeenAt: Date.now(),
})
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, existing.id))
.run();
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
onPeerActivated(existing.id, 'accept_pending').catch(err =>
console.error('[federation] onPeerActivated from /peer/accept (pending) failed:', err)
);
return reply.code(200).send({ accepted: true, instanceName: ourInstanceName, instanceId: ourInstanceId });
}
// New peer — create and activate
const peerId = generateSnowflake();
db.insert(schema.federationPeers).values({
id: peerId,
origin: sourceOrigin,
hmacSecret,
instanceName: reqInstanceName ?? null,
peerInstanceId: reqInstanceId ?? null,
status: 'active',
lastSeenAt: Date.now(),
createdAt: Date.now(),
}).run();
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
onPeerActivated(peerId, 'accept_new').catch(err =>
console.error('[federation] onPeerActivated from /peer/accept (new) failed:', err)
);
return reply.code(200).send({ accepted: true, instanceName: ourInstanceName, instanceId: ourInstanceId });
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/peer/ensure ──────────────────────────────────────
// JWT-authenticated (any user): trigger auto-peering with a remote instance.
// Rate-limited per user (3 requests per 15 minutes).
app.post<{ Body: { remoteOrigin: string } }>(
'/api/federation/peer/ensure',
{ preHandler: [authenticate] },
async (request, reply) => {
const { remoteOrigin: rawOrigin } = request.body ?? {};
if (!rawOrigin || typeof rawOrigin !== 'string') {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'remoteOrigin is required', statusCode: 400 });
}
const remoteOrigin = validateOrigin(rawOrigin);
if (!remoteOrigin) {
return reply.code(400).send({
error: 'remoteOrigin must be a valid HTTPS URL (HTTP is only allowed for localhost)',
statusCode: 400,
});
}
if (isEnsureRateLimited(request.userId)) {
return reply.code(429).send({
error: 'Too many peering requests — try again later',
statusCode: 429,
});
}
const { ensurePeered } = await import('../../../utils/federationPeering.js');
// NOTE: /peer/ensure is currently only invoked from friend-add client paths
// (see packages/web/src/stores/instanceStore.ts ensurePeered references).
// The hardcoded reason here is correct TODAY but will become wrong when
// DM-to-stranger or space-join grow into the gate. When that happens,
// surface the reason and target through the request body instead. Do NOT
// silently leave the hardcoding in place when adding a new caller.
const result = await ensurePeered(remoteOrigin, {
kind: 'user_action',
userId: request.userId,
reason: 'friend_add',
target: remoteOrigin,
});
// NOTE: The internal EnsurePeeredResult status names differ from the client-facing
// peeringStatus values. The mapping:
// 'active' → 'active' (peer is live)
// 'rejected' → 'rejected' (permanently blocked)
// 'pending' → 'awaiting_approval' (queued on remote, waiting for admin)
// 'failed' → 'pending' (transient error, will retry automatically)
// 'admin_required' → 'admin_required' (local outbound gate fired — our admin must approve)
// The internal 'pending' means "we got a 202 from the remote — admin hasn't acted yet",
// while 'failed' means "network/timeout — the outbox worker will retry next tick".
// The client sees 'awaiting_approval' (actionable info) vs 'pending' (transient, will resolve).
switch (result.status) {
case 'active':
return reply.code(200).send({ peeringStatus: 'active', peerId: result.peerId });
case 'rejected':
return reply.code(200).send({ peeringStatus: 'rejected', error: result.error });
case 'pending':
return reply.code(200).send({ peeringStatus: 'awaiting_approval', error: result.error });
case 'failed':
return reply.code(200).send({ peeringStatus: 'pending', error: result.error });
case 'admin_required':
return reply.code(200).send({ peeringStatus: 'admin_required' });
default:
return reply.code(200).send({ peeringStatus: 'pending', error: 'Unknown peering result' });
}
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/peer/rotate ───────────────────────────────────────
// Server-to-server: accept a secret rotation request from a peer instance.
// Authenticated via HMAC-SHA256 signature (current secret), NOT JWT.
app.post<{ Body: { newSecret: string } }>(
'/api/federation/peer/rotate',
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
// 1. Verify HMAC signature
const fedHeaders = parseFederationHeaders(request.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>);
if (!fedHeaders) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Missing or malformed federation headers', statusCode: 401 });
}
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, fedHeaders.origin))
.get();
if (!peer || peer.status !== 'active') {
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'Unknown or inactive peer', statusCode: 403 });
}
const bodyString = JSON.stringify(request.body);
if (!verifyPeerSignature(bodyString, fedHeaders.signature, fedHeaders.timestamp, fedHeaders.nonce, peer)) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Invalid signature', statusCode: 401 });
}
// 2. Validate request body
const { newSecret } = request.body ?? {};
if (!newSecret || typeof newSecret !== 'string' || newSecret.length !== 64 || !/^[0-9a-f]+$/.test(newSecret)) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'newSecret must be a 64-character hex string', statusCode: 400 });
}
// 3. Reject if rotation already in progress
if (peer.pendingHmacSecret) {
return reply.code(409).send({
error: 'A secret rotation is already in progress — wait for it to complete',
statusCode: 409,
});
}
// 4. Store pending secret and activate grace period
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({
pendingHmacSecret: newSecret,
secretRotationAt: Date.now(),
})
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peer.id))
.run();
console.log(`[federation] Secret rotation accepted from peer ${peer.origin}`);
return reply.code(200).send({ accepted: true, gracePeriodMs: 900_000 });
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/peer/denied ─────────────────────────────────────
// Server-to-server: receive a denial notification from a remote instance.
// Authenticated via HMAC-SHA256 signature (the secret we sent in our original
// peer/accept request, which the remote stored in their approval queue).
app.post<{ Body: { origin: string; reason: 'denied_by_admin' | 'expired'; message?: string } }>(
'/api/federation/peer/denied',
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
// Verify HMAC signature
const fedHeaders = parseFederationHeaders(request.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>);
if (!fedHeaders) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Missing or malformed federation headers', statusCode: 401 });
}
const { origin: senderOrigin, signature, timestamp, nonce } = fedHeaders;
// Find the local peer for this origin
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, senderOrigin))
.get();
if (!peer) {
return reply.code(404).send({ error: 'No peer record for this origin', statusCode: 404 });
}
// Only accept denial for awaiting_approval peers
if (peer.status !== 'awaiting_approval') {
return reply.code(409).send({
error: `Peer is in '${peer.status}' state, not awaiting_approval`,
statusCode: 409,
});
}
// Verify signature using our stored hmacSecret (the one we sent in the original request)
const rawBody = JSON.stringify(request.body);
const isValid = verifyPeerSignature(rawBody, signature, timestamp, nonce, {
hmacSecret: peer.hmacSecret,
pendingHmacSecret: null,
secretRotationAt: null,
});
if (!isValid) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Invalid HMAC signature', statusCode: 401 });
}
const { reason, message } = request.body;
// Transition to rejected
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({ status: 'rejected' })
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peer.id))
.run();
connectionManager.sendToAdmins({ type: 'federation_peers_changed' as const });
// Push federation_peer_rejected WS event to affected users
const entries = db
.select({
contextId: schema.federationOutbox.contextId,
contextType: schema.federationOutbox.contextType,
})
.from(schema.federationOutbox)
.where(eq(schema.federationOutbox.peerId, peer.id))
.all();
const contextMap = new Map<string, string>();
for (const entry of entries) {
contextMap.set(entry.contextId, entry.contextType);
}
// Purge outbox entries
db.delete(schema.federationOutbox)
.where(eq(schema.federationOutbox.peerId, peer.id))
.run();
// Build and send WS event
if (contextMap.size > 0) {
const { pushPeerRejectedEvent } = await import('../../../utils/federationWorker.js');
pushPeerRejectedEvent(
senderOrigin,
contextMap,
message || (reason === 'expired'
? 'Request expired — no response from admin within 30 days'
: 'Request denied by admin'),
);
}
return reply.code(200).send({ acknowledged: true });
},
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,851 @@
import path from 'node:path';
import { config } from '../../../config.js';
import { getDb, getRawDb, schema } from '../../../db/index.js';
import { buildFederationHeaders, getOurOrigin, parseFederationHeaders, verifyPeerSignature } from '../../../utils/federationAuth.js';
import { getInstanceId } from '../../../utils/federationEpoch.js';
import { getDmParticipants } from '../../../utils/federationOutbox.js';
import { deleteAttachmentFiles } from '../../../utils/fileCleanup.js';
import { sanitizeUser } from '../../../utils/sanitize.js';
import { collectDeletionBroadcastTargets, tombstoneUser } from '../../../utils/userDeletion.js';
import { connectionManager } from '../../../ws/handler.js';
import { and, eq, isNull, or } from 'drizzle-orm';
import type { FederationIdentityDeleteS2SRequest, FederationRelayAttachment, FederationRelayEvent, FederationRelayRequest, FederationRelayResponse, FederationSyncRequest, FederationSyncResponse } from '@backspace/shared';
import type { FastifyInstance } from 'fastify';
import { processRelayEvents } from '../events/dispatch.js';
import { extractDomain } from '../identity.js';
import { resolveLocalOrigin } from '../origin.js';
import { isNonceDuplicate, isRelayRateLimited } from '../rateLimits.js';
export function registerRelayRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): void {
// ─── DELETE /api/federation/identity ──────────────────────────────────────
// S2S endpoint: delete a federated user's identity on this instance.
// Called by the user's home instance via HMAC-signed request.
app.delete<{ Body: FederationIdentityDeleteS2SRequest }>(
'/api/federation/identity',
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
// 1. Verify HMAC signature (same pattern as relay endpoint)
const fedHeaders = parseFederationHeaders(request.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>);
if (!fedHeaders) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Missing or malformed federation headers', statusCode: 401 });
}
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, fedHeaders.origin))
.get();
if (!peer || peer.status !== 'active') {
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'Unknown or inactive peer', statusCode: 403 });
}
const bodyString = JSON.stringify(request.body);
if (!verifyPeerSignature(bodyString, fedHeaders.signature, fedHeaders.timestamp, fedHeaders.nonce, peer)) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Invalid signature', statusCode: 401 });
}
// Nonce-based replay protection
if (fedHeaders.nonce) {
if (isNonceDuplicate(peer.origin, fedHeaders.nonce)) {
return reply.code(409).send({ error: 'Duplicate nonce — possible replay', statusCode: 409 });
}
} else if (peer.nonceSupported) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Nonce required — peer previously supported nonces', statusCode: 401 });
} else {
console.warn(`[federation] Peer ${peer.origin} does not support replay protection (no nonce)`);
}
// 2. Validate body
const { homeUserId, homeInstance, mode } = request.body;
if (!homeUserId || !homeInstance || !['soft', 'full'].includes(mode)) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'Invalid request: homeUserId, homeInstance, and mode (soft|full) required', statusCode: 400 });
}
// 3. Resolve the live (non-deleted) federated user.
