# REST API Reference Base: `/api`. Auth via `Authorization: Bearer `. All responses JSON. Source files: `packages/server/src/routes/*.ts` --- ## Auth (`routes/auth.ts`) — public, rate-limited ``` POST /auth/register { username, password, displayName?, avatarColor?, homeInstance?, homeUserId?, inviteToken? } → { token, user } GET /auth/check-username ?username= → { available, reason? } GET /auth/check-invite ?token= → CheckInviteResponse POST /auth/login { username, password } → { token, user } ``` **`POST /auth/register` gating** — branches on whether `homeInstance` is set: - **Federated path** (`homeInstance` set): gated solely by `instance_settings.federatedRegistrationOpen`. `inviteToken` is ignored entirely (not validated, not consumed). 403 `Federated registration is closed on this instance` when closed. Existing federated stubs (relay-created, `passwordHash = '!federation-replicated'`) upgrade in place — login is never blocked by this gate. - **Local path** (no `homeInstance`): - When `registrationOpen` is true: `inviteToken` is silently ignored (no row touched, no `usedCount` increment). - When `registrationOpen` is false: `inviteToken` is required. The token is pre-validated, then the user INSERT + `usedCount` increment + `invite_redemptions` row INSERT all run in a single transaction (`inviteService.redeemInvite`). 403 `Registration is closed. An invite is required.` (no token) or `Invalid or expired invite` (token rejected at any stage, including a concurrent-redemption race re-check inside the transaction). **`GET /auth/check-invite`** — public, rate-limited 30/min/IP. Always returns 200; the body discriminates: ```typescript type CheckInviteResponse = | { valid: true; name: string } // active token; name surfaces for UX | { valid: false; reason: 'expired' | 'exhausted' | 'invalid' }; ``` `revoked`, malformed (non-22-char-base64url), and not-in-DB tokens all collapse to `'invalid'` (enumeration shield). `name` is returned **only** in the valid case. ## Users (`routes/users.ts`) — auth required ``` GET /users/@me → { user } PATCH /users/@me { displayName?, avatar?, banner?, accentColor?, avatarColor?, bio?, customStatus?, status?, replicatedInstances?, homeUserId?, profileUpdatedAt?, discoverable?, showActivity? } → { user } POST /users/@me/verify-password { password } → { valid } POST /users/@me/change-password { currentPassword?, newPassword } → { token } DELETE /users/@me { password, username } → { success } PUT /users/@me/space-layout { items, folders, updatedAt? } → { items, folders, updatedAt } GET /users/@me/federation-registry → { registry: FederationRegistryEntry[], updatedAt: number } PUT /users/@me/federation-registry { registry, updatedAt } → { ok: true, updatedAt } (409 if not newer) GET /users/:id → { user } GET /users/:id/mutuals ?homeUserId= → { mutualFriends[], mutualSpaces[] } ``` **Write protection:** If the authenticated user is a replicated user (`homeInstance` is set), the following fields are rejected with 403: `displayName`, `avatar`, `banner`, `accentColor`, `avatarColor`, `bio`. These fields are managed by the home instance via S2S relay. ## Spaces (`routes/spaces.ts`) — auth required ``` GET /spaces → { spaces[] } POST /spaces { name, icon?, description? } → { space } GET /spaces/:id → { space, channels[], members[], roles[] } PATCH /spaces/:id { name?, icon?, banner?, description?, visibility?, avatarColor? } → { space } [MANAGE_SPACE] DELETE /spaces/:id → { success } [owner] POST /spaces/:id/invite → { inviteCode } [CREATE_INVITE] POST /spaces/:id/join { inviteCode } → { space } POST /spaces/join { inviteCode } → { space } GET /spaces/invite/:code/preview → invite preview PATCH /spaces/:id/transfer-ownership { newOwnerId } → { space } [owner] ``` ### Members ``` GET /spaces/:id/members → { members[] } PATCH /spaces/:id/members/:uid { nickname?, roles? } → { member } [MANAGE_ROLES] DELETE /spaces/:id/members/:uid → { success } [KICK_MEMBERS|self] ``` ### Bans ``` GET /spaces/:id/bans → { bans[] } [BAN_MEMBERS] POST /spaces/:id/bans { userId, reason? } → { success } [BAN_MEMBERS] DELETE /spaces/:id/bans/:uid → { success } [BAN_MEMBERS] ``` ### Roles ``` POST /spaces/:id/roles { name, color?, permissions? } → { role } [MANAGE_ROLES] PATCH /spaces/:id/roles/:rid { name?, color?, position?, permissions? } → { role } [MANAGE_ROLES] DELETE /spaces/:id/roles/:rid → { success } [MANAGE_ROLES] POST /spaces/:id/members/:uid/roles { roleId } → { success } [MANAGE_ROLES] DELETE /spaces/:id/members/:uid/roles/:rid → { success } [MANAGE_ROLES] ``` ## Channels (`routes/channels.ts`) — auth required ``` GET /spaces/:id/channels → { channels[] } [VIEW_CHANNEL] POST /spaces/:id/channels { name, type?, topic?, categoryId? } → { channel } [MANAGE_CHANNELS] PATCH /channels/:id { name?, type?, topic?, categoryId? } → { channel } [MANAGE_CHANNELS] DELETE /channels/:id → { success } [MANAGE_CHANNELS] PATCH /spaces/:id/channels/reorder { order } → reordered [MANAGE_CHANNELS] ``` ### Channel Overrides ``` GET /channels/:id/overrides → { overrides[] } [MANAGE_CHANNELS] PUT /channels/:id/overrides { targetType, targetId, permissions } → { override } [MANAGE_CHANNELS] DELETE /channels/:id/overrides/:targetType/:targetId → { success } [MANAGE_CHANNELS] ``` ### Categories ``` POST /spaces/:id/categories { name } → { category } [MANAGE_CHANNELS] PATCH /categories/:id { name?, position? } → { category } [MANAGE_CHANNELS] DELETE /categories/:id → { success } [MANAGE_CHANNELS] GET /categories/:id/overrides → { overrides[] } [MANAGE_ROLES] PUT /categories/:id/overrides { targetType, targetId, permissions } → { success } [MANAGE_ROLES] DELETE /categories/:id/overrides/:tt/:tid → { success } [MANAGE_ROLES] ``` ## Messages (`routes/messages.ts`) — auth required ``` GET /channels/:id/messages ?before=&limit=50 → { messages[] } [VIEW_CHANNEL+READ_MESSAGE_HISTORY] POST /channels/:id/messages { content, attachments?, replyToId? } → { message } [SEND_MESSAGES, +ATTACH_FILES] PATCH /messages/:id { content } → { message } [author] DELETE /messages/:id → { success } [author|MANAGE_MESSAGES] ``` ## DMs (`routes/dm.ts`) — auth required ``` POST /dm { targetUserId, targetUsername? } → { dmChannel } POST /dm/group { name, memberUserIds[] } → { dmChannel } PATCH /dm/:id { name?, icon? } → { id, name, icon, metadataUpdatedAt } [owner; group only] DELETE /dm/:id → { success } (soft-close) POST /dm/:id/members { userIds[] } → { dmChannel } [owner, max 10] DELETE /dm/:id/members → { success } (leave) DELETE /dm/:id/members/:targetUserId ?homeInstance= → { success } [owner kick; cannot self-kick; group only; segment is homeUserId when ?homeInstance is set] POST /dm/:id/transfer { newOwnerId? | (homeUserId+homeInstance) } → { success } [owner; resolved member must be in channel; not self] GET /dm/:id/messages ?before=&limit=50 → { messages[] } POST /dm/:id/messages { content, attachments?, replyToId? } → { message } PATCH /dm/messages/:id { content } → { message } [author] DELETE /dm/messages/:id → { success } [author] ``` **`PATCH /dm/:id`** — Owner-only update of a group DM's `name` and `icon`. Either field may be omitted (no-op), null (clear), or set. Empty/whitespace name collapses to null. `icon` accepts a bare attachment filename owned by the caller (image/*, ≤ `GROUP_DM_ICON_MAX_BYTES`) or an absolute http(s) URL. No-op short-circuit when nothing actually changes — emits no system message and no federation relay. See `docs/systems/dm-system.md` "Group Metadata Update" for the full transaction, federation relay, and icon URL round-trip rules. **`DELETE /dm/:id/members/:targetUserId`** — Owner kicks a member from a group DM. The `:targetUserId` segment carries either a local user id on the owner's instance OR a federated home user id when the `?homeInstance=` query string is present (server resolves via `resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser` — same pattern as `POST /dm/:id/members`). Federated form is required for federated targets, because the client's cached user view returns the user's home id, not the owner instance's local replicated id. Reuses the leave path with `reason: 'kick'`; evicts the target from