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backspace/packages/server
Jannis Braun 058eb992e4 feat(federation): verify approval token before awaiting_approval → active
Receiver-side defense — closes the trust-bypass class the cheap fix
(4533e36) cannot cover. The /peer/accept handler's awaiting_approval
branch now requires an approvalToken matching the one stored on the
local peer row before promoting to active. Without a match:
- autoAccept=0 falls through to queueApprovalRequest (no bypass; new
  approval-request queued, existing awaiting_approval row untouched).
- autoAccept=1 falls back to permissive promotion (no regression vs
  prior behavior, since autoAccept=1 would accept any inbound regardless).

Successful match also deletes any stale approval-request row for the
origin to prevent debris accumulation from prior bypass attempts.

Refactor: queueing path extracted to a top-level queueApprovalRequest()
helper so both the no-existing-peer case and the awaiting_approval
mismatch fallback share one implementation. Helper generates a fresh
single-use token on every call.

Adds 'accept_awaiting_approval_fallback' variant to PeerActivationReason
to distinguish the autoAccept=1 fallback path from the verified path
in onPeerActivated audit logs.

Spec §3.5, §3.6.

Test counts: 289 → 301 (+12).
2026-04-26 11:48:33 +02:00
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