// Must filter isDeleted=0: after a prior deletion + re-federation,
// multiple records share the same homeUserId (one deleted, one live).
const user = db.select().from(schema.users)
.where(and(eq(schema.users.homeUserId, homeUserId), eq(schema.users.isDeleted, 0)))
.get();
// Idempotent: no live user means already deleted or never existed
if (!user) {
return reply.code(200).send({ success: true });
}
// 4. Attribution guard: only the user's home instance can delete them
if (!user.homeInstance || extractDomain(user.homeInstance) !== extractDomain(fedHeaders.origin)) {
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'Attribution mismatch: you can only delete users from your own instance', statusCode: 403 });
}
// Detached (home-orphaned) accounts are sovereign local accounts. The
// domain's new incarnation must not delete them by replaying old
// homeUserIds. Idempotent 200: from the caller's perspective this
// identity does not exist here.
if (user.federationHomeOrphaned === 1) {
console.log(`[federation] Ignoring S2S identity delete for detached account ${user.id} from ${fedHeaders.origin}`);
return reply.code(200).send({ success: true });
}
// 5. Check for owned spaces
const ownedSpaces = db.select({ id: schema.spaces.id, name: schema.spaces.name })
.from(schema.spaces)
.where(eq(schema.spaces.ownerId, user.id))
.all();
if (ownedSpaces.length > 0) {
return reply.code(409).send({ error: 'owns_spaces', ownedSpaces, statusCode: 409 });
}
// 6. Collect broadcast targets BEFORE deletion removes memberships
const { memberSpaceIds, targetUserIds } = collectDeletionBroadcastTargets(user.id);
// 7. Execute deletion
const filesToDelete = tombstoneUser(user.id, { purgeContent: mode === 'full' });
// 8. Clean up files from disk
deleteAttachmentFiles(filesToDelete.map(f => ({ filename: f })));
// 9. Broadcast member_left to other connected clients for each space
for (const spaceId of memberSpaceIds) {
connectionManager.sendToSpace(spaceId, {
type: 'member_left',
spaceId,
userId: user.id,
});
}
// 10. Broadcast user_updated with sanitized deleted user data
const deletedRow = db.select().from(schema.users).where(eq(schema.users.id, user.id)).get();
if (deletedRow) {
const deletedUser = sanitizeUser(deletedRow);
const userUpdatedEvent = { type: 'user_updated' as const, user: deletedUser };
for (const uid of targetUserIds) {
connectionManager.sendToUser(uid, userUpdatedEvent);
}
}
// 11. Force-disconnect WS if somehow still connected (unlikely but safe)
connectionManager.forceDisconnectUser(user.id);
console.log(`[federation] Identity deleted for user ${user.id} (${user.username}) via S2S from ${fedHeaders.origin}, mode=${mode}`);
return reply.code(200).send({ success: true });
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/relay ────────────────────────────────────────────
// Server-to-server: receive relayed DM events from a peer instance.
// Authenticated via HMAC-SHA256 signature, NOT JWT.
app.post<{ Body: FederationRelayRequest }>(
'/api/federation/relay',
{ bodyLimit: 10 * 1024 * 1024 },
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
// 1. Verify HMAC signature
const fedHeaders = parseFederationHeaders(request.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>);
if (!fedHeaders) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Missing or malformed federation headers', statusCode: 401 });
}
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, fedHeaders.origin))
.get();
if (!peer || peer.status !== 'active') {
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'Unknown or inactive peer', statusCode: 403 });
}
// 1b. Per-peer rate limiting (before expensive HMAC verification)
if (isRelayRateLimited(peer.origin)) {
return reply.code(429).send({ error: 'Rate limit exceeded', statusCode: 429 });
}
// Serialize body back to JSON for HMAC verification (we control both sides)
const bodyString = JSON.stringify(request.body);
if (!verifyPeerSignature(bodyString, fedHeaders.signature, fedHeaders.timestamp, fedHeaders.nonce, peer)) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Invalid signature', statusCode: 401 });
}
// 1b-epoch. Fast-path baseline population (design §3.2). The signature just
// verified proves the peer holds the current shared secret, so the epoch it
// carries in `sourceInstanceId` is authentic. Populate-if-null ONLY: a valid
// relay can never carry an epoch differing from a non-null baseline (a
// different incarnation implies a different secret that fails HMAC), so we
// only ever fill a NULL — never overwrite. This is independent of per-event
// processing and does not affect relay accept/reject in any way. Old peers
// omit the field → skip (backward-compatible no-op).
const claimedEpoch = request.body.sourceInstanceId;
if (claimedEpoch && !peer.peerInstanceId) {
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({ peerInstanceId: claimedEpoch })
.where(and(
eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peer.id),
isNull(schema.federationPeers.peerInstanceId),
))
.run();
}
// 1c. Nonce-based replay protection
if (fedHeaders.nonce) {
if (isNonceDuplicate(peer.origin, fedHeaders.nonce)) {
return reply.code(409).send({ error: 'Duplicate nonce — possible replay', statusCode: 409 });
}
} else if (peer.nonceSupported) {
// Peer previously sent nonces but this request doesn't have one — reject
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Nonce required — peer previously supported nonces', statusCode: 401 });
} else {
console.warn(`[federation] Peer ${peer.origin} does not support replay protection (no nonce)`);
}
// 2. Validate request body shape
const body = request.body;
if (!body || body.version !== 1 || !Array.isArray(body.events)) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'Invalid relay request format', statusCode: 400 });
}
if (body.events.length > 50) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'Maximum 50 events per batch', statusCode: 400 });
}
const sourceInstance = body.sourceInstance;
if (!sourceInstance || typeof sourceInstance !== 'string') {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'sourceInstance is required', statusCode: 400 });
}
// 3. Process each event
const { accepted, rejected, undeliverable } = await processRelayEvents(body.events, sourceInstance, peer.origin, db);
// 4. Update peer status
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({
lastSeenAt: Date.now(),
consecutiveFailures: 0,
...(fedHeaders.nonce && !peer.nonceSupported ? { nonceSupported: 1 } : {}),
})
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peer.id))
.run();
// 5. Return response with max upload size info
const settings = db
.select({ maxUploadSizeBytes: schema.instanceSettings.maxUploadSizeBytes })
.from(schema.instanceSettings)
.where(eq(schema.instanceSettings.id, 1))
.get();
const response: FederationRelayResponse = {
accepted,
rejected,
maxUploadSize: settings?.maxUploadSizeBytes ?? config.maxUploadSize,
...(undeliverable.length > 0 ? { undeliverable } : {}),
};
return reply.code(200).send(response);
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/epoch ────────────────────────────────────────────
// Server-to-server: return this instance's persistent epoch (instance_id).
// Authenticated via HMAC-SHA256 signature on the REQUEST (only a peer holding
// the shared secret may call it), and the RESPONSE body is HMAC-SIGNED with
// the same secret so the caller can verify the epoch it newly trusts before
// writing it as the peer's baseline (design §3.2 / §9). The value itself
// (instanceId) is already public via /instance/info; signing is for
// baseline-integrity, not confidentiality.
app.post(
'/api/federation/epoch',
{ bodyLimit: 4 * 1024 },
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
// 1. Parse and require federation headers (mirror relay/users-lookup).
const fedHeaders = parseFederationHeaders(request.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>);
if (!fedHeaders) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'Missing or malformed federation headers', statusCode: 400 });
}
// 2. Resolve the peer by origin. Reject unknown or revoked peers.
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, fedHeaders.origin))
.get();
if (!peer || peer.status === 'revoked') {
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'Not peered', statusCode: 403 });
}
// 3. Verify the inbound request signature (honours rotation grace).
const bodyString = JSON.stringify(request.body ?? {});
if (!verifyPeerSignature(bodyString, fedHeaders.signature, fedHeaders.timestamp, fedHeaders.nonce, peer)) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Invalid signature', statusCode: 401 });
}
// 4. Sign the response body with the peer's shared secret and return it.
const responseBody = JSON.stringify({ instanceId: getInstanceId() });
const sigHeaders = buildFederationHeaders(responseBody, peer.hmacSecret, getOurOrigin());
reply.headers({
'X-Federation-Signature': sigHeaders['X-Federation-Signature'],
'X-Federation-Timestamp': sigHeaders['X-Federation-Timestamp'],
'X-Federation-Nonce': sigHeaders['X-Federation-Nonce'],
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
});
return reply.code(200).send(responseBody);
},
);
// ─── POST /api/federation/sync ──────────────────────────────────────────────
// Server-to-server: checkpoint catch-up sync. A peer calls this after downtime
// to retrieve missed DM mutations from the mutation log.