the DM voice room first. Sends `dm_channel_closed` to the kicked user. Receivers enforce `sourceInstance === ownerHomeInstance`; non-owner kicks reject as `unauthorized_source`. **`POST /dm/:id/transfer`** — Owner transfers ownership to another current member without leaving. Body accepts either a local id (`newOwnerId`) or a federated identity (`homeUserId` + `homeInstance`). When both forms are supplied, federated args take precedence. Server resolves via `resolveOrCreateReplicatedUser` before checking membership — mirrors `POST /dm/:id/members`. Updates `ownerId`, `ownerHomeUserId`, `ownerHomeInstance`; inserts an `owner_changed` system message; broadcasts `dm_owner_updated`; queues an `ownership_transfer` outbox event. Reuses the existing receiver path (`processOwnershipTransferEvent`) with no protocol changes. ## Social (`routes/social.ts`) — auth required ``` GET /social/friends → { friends[] } GET /social/requests → { requests[] } POST /social/requests { username } → { success, requestId } PATCH /social/requests/:id { status: 'accepted'|'declined' } → { request } DELETE /social/requests/:id → { success } (cancel, sender-only) DELETE /social/friends/:id → { success } GET /social/discover ?q=&limit=&offset= → { users[], total } GET /social/search ?q= → { users[] } ``` ### POST /api/social/requests — routing & error codes `body.username` may be `bare` (local), `bare@` (also routed local — server normalizes), or `bare@` (federated branch). The client sends the trimmed handle verbatim; all parsing, routing, peering, and remote lookup are server-side. | HTTP | error code | When | |---|---|---| | 200 | (success, idempotent) | Same-direction pending request already exists; returns existing `requestId` | | 201 | (success, created) | New friend request created | | 400 | `username_required` | Missing/empty/non-string username | | 400 | `cannot_friend_self` | Looked-up identity matches sender | | 400 | `invalid_target_domain` | Scheme resolution failed (e.g., non-localhost HTTP target when our scheme is HTTPS) | | 403 | `peer_rejected` | Remote instance has rejected federation; admin must intervene | | 403 | `not_authoritative_for_sender` | Caller is a federated (replicated) user; should not have reached here | | 404 | `user_not_found` | Remote lookup returned 404 (no such user, or tombstoned) | | 409 | `already_friends` | Friendship row already exists | | 409 | `peer_pending_approval` | Remote admin needs to approve the peering relationship | | 409 | `peer_pending_local_admin` | Local instance has `autoAcceptPeering=0` and the user attempted to friend-add a never-peered remote target. The user's own admin must approve before any traffic reaches the wire. Distinct from `peer_pending_approval` (remote admin must approve). See [federation.md → Outbound Peering Gate](federation.md#outbound-peering-gate). | | 409 | `peer_pending` | Peer handshake in flight | | 409 | `incoming_request_exists` | Opposite-direction pending request exists; response includes `requestId` for deep-link | | 429 | `lookup_rate_limited` | Remote `/users/lookup` returned 429; `Retry-After` header forwarded | | 503 | `peer_unreachable` | Remote instance unreachable (network/timeout/lookup-unreachable) | ## Search (`routes/search.ts`) — auth required ``` GET /channels/:id/search ?q=&from=&has=&before=&after=&offset=&limit= → { results[], totalCount } [VIEW_CHANNEL] GET /channels/:id/messages/around ?messageId=&limit= → { messages[] } GET /dm/:id/search ?q=&from=&has=&before=&after=&offset=&limit= → { results[], totalCount } GET /dm/:id/messages/around ?messageId=&limit= → { messages[] } ``` has: `file`|`image`|`link` ## Explore (`routes/explore.ts`) — auth required ``` GET /spaces/explore ?q=&limit=&offset= → { spaces[], total, totalAll, discoveryEnabled } POST /spaces/:id/public-join → { space } POST /spaces/:id/request-join { message? } → { request } GET /spaces/:id/join-requests ?status= → { requests[] } [MANAGE_SPACE] PATCH /spaces/:id/join-requests/:rid { action } → { request } [MANAGE_SPACE] GET /users/@me/join-requests ?status= → { requests[] } ``` ## Uploads (`routes/files.ts`, `routes/uploads.ts`) ### Tus Upload Endpoints | Method | Path | Auth | Purpose | |--------|------|------|---------| | POST | `/api/files/` | JWT | Create resumable upload. Returns `Location` (upload URL) and `Upload-Expires`. | | HEAD | `/api/files/:uploadId` | JWT (ownership) | Probe `Upload-Offset` for resume. | | PATCH | `/api/files/:uploadId` | JWT (ownership) | Append bytes at offset. | | DELETE | `/api/files/:uploadId` | JWT (ownership) | Abort. | The final PATCH that completes an upload returns the `Attachment` JSON in its response body. See `docs/systems/uploads.md` for the full pipeline (PRE_CREATE / PRE_PATCH / POST_FINISH hooks, storage layout, janitor). ### File Serving ``` GET /uploads/:filename (public, supports Range) → file stream ``` ## GIF (`routes/gif.ts`) — auth required ``` GET /gif/enabled → { enabled } GET /gif/trending ?limit=&pos= → { results[], next } GET /gif/search ?q=&limit=&pos= → { results[], next } ``` Backend: Klipy API (requires `gifApiKey` in instance_settings) ## Voice (`routes/livekit.ts`) — auth required ``` POST /livekit/token { channelId | dmChannelId } → { token, url } ``` Permissions checked: CONNECT, SPEAK, STREAM (space channels). DM calls: always full grants. ## Instance (`routes/instance.ts`) — public ``` GET /instance/info → { name, version, registrationOpen, federatedRegistrationOpen, sourceCodeUrl, commit } ``` `federatedRegistrationOpen` is a UX hint consumed by the Connections add-instance pre-flight (see `client-federation.md`). The 403 from `POST /auth/register` remains the security boundary. `sourceCodeUrl` (`string`) and `commit` (`string | null`) implement the **AGPL-3.0 § 13 network-use source offer**: every network user (and federated peer) can obtain the Corresponding Source of the exact version this instance is running. `sourceCodeUrl` comes from `config.sourceCodeUrl` (env `BACKSPACE_SOURCE_URL`, default `https://github.com/TheZwiss/backspace`) — operators who modify Backspace MUST set it to their fork's source. `commit` comes from `config.commit` (env `BACKSPACE_COMMIT`, injected at Docker build via `deploy.sh --build-arg`; `null` in local dev). The web client surfaces `sourceCodeUrl`/`version` via the `SourceCodeLink` component on settings sidebars and the pre-auth login/register pages; the desktop app exposes it via the tray + app menus ("Source code (AGPL)") and the native About panel. ## Settings (`routes/settings.ts`) ``` GET /settings/streaming (auth) → { streamingLimits } PATCH /settings/streaming (admin) → { streamingLimits } GET /settings/instance (admin) → { instanceName, registrationOpen, federatedRegistrationOpen, discoveryEnabled, ... } PATCH /settings/instance (admin) { instanceName?, registrationOpen?, federatedRegistrationOpen?, discoveryEnabled?, gifApiKey?, maxUploadSizeMb?, federationRelayEnabled?, federationRelayTtlDays? } → { settings } ``` `registrationOpen` and `federatedRegistrationOpen` are **independent** toggles. PATCH validates `federatedRegistrationOpen` is `boolean` if provided; rejects 400 otherwise. `registrationOpen` is stored as a nullable column (null = fall back to `config.registrationOpen` env default); `federatedRegistrationOpen` is NOT NULL with default 1. ## Admin (`routes/admin.ts`) — admin required ``` GET /admin/storage/stats → StorageStats GET /admin/storage/orphans → { orphans[] } POST /admin/storage/cleanup { dryRun? } → CleanupResult POST /admin/storage/cleanup-media { maxAgeDays, dryRun? } → CleanupResult GET /admin/users ?q=&page=&pageSize=&showDeleted=&homeInstance=&role=&joinedAfter=&joinedBefore=&sort= → AdminUserListResponse GET /admin/users/instances → distinct home instance domains PATCH /admin/users/:id/role { isAdmin } → AdminUser POST /admin/users/:id/reset-password → { temporaryPassword } DELETE /admin/users/:id → { success } ``` ## Admin: Invite Management (`routes/invites.ts`) — admin required All endpoints sit behind `[authenticate, requireAdmin]`. Mutating endpoints wrap their read-modify-write in a SQLite transaction with an in-txn re-fetch + status