// Authenticated via HMAC-SHA256 signature, same as /relay.
app.post<{ Body: FederationSyncRequest }>(
'/api/federation/sync',
{ bodyLimit: 1024 * 64 },
async (request, reply) => {
const db = getDb();
const rawDb = getRawDb();
// 1. Verify HMAC signature
const fedHeaders = parseFederationHeaders(request.headers as Record<string, string | string[] | undefined>);
if (!fedHeaders) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Missing or malformed federation headers', statusCode: 401 });
}
const peer = db
.select()
.from(schema.federationPeers)
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.origin, fedHeaders.origin))
.get();
if (!peer || peer.status !== 'active') {
return reply.code(403).send({ error: 'Unknown or inactive peer', statusCode: 403 });
}
const bodyString = JSON.stringify(request.body);
if (!verifyPeerSignature(bodyString, fedHeaders.signature, fedHeaders.timestamp, fedHeaders.nonce, peer)) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Invalid signature', statusCode: 401 });
}
// 1b. Nonce-based replay protection
if (fedHeaders.nonce) {
if (isNonceDuplicate(peer.origin, fedHeaders.nonce)) {
return reply.code(409).send({ error: 'Duplicate nonce — possible replay', statusCode: 409 });
}
} else if (peer.nonceSupported) {
return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Nonce required — peer previously supported nonces', statusCode: 401 });
} else {
console.warn(`[federation] Peer ${peer.origin} does not support replay protection (no nonce) [sync]`);
}
// Ratchet: mark peer as nonce-supporting if this is the first nonce we've seen
if (fedHeaders.nonce && !peer.nonceSupported) {
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({ nonceSupported: 1 })
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peer.id))
.run();
}
// 2. Validate & normalize request body
const body = request.body;
if (!body || typeof body.sinceTimestamp !== 'number' || body.sinceTimestamp < 0) {
return reply.code(400).send({ error: 'sinceTimestamp must be a non-negative number', statusCode: 400 });
}
const sinceTimestamp = body.sinceTimestamp;
const dmChannelIdFilter = body.dmChannelId && typeof body.dmChannelId === 'string' ? body.dmChannelId : null;
const federatedIdFilter = body.federatedId && typeof body.federatedId === 'string' ? body.federatedId : null;
const contextTypeFilter = body.contextType && typeof body.contextType === 'string'
? body.contextType as 'dm' | 'friend' | 'profile'
: null;
// Clamp limit: min 1, max 500, default 100
let limit = typeof body.limit === 'number' ? body.limit : 100;
limit = Math.max(1, Math.min(500, Math.floor(limit)));
// 3. Query mutation log — branch by contextType
let mutationRows: Array<{
id: string;
entity_id: string;
context_id: string;
context_type: string;
mutation_type: string;
mutated_at: number;
payload: string | null;
}>;
// Maps local DM channel ID → federatedId for O(1) lookup in serializers.
// Only populated in the DM branch (friend/profile branches don't need it).
let channelFederatedIdMap = new Map<string, string>();
// Friend-branch pagination must be computed from PRE-filter rows —
// filtering in place would stall the checkpoint / drop pages (spec §3.2).
let prefilterCount: number | null = null;
let prefilterLastTs: number | null = null;
if (contextTypeFilter === 'friend') {
// ── Friend event sync: relevance-scoped to the requesting peer ──
const fetchedFriendRows = rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT id, entity_id, context_id, context_type, mutation_type, mutated_at, payload
FROM federation_mutation_log
WHERE context_type = 'friend' AND mutated_at > ?
ORDER BY mutated_at ASC
LIMIT ?
`).all(sinceTimestamp, limit) as typeof mutationRows;
prefilterCount = fetchedFriendRows.length;
prefilterLastTs = fetchedFriendRows.length > 0
? fetchedFriendRows[fetchedFriendRows.length - 1]!.mutated_at
: null;
const peerDomainFriend = extractDomain(peer.origin).toLowerCase();
const normHome = `lower(replace(replace(coalesce(home_instance, ''), 'https://', ''), 'http://', ''))`;
const localRowStmt = rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT is_deleted, federation_home_orphaned FROM users
WHERE home_user_id = ? AND ${normHome} = ?
`);
// An event qualifies iff at least one side is homed at the requester's
// domain AND that side, when it resolves to a local row, is live and
// non-detached. A detached/tombstoned row belongs to a dead incarnation
// of the requester, not to the requester (spec §3.2).
const sideQualifies = (side: { homeUserId?: string; homeInstance?: string } | undefined): boolean => {
if (!side?.homeUserId || !side.homeInstance) return false;
if (extractDomain(side.homeInstance).toLowerCase() !== peerDomainFriend) return false;
const local = localRowStmt.get(side.homeUserId, peerDomainFriend) as
{ is_deleted: number; federation_home_orphaned: number } | undefined;
if (local && (local.is_deleted === 1 || local.federation_home_orphaned === 1)) return false;
return true;
};
mutationRows = fetchedFriendRows.filter((row) => {
if (!row.payload) return false;
let friendship: { from?: { homeUserId?: string; homeInstance?: string }; to?: { homeUserId?: string; homeInstance?: string } } | undefined;
try {
friendship = (JSON.parse(row.payload) as { friendship?: typeof friendship }).friendship;
} catch {
return false;
}
if (!friendship) return false;
return sideQualifies(friendship.from) || sideQualifies(friendship.to);
});
} else if (contextTypeFilter === 'profile') {
// ── Profile event sync: no DM channel logic needed ──
mutationRows = rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT id, entity_id, context_id, context_type, mutation_type, mutated_at, payload
FROM federation_mutation_log
WHERE context_type = 'profile' AND mutated_at > ?
ORDER BY mutated_at ASC
LIMIT ?
`).all(sinceTimestamp, limit) as typeof mutationRows;
} else {
// ── DM sync path ──
// Determine which DM channels to sync.
// Use federated_id: any channel with a federated ID is a federated DM
// that should be synced. The peer's relay endpoint will create the channel
// if it doesn't exist, or match by federated_id if it does.
// Relevance scoping (dead-incarnation spec §3.2): only offer channels
// with at least one LIVE member homed at the requesting peer's domain.
// A reset peer's former users are detached (federation_home_orphaned=1)
// or tombstoned here — their channels are our history, not the new
// incarnation's. Channels not involving the requester at all are none
// of its business either (third-instance over-broadcast).
const peerDomain = extractDomain(peer.origin).toLowerCase();
const sharedChannelRows = rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT DISTINCT c.id as dm_channel_id, c.federated_id
FROM dm_channels c
JOIN dm_members m ON m.dm_channel_id = c.id
JOIN users u ON u.id = m.user_id
WHERE c.federated_id IS NOT NULL AND c.deleted_at IS NULL
AND u.is_deleted = 0
AND u.federation_home_orphaned = 0
AND lower(replace(replace(coalesce(u.home_instance, ''), 'https://', ''), 'http://', '')) = ?
`).all(peerDomain) as Array<{ dm_channel_id: string; federated_id: string }>;
const sharedChannelIds = sharedChannelRows.map(r => r.dm_channel_id);
channelFederatedIdMap = new Map<string, string>(
sharedChannelRows.map(r => [r.dm_channel_id, r.federated_id])
);
// If filtering by federatedId, resolve to local channel ID
let effectiveChannelFilter = dmChannelIdFilter;
if (federatedIdFilter && !effectiveChannelFilter) {
const fedChannel = rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT id FROM dm_channels WHERE federated_id = ?
`).get(federatedIdFilter) as { id: string } | undefined;
if (fedChannel) {
effectiveChannelFilter = fedChannel.id;
}
}
if (sharedChannelIds.length === 0) {
const syncResponse: FederationSyncResponse = {
events: [],
hasMore: false,
checkpoint: sinceTimestamp,
};
return reply.code(200).send(syncResponse);
}
// 4. Query mutation log for the relevant channels
// Return mutations for ALL locally-created messages (source_instance IS NULL).
// This includes messages by replicated users (e.g., Heidi browsing orbit)
// because they were created on THIS instance and need to be synced to the peer.
if (effectiveChannelFilter) {
// Validate that the requested channel is actually shared with this peer
if (!sharedChannelIds.includes(effectiveChannelFilter)) {
const syncResponse: FederationSyncResponse = {
events: [],
hasMore: false,
checkpoint: sinceTimestamp,
};
return reply.code(200).send(syncResponse);
}
mutationRows = rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT ml.id, ml.entity_id, ml.context_id, ml.context_type, ml.mutation_type, ml.mutated_at, ml.payload
FROM federation_mutation_log ml
LEFT JOIN dm_messages dm ON ml.entity_id = dm.id
WHERE ml.context_id = ?
AND ml.context_type = 'dm'
AND ml.mutated_at > ?
AND (dm.id IS NOT NULL OR ml.mutation_type IN (
'delete', 'member_add', 'member_remove', 'ownership_transfer',
'dm_close', 'dm_reopen', 'read_state_update', 'file_rejected'
))
ORDER BY ml.mutated_at ASC
LIMIT ?
`).all(effectiveChannelFilter, sinceTimestamp, limit) as typeof mutationRows;
// For delete mutations, the dm_messages row won't exist — handle separately
const deleteMutations = rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT ml.id, ml.entity_id, ml.context_id, ml.context_type, ml.mutation_type, ml.mutated_at, ml.payload
FROM federation_mutation_log ml
WHERE ml.context_id = ?
AND ml.context_type = 'dm'
AND ml.mutated_at > ?
AND ml.mutation_type = 'delete'
AND ml.entity_id NOT IN (SELECT dm.id FROM dm_messages dm WHERE dm.id = ml.entity_id)
ORDER BY ml.mutated_at ASC
LIMIT ?
`).all(effectiveChannelFilter, sinceTimestamp, limit) as typeof mutationRows;
// Merge, deduplicate, sort, and re-limit
const seen = new Set(mutationRows.map(r => r.id));
for (const row of deleteMutations) {
if (!seen.has(row.id)) {
mutationRows.push(row);
seen.add(row.id);
}
}
mutationRows.sort((a, b) => a.mutated_at - b.mutated_at);
if (mutationRows.length > limit) {
mutationRows = mutationRows.slice(0, limit);
}
} else {
// All shared channels — build IN clause with placeholders
const placeholders = sharedChannelIds.map(() => '?').join(',');
mutationRows = rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT ml.id, ml.entity_id, ml.context_id, ml.context_type, ml.mutation_type, ml.mutated_at, ml.payload
FROM federation_mutation_log ml
LEFT JOIN dm_messages dm ON ml.entity_id = dm.id
WHERE ml.context_id IN (${placeholders})
AND ml.context_type = 'dm'
AND ml.mutated_at > ?
AND (dm.id IS NOT NULL OR ml.mutation_type IN (
'delete', 'member_add', 'member_remove', 'ownership_transfer',
'dm_close', 'dm_reopen', 'read_state_update', 'file_rejected'
))
ORDER BY ml.mutated_at ASC
LIMIT ?
`).all(...sharedChannelIds, sinceTimestamp, limit) as typeof mutationRows;
// For delete mutations, the dm_messages row won't exist — handle separately
const deleteMutations = rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT ml.id, ml.entity_id, ml.context_id, ml.context_type, ml.mutation_type, ml.mutated_at, ml.payload
FROM federation_mutation_log ml
WHERE ml.context_id IN (${placeholders})
AND ml.context_type = 'dm'
AND ml.mutated_at > ?
AND ml.mutation_type = 'delete'
AND ml.entity_id NOT IN (SELECT dm.id FROM dm_messages dm WHERE dm.id = ml.entity_id)
ORDER BY ml.mutated_at ASC
LIMIT ?
`).all(...sharedChannelIds, sinceTimestamp, limit) as typeof mutationRows;
// Merge, deduplicate, sort, and re-limit
const seen = new Set(mutationRows.map(r => r.id));
for (const row of deleteMutations) {
if (!seen.has(row.id)) {
mutationRows.push(row);
seen.add(row.id);
}
}
mutationRows.sort((a, b) => a.mutated_at - b.mutated_at);
if (mutationRows.length > limit) {
mutationRows = mutationRows.slice(0, limit);
}
}
}
// 5. Build response events from mutation log entries
const events: FederationRelayEvent[] = [];
for (const mutation of mutationRows) {
const mutationType = mutation.mutation_type as 'create' | 'update' | 'delete' | 'reaction_add' | 'reaction_remove'
| 'member_add' | 'member_remove' | 'ownership_transfer'
| 'friend_request_create' | 'friend_request_update' | 'friend_request_cancel'
| 'friend_add' | 'friend_remove'
| 'dm_close' | 'dm_reopen' | 'read_state_update' | 'file_rejected'
| 'profile_update';
if (['member_add', 'member_remove', 'ownership_transfer',
'friend_request_create', 'friend_request_update', 'friend_request_cancel',
'friend_add', 'friend_remove'].includes(mutationType)) {
// Membership and friend mutations store the full event in the payload
const payload = mutation.payload ? JSON.parse(mutation.payload) : {};
events.push({
eventType: mutationType as FederationRelayEvent['eventType'],
contextType: (mutation.context_type ?? 'dm') as 'dm' | 'friend' | 'profile',
...(mutation.context_type === 'dm' || !mutation.context_type ? { dmChannelId: mutation.context_id } : {}),
messageId: mutation.entity_id,
encryptionVersion: 0,
timestamp: mutation.mutated_at,
...payload,
});
continue;
}
if (mutationType === 'delete') {
// For deletes, we don't need the message content — just the ID and channel
events.push({
eventType: 'delete',
dmChannelId: mutation.context_id,
messageId: mutation.entity_id,
encryptionVersion: 0,
timestamp: mutation.mutated_at,
});
continue;
}
if (mutationType === 'reaction_add' || mutationType === 'reaction_remove') {
// Use the stored payload from the mutation log
if (mutation.payload) {
let reactionData: { userId: string; homeUserId: string; homeInstance?: string; emoji: string; createdAt?: number } | null = null;
try {
reactionData = JSON.parse(mutation.payload) as { userId: string; homeUserId: string; homeInstance?: string; emoji: string; createdAt?: number };
} catch {
// Skip malformed payload
continue;
}
events.push({
eventType: mutationType,
dmChannelId: mutation.context_id,
messageId: mutation.entity_id,
encryptionVersion: 0,
timestamp: mutation.mutated_at,
reaction: {
userId: reactionData.userId,
homeUserId: reactionData.homeUserId,
homeInstance: reactionData.homeInstance || getOurOrigin(),
emoji: reactionData.emoji,
createdAt: reactionData.createdAt ?? mutation.mutated_at,
},
});
}
continue;
}
if (mutationType === 'dm_close' || mutationType === 'dm_reopen') {
if (!mutation.payload) continue;
let dmCloseReopenPayload: { homeUserId: string; homeInstance: string } | null = null;
try { dmCloseReopenPayload = JSON.parse(mutation.payload); } catch { continue; }
if (!dmCloseReopenPayload) continue;
const fedIdCloseReopen = channelFederatedIdMap.get(mutation.context_id);
if (!fedIdCloseReopen) continue;
events.push({
eventType: mutationType,
dmChannelId: mutation.context_id,
messageId: mutation.entity_id,
federatedId: fedIdCloseReopen,
encryptionVersion: 0,
timestamp: mutation.mutated_at,
dmCloseReopen: dmCloseReopenPayload,
});
continue;
}
if (mutationType === 'read_state_update') {
if (!mutation.payload) continue;
let readState: NonNullable<FederationRelayEvent['readState']> | null = null;
try { readState = JSON.parse(mutation.payload) as NonNullable<FederationRelayEvent['readState']>; } catch { continue; }
if (!readState) continue;
const fedIdReadState = channelFederatedIdMap.get(mutation.context_id);
if (!fedIdReadState) continue;
events.push({
eventType: 'read_state_update',
dmChannelId: mutation.context_id,
messageId: mutation.entity_id,
federatedId: fedIdReadState,
encryptionVersion: 0,
timestamp: mutation.mutated_at,
readState,
});
continue;
}
if (mutationType === 'file_rejected') {
if (!mutation.payload) continue;
let fileRejectedPayload: {
attachmentId: string;
sourceFilename: string;
rejectionReason: string;
rejectionLimit: number;
affectedUserIds: string[];
} | null = null;
try { fileRejectedPayload = JSON.parse(mutation.payload); } catch { continue; }
if (!fileRejectedPayload) continue;
events.push({
eventType: 'file_rejected',
dmChannelId: mutation.context_id,
messageId: mutation.entity_id,
encryptionVersion: 0,
timestamp: mutation.mutated_at,
attachmentId: fileRejectedPayload.attachmentId,
sourceFilename: fileRejectedPayload.sourceFilename,
rejectionReason: fileRejectedPayload.rejectionReason,
rejectionLimit: fileRejectedPayload.rejectionLimit,
affectedUserIds: fileRejectedPayload.affectedUserIds,
});
continue;
}
if (mutationType === 'profile_update') {
if (!mutation.payload) continue;
let profileOuter: { profileUpdate?: NonNullable<FederationRelayEvent['profileUpdate']> } | null = null;
try { profileOuter = JSON.parse(mutation.payload); } catch { continue; }
if (!profileOuter?.profileUpdate) continue;
events.push({
eventType: 'profile_update',
contextType: 'profile',
messageId: mutation.entity_id,
encryptionVersion: 0,
timestamp: mutation.mutated_at,
profileUpdate: profileOuter.profileUpdate,
});
continue;
}
// For create and update: fetch the current message state
const message = db
.select()
.from(schema.dmMessages)
.where(eq(schema.dmMessages.id, mutation.entity_id))
.get();
if (!message) {
// Message was deleted after this create/update mutation was logged — skip it.
// The delete mutation will handle the cleanup on the peer side.
continue;
}
// Resolve the author user to get homeUserId and homeInstance
const authorUser = db
.select()
.from(schema.users)
.where(eq(schema.users.id, message.userId))
.get();
if (!authorUser) {
continue;
}
const homeUserId = authorUser.homeUserId || authorUser.id;
const homeInstance = authorUser.homeInstance || (config.domain ? `https://${config.domain}` : '');
// Fetch attachments for the message
const attachmentRows = db
.select()
.from(schema.attachments)
.where(eq(schema.attachments.dmMessageId, message.id))
.all();
let localOrigin: string;
try {
localOrigin = resolveLocalOrigin();
} catch {
localOrigin = config.domain ? `https://${config.domain}` : '';
}
const attachments: FederationRelayAttachment[] = attachmentRows.map(a => ({
id: a.id,
filename: a.filename,
originalName: a.originalName,
mimetype: a.mimetype,
size: a.size,
width: a.width ?? undefined,
height: a.height ?? undefined,
duration: a.duration ?? undefined,
playable: a.playable ?? null,
thumbnailFilename: a.thumbnailFilename ?? undefined,
sourceUrl: `${localOrigin}/api/uploads/${a.filename}`,
}));
// Include federatedId for group DMs so the peer uses the correct
// channel lookup path instead of computing a 1-on-1 pair hash.
const syncChannel = db
.select({ federatedId: schema.dmChannels.federatedId, ownerId: schema.dmChannels.ownerId })
.from(schema.dmChannels)
.where(eq(schema.dmChannels.id, mutation.context_id))
.get();
events.push({
eventType: mutationType,
...(syncChannel?.federatedId && syncChannel.ownerId ? { federatedId: syncChannel.federatedId } : {}),
dmChannelId: mutation.context_id,
messageId: message.id,
encryptionVersion: 0,
timestamp: mutation.mutated_at,
participants: getDmParticipants(mutation.context_id),
message: {
userId: message.userId,
homeUserId,
homeInstance,
content: message.content,
replyToId: message.replyToId ?? null,
editedAt: message.editedAt ?? null,
createdAt: message.createdAt,
attachments: attachments.length > 0 ? attachments : undefined,
},
});
}
// 6. Compute pagination metadata — from PRE-filter rows when the friend
// branch filtered, so filtered-out events still advance the cursor.
const hasMore = (prefilterCount ?? mutationRows.length) >= limit;
const checkpoint = prefilterLastTs
?? (mutationRows.length > 0
? mutationRows[mutationRows.length - 1]!.mutated_at
: sinceTimestamp);
// 7. Update peer last-seen timestamp
db.update(schema.federationPeers)
.set({ lastSeenAt: Date.now() })
.where(eq(schema.federationPeers.id, peer.id))
.run();
const syncResponse: FederationSyncResponse = {
events,
hasMore,
checkpoint,
};
return reply.code(200).send(syncResponse);
},
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
import path from 'node:path';
import { config } from '../../config.js';
import { getDb, schema } from '../../db/index.js';
import { getOurOrigin } from '../../utils/federationAuth.js';
import { generateSnowflake } from '../../utils/snowflake.js';
import { and, eq, isNull, or, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { randomBytes } from 'node:crypto';
/**
* Extract bare domain from a homeInstance value.
* Handles both full URLs ("https://nova.ddns.net") and bare domains ("nova.ddns.net").
* Used to normalize homeInstance to a canonical format for identity matching.
*/
export function extractDomain(homeInstance: string): string {
try {
return new URL(homeInstance).hostname;
} catch {
// Already a bare domain or malformed — strip protocol manually
return homeInstance.replace(/^https?:\/\//, '').split('/')[0] ?? homeInstance;
}
}
/**
* The bare lowercase domain that constitutes this instance's federated
* identity authority. Derives from DOMAIN (identity), falling back to
* getOurOrigin() only when DOMAIN is unset (dev/tests). PUBLIC_ORIGIN is a
* transport override and deliberately NOT consulted first — identity
* comparisons must not shift when the transport origin is overridden.
*/
export function getOurIdentityDomain(): string | null {
if (config.domain) return config.domain.toLowerCase();
const origin = getOurOrigin();
if (!origin) return null;
return extractDomain(origin).toLowerCase();
}
/**
* Verify that an acting user's homeInstance is legitimate for this relay.
*
* Two valid cases:
* 1. **Direct**: author is from the source instance (standard S2S — peer sends events for its own users).
* 2. **Homeward relay**: author is from the *receiving* instance. This happens when a client-federation
* user (e.g., erin@nova logged into orbit) sends a message on a remote server, and the
* S2S relay forwards it back to the author's home instance. The trusted peer is just the messenger.
*
* Both sides are normalized to bare domain before comparison.
*/
export function verifyAttribution(actingUserHomeInstance: string, sourceInstance: string): boolean {
const authorDomain = extractDomain(actingUserHomeInstance);
// Case 1: author belongs to the source peer
if (authorDomain === extractDomain(sourceInstance)) return true;
// Case 2: homeward relay — author belongs to THIS (receiving) instance
if (authorDomain === extractDomain(getOurOrigin())) return true;
return false;
}
/**
* Resolve a home user ID to a local user.
* Matches users where home_user_id = homeUserId, or where
* the user's own id equals homeUserId and they have no home_instance set (local user).
*/
export function resolveLocalUser(
homeUserId: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
): typeof schema.users.$inferSelect | undefined {
const candidates = db
.select()
.from(schema.users)
.where(
and(
or(
eq(schema.users.homeUserId, homeUserId),
and(eq(schema.users.id, homeUserId), isNull(schema.users.homeInstance)),
),
eq(schema.users.isDeleted, 0),
),
)
.all();
// Prefer non-deleted active users; if multiple, prefer the one with homeUserId set
// (replicated user) over a local user match
if (candidates.length === 0) return undefined;
if (candidates.length === 1) return candidates[0];
return candidates.find(u => u.homeUserId === homeUserId) ?? candidates[0];
}
/**
* Unified federated user lookup — finds a user regardless of which code path
* created them (auth registration vs S2S relay stub).
*
* Three-tier matching:
* 1. Fast path: homeUserId column match (existing resolveLocalUser logic)
* 2. Domain + username hint: normalized homeInstance domain + username base match
* 3. Not found: returns undefined
*
* Does NOT perform side effects (backfill). See `backfillHomeUserId` for that.
*/
export function findFederatedUser(
homeUserId: string,
homeInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
hints?: { username?: string | null },
): typeof schema.users.$inferSelect | undefined {
// Tier 1: fast path — existing resolveLocalUser logic
const fastMatch = resolveLocalUser(homeUserId, db);
if (fastMatch) return fastMatch;
// Tier 2: domain + username hint match
if (!hints?.username) return undefined;
const domain = extractDomain(homeInstance);
const hintLower = hints.username.toLowerCase();
// Scoped SQL query: match on homeInstance domain + username base
// Username base is the part before '@'. We use SQL LIKE to match
// '{hint}@%' pattern, plus an exact match for users without '@'.
const candidates = db
.select()
.from(schema.users)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.users.homeInstance, domain),
eq(schema.users.isDeleted, 0),
// Detached (home-orphaned) accounts are sovereign: never re-bindable to
// the domain's new incarnation via username heuristics — that is exactly
// how a new same-name user would capture the established account.
eq(schema.users.federationHomeOrphaned, 0),
or(
sql`lower(substr(${schema.users.username}, 1, instr(${schema.users.username}, '@') - 1)) = ${hintLower}`,
and(
sql`instr(${schema.users.username}, '@') = 0`,
sql`lower(${schema.users.username}) = ${hintLower}`,
),
),
),
)
.all();
if (candidates.length === 0) return undefined;
// Pick best candidate: prefer real accounts over stubs, then most profile data
if (candidates.length === 1) return candidates[0]!;
return candidates.sort((a, b) => {
// Real account (not federation-replicated) wins
const aReal = a.passwordHash !== '!federation-replicated' ? 1 : 0;
const bReal = b.passwordHash !== '!federation-replicated' ? 1 : 0;
if (aReal !== bReal) return bReal - aReal;
// More profile data wins
const profileCount = (u: typeof a) =>
[u.displayName, u.avatar, u.banner, u.bio].filter(Boolean).length;
return profileCount(b) - profileCount(a);
})[0]!;
}
/**
* Backfill homeUserId on an existing user record so future lookups
* use the fast path (tier 1). Called by resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser
* after findFederatedUser matches via tier 2.
*/
export function backfillHomeUserId(
user: typeof schema.users.$inferSelect,
homeUserId: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
): typeof schema.users.$inferSelect {
if (user.homeUserId === homeUserId) return user;
// Only backfill if the user has no homeUserId yet. If they already have a
// DIFFERENT non-null homeUserId, this means the wrong user was matched —
// overwriting would corrupt their identity.
if (user.homeUserId) {
console.warn(`[federation] Refusing to overwrite homeUserId on user ${user.id} (${user.username}): existing=${user.homeUserId}, incoming=${homeUserId}`);
return user;
}
db.update(schema.users)
.set({ homeUserId })
.where(eq(schema.users.id, user.id))
.run();
console.log(`[federation] Backfilled homeUserId=${homeUserId} on user ${user.id} (${user.username})`);
return { ...user, homeUserId };
}
/**
* Resolve a federated participant to a local user, creating a minimal
* replicated user stub if one doesn't already exist. This is needed
* for the group-DM bootstrap path: when Instance C receives a
* member_add event whose roster includes users that only live on
* Instance A or B, those users won't have been pre-replicated via the
* friend-connect flow. We create a bare-bones row so the local DB
* can reference them in dm_members / dm_messages.
*/
export function resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser(
homeUserId: string,
homeInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
hints?: { username?: string | null; status?: 'online' | 'idle' | 'dnd' | 'offline' | null; deleted?: boolean | null },
): typeof schema.users.$inferSelect | null {
const existing = findFederatedUser(homeUserId, homeInstance, db, hints);
if (existing) return backfillHomeUserId(existing, homeUserId, db);
// A participant the sender marks as deleted must not materialize as a new
// stub — mirror of the local-tombstone skip below. An existing row still
// resolves above, so historical attribution is unaffected (spec §3.3).
if (hints?.deleted) {
console.log(`[federation] Skipping stub creation for remotely-deleted identity homeUserId=${homeUserId}`);
return null;
}
// Check if this identity was previously deleted — don't resurrect a tombstoned
// user by creating a new stub. The isDeleted=0 filter in findFederatedUser
// already hides the deleted row, so we must query without that filter here.
const domain = extractDomain(homeInstance);
// An instance never hosts a replicated stub homed at itself. A self-domain
// identity that is live resolves at tier 1 above (native id match); one
// that reaches the create path is a dead incarnation from before an
// instance reset (e.g. replayed by a peer's initial sync). Creating a row
// here is what produced the self-homed double-domain junk stubs.
const ourDomain = getOurIdentityDomain();
if (ourDomain && domain.toLowerCase() === ourDomain) {
console.log(`[federation] Refusing self-homed stub for homeUserId=${homeUserId} (${domain}) — dead incarnation of this instance`);
return null;
}
const deletedMatch = db
.select({ id: schema.users.id, isDeleted: schema.users.isDeleted })
.from(schema.users)
.where(and(eq(schema.users.homeUserId, homeUserId), eq(schema.users.homeInstance, domain)))
.get();
if (deletedMatch?.isDeleted) {
console.log(`[federation] Skipping stub creation for deleted identity homeUserId=${homeUserId} (tombstoned)`);
return null;
}
// Use the home user's real username when the caller passes a hint (the wire
// profile snapshot from friend_request_create / friend_add / DM relay carries
// it). This makes the local stub's `username` human-readable, so client-side
// `parseFederatedUsername(username).baseName` returns the real handle. Falls
// back to the snowflake-id scheme when no hint is available (legacy paths).
const localPart = (hints?.username ?? homeUserId).toLowerCase();
const baseUsername = `${localPart}@${domain}`.toLowerCase();
// Guard against the (unlikely) case where this username already
// exists — e.g. a prior partial replication or manual creation.
let username = baseUsername;
let collision = db.select().from(schema.users).where(eq(schema.users.username, username)).get();
let attempt = 0;
while (collision) {
attempt++;
username = `${localPart}_${attempt}@${domain}`.toLowerCase();
collision = db.select().from(schema.users).where(eq(schema.users.username, username)).get();
if (attempt > 10) {
// Extremely unlikely; use a random suffix to break out
username = `${localPart}_${randomBytes(4).toString('hex')}@${domain}`.toLowerCase();
break;
}
}
const userId = generateSnowflake();
const now = Date.now();
// Seed status from the wire snapshot when available — without this, a
// freshly-created stub for an already-online remote sticks at 'offline'
// until the home next emits a presence transition (presence_update only
// fires on changes, not on stub creation). Falls back to 'offline'.
const initialStatus = hints?.status ?? 'offline';
db.insert(schema.users).values({
id: userId,
username,
displayName: null,
passwordHash: '!federation-replicated', // Cannot be used to log in (bcrypt never produces this)
status: initialStatus,
isAdmin: 0,
homeInstance: domain, // Normalized to bare domain
homeUserId,
createdAt: now,
}).run();
const created = db.select().from(schema.users).where(eq(schema.users.id, userId)).get();
if (!created) {
throw new Error(`Failed to create replicated user for homeUserId=${homeUserId}`);
}
console.log(`[federation] Auto-created replicated user ${userId} (${username}) for homeUserId=${homeUserId} from ${domain}`);
return created;
}
@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
import { schema } from '../../db/index.js';
import { getOurOrigin } from '../../utils/federationAuth.js';
import { or } from 'drizzle-orm';
/** Fields safe to expose to admin callers (everything except hmacSecret). */
export interface SanitizedPeer {
id: string;
origin: string;
instanceName: string | null;
status: string;
lastSeenAt: number | null;
lastFailureAt: number | null;
consecutiveFailures: number;
lastSyncedAt: number | null;
createdAt: number;
rotationInProgress: boolean;
secretRotatedAt: number | null;
autoRotateIntervalDays: number;
needsAttentionReason: 'auth_failures' | 'peer_reset_detected' | 'repeer_incomplete' | null;
}
export function sanitizePeer(row: typeof schema.federationPeers.$inferSelect): SanitizedPeer {
return {
id: row.id,
origin: row.origin,
instanceName: row.instanceName,
status: row.status,
lastSeenAt: row.lastSeenAt,
lastFailureAt: row.lastFailureAt,
consecutiveFailures: row.consecutiveFailures,
lastSyncedAt: row.lastSyncedAt,
createdAt: row.createdAt,
rotationInProgress: row.pendingHmacSecret !== null,
secretRotatedAt: row.secretRotatedAt,
autoRotateIntervalDays: row.autoRotateIntervalDays,
needsAttentionReason: row.needsAttentionReason as SanitizedPeer['needsAttentionReason'],
};
}
/**
* Determine this instance's public origin for the peering handshake.
*
* Delegates to `getOurOrigin()` so the handshake `sourceOrigin` is IDENTICAL to
* the `X-Federation-Origin` value used for authenticated S2S requests. This
* honors `PUBLIC_ORIGIN` (getOurOrigin's precedence: PUBLIC_ORIGIN →
* `https://${DOMAIN}` → `http://localhost:${PORT}`). Using DOMAIN directly here
* previously desynced the responder's peer-row key from the auth origin,
* causing permanent `403 Not peered` whenever PUBLIC_ORIGIN != https://DOMAIN.
*/
export function resolveLocalOrigin(): string {
return getOurOrigin();
}
/**
* Validate that a string is a well-formed HTTP(S) URL origin.
* Returns the normalized origin (no trailing slash) or null if invalid.
*/
export function validateOrigin(raw: string): string | null {
try {
const url = new URL(raw);
if (url.protocol !== 'http:' && url.protocol !== 'https:') return null;
if (url.protocol === 'http:' && !['localhost', '127.0.0.1'].includes(url.hostname)) {
return null;
}
return url.origin;
} catch {
return null;
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,364 @@
import fs from 'node:fs';
import path from 'node:path';
import { config } from '../../config.js';
import { getDb, schema } from '../../db/index.js';
import { deleteUploadFile } from '../../utils/fileCleanup.js';
import { sanitizeUser } from '../../utils/sanitize.js';
import { generateSnowflake } from '../../utils/snowflake.js';
import { collectProfileBroadcastTargetIds } from '../../utils/userDeletion.js';
import { connectionManager } from '../../ws/handler.js';
import { and, eq, or, sql } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { Readable } from 'node:stream';
import { pipeline } from 'node:stream/promises';
import type { FederationRelayEvent, FederationRelayProfileSnapshot } from '@backspace/shared';
import { extractDomain } from './identity.js';
/**
* Hydrate a replicated user stub with profile data from a relay event.
* Only updates fields that are currently null/empty on the local row,
* so manually-set local values are preserved.
*/
export async function hydrateReplicatedUserProfile(
user: typeof schema.users.$inferSelect,
profile: FederationRelayProfileSnapshot | undefined,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
): Promise<typeof schema.users.$inferSelect> {
if (!profile) return user;
if (!user.homeInstance) return user; // Don't update native users
// Detached accounts are sovereign local accounts: the home domain now belongs
// to a different incarnation, so a relayed snapshot resolved via an old
// homeUserId (tier-1 historical hit) must never fill this row's fields. No-op
// return, mirroring the profile_update / presence_update / identity-delete
// guards (detach spec §4.3).
if (user.federationHomeOrphaned === 1) return user;
const baseUrl = user.homeInstance.startsWith('http') ? user.homeInstance : `https://${user.homeInstance}`;
const buildAbsoluteUrl = (value: string): string => {
if (value.startsWith('http')) return value;
const path = value.startsWith('/') ? value : `/api/uploads/${value}`;
return `${baseUrl}${path}`;
};
// Resolve a snapshot asset to a local filename (preferred) or, on download
// failure, fall back to the absolute URL so the avatar still renders while
// the home instance is reachable.
const resolveAsset = async (snapshot: string): Promise<string> => {
const absoluteUrl = buildAbsoluteUrl(snapshot);
const localFile = await downloadProfileAsset(absoluteUrl, baseUrl);
return localFile ?? absoluteUrl;
};
const updates: Record<string, string | null> = {};
// Use displayName from profile, falling back to the home username (without
// the @domain suffix that the local replicated username carries). This
// ensures federated users show a human-readable name instead of the raw
// "user@instance.example" federation username.
const effectiveDisplayName = profile.displayName || profile.username || null;
if (effectiveDisplayName && !user.displayName) updates.displayName = effectiveDisplayName;
// Hydrate is best-effort: only fill empty fields. Never overwrite existing
// avatar/banner values — that is exclusively processProfileUpdateEvent's job
// (which carries a monotonic version). In particular, locally-downloaded
// bare filenames produced by that path must not be clobbered back to URLs.
if (profile.avatar && !user.avatar) updates.avatar = await resolveAsset(profile.avatar);
if (profile.avatarColor) updates.avatarColor = profile.avatarColor;
if (profile.banner && !user.banner) updates.banner = await resolveAsset(profile.banner);
if (profile.bio && !user.bio) updates.bio = profile.bio;
if (Object.keys(updates).length === 0) return user;
db.update(schema.users)
.set(updates)
.where(eq(schema.users.id, user.id))
.run();
return { ...user, ...updates };
}
/**
* Download a profile image (avatar or banner) from a remote instance.
* Returns the local filename on success, or null on failure.
* On failure, the caller stores the absolute URL as a display fallback.
*/
export async function downloadProfileAsset(
url: string,
sourceInstance: string,
): Promise<string | null> {
// SSRF: hostname must match the authenticated source instance
try {
const urlHostname = new URL(url).hostname;
const sourceHostname = new URL(sourceInstance).hostname;
if (urlHostname !== sourceHostname) {
console.warn(`[federation] Profile asset SSRF blocked: URL hostname "${urlHostname}" != source "${sourceHostname}"`);
return null;
}
} catch {
return null;
}
const ext = path.extname(new URL(url).pathname) || '.webp';
const localId = generateSnowflake();
const finalFilename = `${localId}${ext}`;
const tempFilename = `temp_${localId}${ext}`;
const tempPath = path.join(config.uploadDir, tempFilename);
const finalPath = path.join(config.uploadDir, finalFilename);
try {
const response = await fetch(url, {
signal: AbortSignal.timeout(10_000),
});
if (!response.ok || !response.body) {
return null;
}
// Content-type must be an image
const contentType = response.headers.get('content-type') ?? '';
if (!contentType.startsWith('image/')) {
console.warn(`[federation] Profile asset rejected: non-image content-type "${contentType}" from ${url}`);
return null;
}
// Ensure upload directory exists
fs.mkdirSync(config.uploadDir, { recursive: true });
// Stream to temp file
const nodeStream = Readable.fromWeb(response.body as ReadableStream);
const writeStream = fs.createWriteStream(tempPath);
await pipeline(nodeStream, writeStream);
// Atomic rename
fs.renameSync(tempPath, finalPath);
return finalFilename;
} catch (err) {
// Clean up temp file on any failure
try { fs.unlinkSync(tempPath); } catch { /* may not exist */ }
console.warn(`[federation] Profile asset download failed for ${url}:`, (err as Error).message);
return null;
}
}
export async function processProfileUpdateEvent(
event: FederationRelayEvent,
sourceInstance: string,
db: ReturnType<typeof getDb>,
accepted: string[],
rejected: Array<{ messageId: string; reason: string }>,
): Promise<void> {
const payload = event.profileUpdate;
if (!payload) {
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'missing_profile_update_payload' });
return;
}
// Strict attribution: profile updates MUST originate from the home instance.
// No homeward relay exception — unlike DMs, profile updates always come from home.
const payloadDomain = extractDomain(payload.homeInstance);
const sourceDomain = extractDomain(sourceInstance);
if (payloadDomain !== sourceDomain) {
console.warn(`[federation] Attribution mismatch in profile_update: homeInstance=${payloadDomain} source=${sourceDomain}`);
rejected.push({ messageId: event.messageId, reason: 'attribution_mismatch' });
return;
}
// Look up the local replicated user by canonical identity
const localUser = db
.select()
.from(schema.users)
.where(
and(
eq(schema.users.homeUserId, payload.homeUserId),
eq(schema.users.isDeleted, 0),
),
)
.get();
if (!localUser) {
// This peer has no replica of this user — silently accept
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Verify the homeInstance domain matches (guard against homeUserId collisions)
if (localUser.homeInstance && extractDomain(localUser.homeInstance) !== payloadDomain) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Detached accounts are sovereign: the domain now belongs to a different
// incarnation, which must never overwrite the established account's profile
// by replaying its old homeUserId. Ack (not reject) — the sender considers
// this identity theirs to update; from our side the update simply no-ops.
if (localUser.federationHomeOrphaned === 1) {
console.log(`[federation] Skipping profile_update for detached account ${localUser.id} (home-orphaned)`);
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// Version check: reject stale/duplicate events
const storedTs = localUser.profileUpdatedAt ?? 0;
const incomingTs = payload.profileUpdatedAt ?? 0;
if (incomingTs <= storedTs) {
accepted.push(event.messageId);
return;
}
// ── Resolve avatar/banner: download locally, fall back to absolute URL ──
let resolvedAvatar: string | null = payload.avatar ?? null;
let resolvedBanner: string | null = payload.banner ?? null;
// Download avatar
if (resolvedAvatar && resolvedAvatar.startsWith('http')) {
const localFile = await downloadProfileAsset(resolvedAvatar, sourceInstance);
resolvedAvatar = localFile ?? resolvedAvatar; // local filename or absolute URL fallback
} else if (resolvedAvatar && !resolvedAvatar.startsWith('http')) {
// Bare filename (shouldn't happen) — resolve to absolute URL
const baseUrl = sourceInstance.startsWith('http') ? sourceInstance : `https://${sourceInstance}`;
const absoluteUrl = `${baseUrl}/api/uploads/${resolvedAvatar}`;
const localFile = await downloadProfileAsset(absoluteUrl, sourceInstance);
resolvedAvatar = localFile ?? absoluteUrl;
}
// Download banner
if (resolvedBanner && resolvedBanner.startsWith('http')) {
const localFile = await downloadProfileAsset(resolvedBanner, sourceInstance);
resolvedBanner = localFile ?? resolvedBanner;
} else if (resolvedBanner && !resolvedBanner.startsWith('http')) {
const baseUrl = sourceInstance.startsWith('http') ? sourceInstance : `https://${sourceInstance}`;
const absoluteUrl = `${baseUrl}/api/uploads/${resolvedBanner}`;
const localFile = await downloadProfileAsset(absoluteUrl, sourceInstance);
resolvedBanner = localFile ?? absoluteUrl;
}
// Clean up old local files being replaced
const oldAvatar = localUser.avatar;
const oldBanner = localUser.banner;
if (oldAvatar && !oldAvatar.startsWith('http') && oldAvatar !== resolvedAvatar) {
deleteUploadFile(oldAvatar);
}
if (oldBanner && !oldBanner.startsWith('http') && oldBanner !== resolvedBanner) {
deleteUploadFile(oldBanner);
}
// Authoritative overwrite — home instance is always right.
// displayName falls back to the home user's canonical username when null,
// mirroring hydrateReplicatedUserProfile so stubs whose home user has no
// displayName show the real handle instead of getting clobbered to null.
// (The username field on the wire is the home's canonical handle, not the
// stub's local-part; usernames are immutable on the home instance, so we
// never rewrite the stub's username column here.)
const effectiveDisplayName = payload.displayName ?? payload.username ?? null;
db.update(schema.users)
.set({
displayName: effectiveDisplayName,
avatar: resolvedAvatar,
banner: resolvedBanner,
accentColor: payload.accentColor,
avatarColor: payload.avatarColor,
bio: payload.bio,
profileUpdatedAt: payload.profileUpdatedAt,
})
.where(eq(schema.users.id, localUser.id))
.run();
// Broadcast user_updated to local clients
const updatedUser = db.select().from(schema.users).where(eq(schema.users.id, localUser.id)).get();
if (updatedUser) {
const sanitized = sanitizeUser(updatedUser, false);
const targetUserIds = collectProfileBroadcastTargetIds(localUser.id);
targetUserIds.add(localUser.id); // Include self (other tabs/connections)
const userUpdatedEvent = { type: 'user_updated' as const, user: sanitized };
for (const uid of targetUserIds) {
connectionManager.sendToUser(uid, userUpdatedEvent);
}
}
accepted.push(event.messageId);
}
/**
* One-time / idempotent pass that converts existing absolute-URL avatars and
* banners on replicated users into local files via downloadProfileAsset.
*
* Why: hydrateReplicatedUserProfile historically wrote home-instance URLs into
* users.avatar / users.banner. When the home instance is offline those URLs
* 404, leaving sidebars (server activity, friend activity, DM list) showing
* letter fallbacks. processProfileUpdateEvent only re-downloads on the next
* profile edit, which most users don't do — so this worker cleans up the
* accumulated URL rows.
*
* Behavior: best-effort. Rows where the home instance can't be reached are
* left as URLs (they still render while the peer is up), and the worker is
* safe to re-run on every startup.
*/
export async function backfillReplicatedProfileAssets(): Promise<void> {
const db = getDb();
const rows = db
.select({
id: schema.users.id,
homeInstance: schema.users.homeInstance,
avatar: schema.users.avatar,
banner: schema.users.banner,
})
.from(schema.users)
.where(
and(
sql`${schema.users.homeInstance} IS NOT NULL`,
eq(schema.users.isDeleted, 0),
or(
sql`${schema.users.avatar} LIKE 'http%'`,
sql`${schema.users.banner} LIKE 'http%'`,
),
),
)
.all();
if (rows.length === 0) return;
let avatarOk = 0;
let bannerOk = 0;
let skipped = 0;
for (const row of rows) {
if (!row.homeInstance) continue;
const baseUrl = row.homeInstance.startsWith('http')
? row.homeInstance
: `https://${row.homeInstance}`;
const updates: Record<string, string | null> = {};
if (row.avatar && row.avatar.startsWith('http')) {
const localFile = await downloadProfileAsset(row.avatar, baseUrl);
if (localFile) {
updates.avatar = localFile;
avatarOk++;
} else {
skipped++;
}
}
if (row.banner && row.banner.startsWith('http')) {
const localFile = await downloadProfileAsset(row.banner, baseUrl);
if (localFile) {
updates.banner = localFile;
bannerOk++;
} else {
skipped++;
}
}
if (Object.keys(updates).length > 0) {
db.update(schema.users)
.set(updates)
.where(eq(schema.users.id, row.id))
.run();
}
}
console.log(
`[federation] Replicated profile asset backfill: ${avatarOk} avatars, ${bannerOk} banners downloaded; ${skipped} unreachable (will retry next start)`,
);
}
@@ -0,0 +1,177 @@
// ─── In-memory rate limiter for the accept endpoint ──────────────────────────
export const acceptRateBuckets = new Map<string, number[]>();
export const ACCEPT_RATE_WINDOW_MS = 60_000;
export const ACCEPT_RATE_MAX = 10;
export function isAcceptRateLimited(ip: string): boolean {
const now = Date.now();
let timestamps = acceptRateBuckets.get(ip);
if (!timestamps) {
timestamps = [];
acceptRateBuckets.set(ip, timestamps);
}
// Prune entries outside the window
const cutoff = now - ACCEPT_RATE_WINDOW_MS;
while (timestamps.length > 0 && (timestamps[0] ?? Infinity) < cutoff) {
timestamps.shift();
}
if (timestamps.length >= ACCEPT_RATE_MAX) {
return true;
}
timestamps.push(now);
return false;
}
// ─── In-memory rate limiter for the relay endpoint (per-peer) ────────────────
export const relayRateBuckets = new Map<string, number[]>();
export const RELAY_RATE_WINDOW_MS = 60_000;
export const RELAY_RATE_MAX = 90;
export function isRelayRateLimited(peerOrigin: string): boolean {
const now = Date.now();
let timestamps = relayRateBuckets.get(peerOrigin);
if (!timestamps) {
timestamps = [];
relayRateBuckets.set(peerOrigin, timestamps);
}
const cutoff = now - RELAY_RATE_WINDOW_MS;
while (timestamps.length > 0 && (timestamps[0] ?? Infinity) < cutoff) {
timestamps.shift();
}
if (timestamps.length >= RELAY_RATE_MAX) {
return true;
}
timestamps.push(now);
return false;
}
// ─── In-memory rate limiter for the user-lookup endpoint (per-peer) ──────────
export const lookupRateBuckets = new Map<string, number[]>();
export const LOOKUP_RATE_WINDOW_MS = 60_000;
export const LOOKUP_RATE_MAX = 60;
export function isLookupRateLimited(peerOrigin: string): boolean {
const now = Date.now();
let timestamps = lookupRateBuckets.get(peerOrigin);
if (!timestamps) {
timestamps = [];
lookupRateBuckets.set(peerOrigin, timestamps);
}
const cutoff = now - LOOKUP_RATE_WINDOW_MS;
while (timestamps.length > 0 && (timestamps[0] ?? Infinity) < cutoff) {
timestamps.shift();
}
if (timestamps.length >= LOOKUP_RATE_MAX) return true;
timestamps.push(now);
return false;
}
// Test-only export — used by federation.userLookup.test.ts to reset between cases.
export function _resetLookupRateBuckets(): void {
lookupRateBuckets.clear();
}
// ─── In-memory rate limiter for the ensure endpoint (per-user) ─────────────
export const ensureRateBuckets = new Map<string, number[]>();
export const ENSURE_RATE_WINDOW_MS = 15 * 60_000; // 15 minutes
export const ENSURE_RATE_MAX = 3;
export function isEnsureRateLimited(userId: string): boolean {
const now = Date.now();
let timestamps = ensureRateBuckets.get(userId);
if (!timestamps) {
timestamps = [];
ensureRateBuckets.set(userId, timestamps);
}
const cutoff = now - ENSURE_RATE_WINDOW_MS;
while (timestamps.length > 0 && (timestamps[0] ?? Infinity) < cutoff) {
timestamps.shift();
}
if (timestamps.length >= ENSURE_RATE_MAX) {
return true;
}
timestamps.push(now);
return false;
}
// Clean up stale ensure rate limit buckets every 15 minutes
setInterval(() => {
const cutoff = Date.now() - ENSURE_RATE_WINDOW_MS;
for (const [userId, timestamps] of ensureRateBuckets) {
while (timestamps.length > 0 && (timestamps[0] ?? Infinity) < cutoff) {
timestamps.shift();
}
if (timestamps.length === 0) {
ensureRateBuckets.delete(userId);
}
}
}, ENSURE_RATE_WINDOW_MS).unref();
// ─── In-memory nonce store for replay protection (per-peer) ──────────────────
// Maps peerOrigin → (nonce → insertion timestamp). Nonces are evicted after
// NONCE_MAX_AGE_MS (15 min) to match the HMAC timestamp window.
export const NONCE_MAX_AGE_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000;
export const nonceStore = new Map<string, Map<string, number>>();
/** Returns true if the nonce is a duplicate (already seen for this peer). */
export function isNonceDuplicate(peerOrigin: string, nonce: string): boolean {
let peerNonces = nonceStore.get(peerOrigin);
if (!peerNonces) {
peerNonces = new Map();
nonceStore.set(peerOrigin, peerNonces);
}
if (peerNonces.has(nonce)) return true;
peerNonces.set(nonce, Date.now());
return false;
}
// Periodically clean stale buckets to prevent unbounded memory growth
setInterval(() => {
const cutoff = Date.now() - ACCEPT_RATE_WINDOW_MS;
for (const [ip, timestamps] of acceptRateBuckets) {
while (timestamps.length > 0 && (timestamps[0] ?? Infinity) < cutoff) {
timestamps.shift();
}
if (timestamps.length === 0) {
acceptRateBuckets.delete(ip);
}
}
const relayCutoff = Date.now() - RELAY_RATE_WINDOW_MS;
for (const [origin, timestamps] of relayRateBuckets) {
while (timestamps.length > 0 && (timestamps[0] ?? Infinity) < relayCutoff) {
timestamps.shift();
}
if (timestamps.length === 0) {
relayRateBuckets.delete(origin);
}
}
// Evict expired nonces
const nonceCutoff = Date.now() - NONCE_MAX_AGE_MS;
for (const [origin, nonces] of nonceStore) {
for (const [nonce, ts] of nonces) {
if (ts < nonceCutoff) nonces.delete(nonce);
}
if (nonces.size === 0) nonceStore.delete(origin);
}
}, ACCEPT_RATE_WINDOW_MS).unref();
@@ -0,0 +1,196 @@
import { getRawDb } from '../../db/index.js';
import { computeFederatedId } from '../../utils/federationOutbox.js';
import { and, or } from 'drizzle-orm';
import { getOurIdentityDomain } from './identity.js';
export interface DmReconcileResult {
action: 'noop' | 'rekeyed' | 'merged';
channelId: string;
targetChannelId: string;
affectedUserIds: string[];
}
/**
* Reconcile a single 1-on-1 DM channel's deterministic federatedId against its
* members' CURRENT home identities (reattach-dm-reconcile spec §3.1). A 1-on-1
* federatedId is f(sorted home user ids); when a participant's home_user_id
* changes (re-attach), the channel's stored id goes stale and new messages
* compute a different id → a split conversation. This re-keys the channel in
* place, or — when a channel already carries the correct id (idx_dm_federated is
* UNIQUE, so two rows can't share it) — merges this channel INTO that one and
* deletes it.
*
* Idempotent: a correctly-keyed channel is a noop. Group DMs (UUID federatedId
* or member count != 2) are skipped. Must be called inside a transaction.
*/
export function reconcileDmChannelFederatedId(
rawDb: ReturnType<typeof getRawDb>,
channelId: string,
): DmReconcileResult {
const noop: DmReconcileResult = { action: 'noop', channelId, targetChannelId: channelId, affectedUserIds: [] };
const chan = rawDb.prepare(`SELECT id, federated_id FROM dm_channels WHERE id = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL`).get(channelId) as
{ id: string; federated_id: string | null } | undefined;
if (!chan || !chan.federated_id) return noop;
// Only 1-on-1 shape (32 hex). Group DMs use a random UUID.
if (!/^[0-9a-f]{32}$/.test(chan.federated_id)) return noop;
const members = rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT u.id, u.home_user_id FROM dm_members m JOIN users u ON u.id = m.user_id
WHERE m.dm_channel_id = ?
`).all(channelId) as Array<{ id: string; home_user_id: string | null }>;
if (members.length !== 2) return noop;
const homeA = members[0]!.home_user_id || members[0]!.id;
const homeB = members[1]!.home_user_id || members[1]!.id;
const expected = computeFederatedId(homeA, homeB);
if (expected === chan.federated_id) return noop;
const target = rawDb.prepare(`SELECT id FROM dm_channels WHERE federated_id = ? AND deleted_at IS NULL AND id != ?`).get(expected, channelId) as
{ id: string } | undefined;
if (!target) {
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE dm_channels SET federated_id = ? WHERE id = ?`).run(expected, channelId);
return { action: 'rekeyed', channelId, targetChannelId: channelId, affectedUserIds: members.map(m => m.id) };
}
// Merge source (channelId) INTO target, then delete source.
const targetId = target.id;
const targetMemberIds = (rawDb.prepare(`SELECT user_id FROM dm_members WHERE dm_channel_id = ?`).all(targetId) as Array<{ user_id: string }>).map(r => r.user_id);
const affected = Array.from(new Set([...members.map(m => m.id), ...targetMemberIds]));
// Messages: globally-unique ids, straight move (attachments + dm_reactions
// reference dm_message_id and follow automatically).
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE dm_messages SET dm_channel_id = ? WHERE dm_channel_id = ?`).run(targetId, channelId);
// Members: drop source rows already present on target (composite PK), repoint the rest.
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM dm_members WHERE dm_channel_id = ? AND user_id IN (SELECT user_id FROM dm_members WHERE dm_channel_id = ?)`).run(channelId, targetId);
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE dm_members SET dm_channel_id = ? WHERE dm_channel_id = ?`).run(targetId, channelId);
// read_states: keyed by channel_id; dedupe on (user_id, channel_id) then repoint.
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM read_states WHERE channel_id = ? AND user_id IN (SELECT user_id FROM read_states WHERE channel_id = ?)`).run(channelId, targetId);
rawDb.prepare(`UPDATE read_states SET channel_id = ? WHERE channel_id = ?`).run(targetId, channelId);
// Remove the now-empty source channel.
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM dm_channels WHERE id = ?`).run(channelId);
return { action: 'merged', channelId, targetChannelId: targetId, affectedUserIds: affected };
}
/**
* Startup sweep: reconcile any 1-on-1 DM channel whose stored federatedId has
* drifted from its members' current home identities (reattach-dm-reconcile
* spec §3.3). Heals accounts re-attached before inline reconciliation shipped
* (e.g. the live split-conversation duplicate). Idempotent; a noop on a clean DB.
*/
export function reconcileDriftedDmFederatedIds(): void {
const rawDb = getRawDb();
const candidates = rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT c.id FROM dm_channels c
WHERE c.deleted_at IS NULL
AND c.federated_id IS NOT NULL
AND (SELECT count(*) FROM dm_members m WHERE m.dm_channel_id = c.id) = 2
`).all() as Array<{ id: string }>;
if (candidates.length === 0) return;
let rekeyed = 0;
let merged = 0;
rawDb.transaction(() => {
for (const c of candidates) {
// A prior merge in this loop may have deleted this id — reconcile returns
// noop for a missing/mutated channel, so this is safe.
const r = reconcileDmChannelFederatedId(rawDb, c.id);
if (r.action === 'rekeyed') rekeyed++;
else if (r.action === 'merged') merged++;
}
})();
if (rekeyed > 0 || merged > 0) {
console.log(`[federation] DM federatedId reconciliation: rekeyed ${rekeyed}, merged ${merged}`);
}
}
/**
* Remove dead-incarnation artifacts produced by pre-fix initial syncs
* (dead-incarnation spec §3.4): DM channels with no native member, and
* replicated stubs homed at this instance's own domain. Idempotent —
* a no-op on a clean database. Synchronous (better-sqlite3), runs once
* at startup from startFederationWorkers.
*
* Child rows are deleted explicitly: FK cascade enforcement cannot be
* assumed ON, and dm_messages.user_id has no cascade anyway.
*/
export function sweepDeadIncarnationArtifacts(): void {
const ourDomain = getOurIdentityDomain();
if (!ourDomain) return;
const rawDb = getRawDb();
const normHome = `lower(replace(replace(coalesce(home_instance, ''), 'https://', ''), 'http://', ''))`;
// ── 1. DM channels with no native member. A legitimate channel always
// involves a native user; native-less channels are sync junk. ──
const junkChannelIds = (rawDb.prepare(`
SELECT c.id FROM dm_channels c
WHERE NOT EXISTS (
SELECT 1 FROM dm_members m JOIN users u ON u.id = m.user_id
WHERE m.dm_channel_id = c.id AND u.home_instance IS NULL
)
`).all() as Array<{ id: string }>).map(r => r.id);
if (junkChannelIds.length > 0) {
const ph = junkChannelIds.map(() => '?').join(',');
rawDb.transaction(() => {
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM dm_reactions WHERE dm_message_id IN (SELECT id FROM dm_messages WHERE dm_channel_id IN (${ph}))`).run(...junkChannelIds);
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM attachments WHERE dm_message_id IN (SELECT id FROM dm_messages WHERE dm_channel_id IN (${ph}))`).run(...junkChannelIds);
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM dm_messages WHERE dm_channel_id IN (${ph})`).run(...junkChannelIds);
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM dm_members WHERE dm_channel_id IN (${ph})`).run(...junkChannelIds);
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM read_states WHERE channel_id IN (${ph})`).run(...junkChannelIds);
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM dm_channels WHERE id IN (${ph})`).run(...junkChannelIds);
})();
}
// ── 2. Self-homed replicated stubs. Junk social rows referencing them go
// first; then stubs with no remaining non-cascading references. ──
const stubSelect = `SELECT id FROM users WHERE password_hash = '!federation-replicated' AND ${normHome} = ?`;
const allStubIds = (rawDb.prepare(stubSelect).all(ourDomain) as Array<{ id: string }>).map(r => r.id);
let deletedStubs = 0;
if (allStubIds.length > 0) {
rawDb.transaction(() => {
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM friends WHERE user_id IN (${stubSelect}) OR friend_id IN (${stubSelect})`).run(ourDomain, ourDomain);
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM friend_requests WHERE from_id IN (${stubSelect}) OR to_id IN (${stubSelect})`).run(ourDomain, ourDomain);
// Deletable = no rows left in any table whose FK to users.id does NOT
// cascade, and no surviving dm/space membership or authored message.
const deletable = (rawDb.prepare(`
${stubSelect}
AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM dm_messages WHERE user_id = users.id)
AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM messages WHERE user_id = users.id)
AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM dm_members WHERE user_id = users.id)
AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM space_members WHERE user_id = users.id)
AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM spaces WHERE owner_id = users.id)
AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM bans WHERE banned_by = users.id)
AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM join_requests WHERE decided_by = users.id)
AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM voice_restrictions WHERE moderator_id = users.id)
AND NOT EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM invite_links WHERE created_by = users.id)
`).all(ourDomain) as Array<{ id: string }>).map(r => r.id);
if (deletable.length > 0) {
const dph = deletable.map(() => '?').join(',');
// Explicit child cleanup for the cascade-declared tables too — FK
// enforcement cannot be assumed ON.
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM dm_reactions WHERE user_id IN (${dph})`).run(...deletable);
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM reactions WHERE user_id IN (${dph})`).run(...deletable);
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM read_states WHERE user_id IN (${dph})`).run(...deletable);
rawDb.prepare(`DELETE FROM users WHERE id IN (${dph})`).run(...deletable);
deletedStubs = deletable.length;
}
})();
}
const skipped = allStubIds.length - deletedStubs;
if (junkChannelIds.length > 0 || allStubIds.length > 0) {
console.log(`[federation] Dead-incarnation sweep: removed ${junkChannelIds.length} channels, ${deletedStubs} self-homed stubs${skipped > 0 ? `, skipped ${skipped} still-referenced stubs` : ''}`);
}
}
// ─── Replicated Profile Asset Backfill ──────────────────────────────────────