re-derive; any state mismatch returns 409. Service layer: `packages/server/src/utils/inviteService.ts` (`InviteValidationError` → 400, `InviteNotFoundError` → 404, `InviteStateConflictError` → 409). ``` POST /admin/invites { name, maxUses, expiresAt } → InviteLinkSummary (201) GET /admin/invites ?status=active|archived (default: active) → { invites: InviteLinkSummary[] } PATCH /admin/invites/:id { name?, maxUses?, expiresAt? } → InviteLinkSummary POST /admin/invites/:id/revoke → { invite: InviteLinkSummary } POST /admin/invites/:id/reinstate { maxUses?, expiresAt? } → { invite: InviteLinkSummary, tokenRotated: boolean } DELETE /admin/invites/:id → { success: true } GET /admin/invites/:id/redemptions → { redemptions: InviteRedemption[] } ``` **`POST /admin/invites`** — `name` 1-64 chars trimmed; `maxUses` null (unlimited) or positive integer; `expiresAt` null (never) or epoch ms strictly greater than `Date.now()`. 400 on shape violation. **`GET /admin/invites?status=`** — `active` returns rows whose derived status is `active`; `archived` returns `expired | exhausted | revoked`. Sort `createdAt DESC`. Joins `users` to surface `createdByUsername` (`'Deleted User'` if creator's `isDeleted = 1`). **`PATCH /admin/invites/:id`** — partial body. 400 if `maxUses` is a positive integer less than the current `usedCount` (would retroactively exhaust — admin should revoke instead). 409 if the invite is currently `revoked` (status conflict — reinstate first). **`POST /admin/invites/:id/revoke`** — sets `revokedAt = Date.now()`. 409 if already revoked. **`POST /admin/invites/:id/reinstate`** — branches on the row's pre-reinstate derived status: - **Path A — was `revoked`**: rotates the token (`crypto.randomBytes(16).toString('base64url')`), clears `revokedAt`, applies any provided `maxUses`/`expiresAt` overrides. Response includes `tokenRotated: true`. 400 if the resulting row would still derive non-`active` (caller must bump enough). - **Path B — was `expired` or `exhausted`**: token preserved. Applies overrides. Response `tokenRotated: false`. 400 same rule. - **Path C — already `active`**: 409 "Invite is already active." Pure no-op rejection. **`DELETE /admin/invites/:id`** — hard-delete. CASCADE removes all `invite_redemptions` rows for this invite. Allowed in any status. 404 if not found. **`GET /admin/invites/:id/redemptions`** — sort `redeemedAt DESC`. Each row includes the registration-moment snapshot (`registrantUsername`) plus the live joined state (`currentUsername` / `isDeleted`) so the UI can render `alice (now Deleted User)` for renamed/tombstoned users. ```typescript type InviteLinkSummary = { id: string; token: string; name: string; status: 'active' | 'expired' | 'exhausted' | 'revoked'; // derived maxUses: number | null; usedCount: number; expiresAt: number | null; revokedAt: number | null; createdBy: string; createdByUsername: string | null; // 'Deleted User' if creator tombstoned createdAt: number; lastRedeemedAt: number | null; // epoch ms of most recent redemption; null when usedCount = 0 url: string; // server-built `https:///register?invite=` — clients MUST NOT assemble }; type InviteRedemption = { id: string; userId: string | null; // null only on hard-delete (defensive — tombstone keeps row) registrantUsername: string; // snapshot at registration moment currentUsername: string | null; isDeleted: boolean; redeemedAt: number; }; ``` ## Federation (`routes/federation.ts`) ``` POST /federation/peer/initiate (admin) { remoteOrigin } → peer created POST /federation/peer/accept (public, IP rate-limited 10/min) { sourceOrigin, challenge, hmacSecret, instanceName?, approvalToken? } → accepted (200) | queued (202 + { approvalToken }) GET /federation/peers (admin) → { peers[] } (no secrets) DELETE /federation/peers/:id (admin) → { success } + outbox cleanup POST /federation/relay (HMAC-signed S2S) FederationRelayRequest → { accepted[], rejected[] } POST /federation/sync (HMAC-signed S2S) { sinceTimestamp, limit?, dmChannelId?, federatedId?, contextType? } → { events[], hasMore, checkpoint } POST /federation/users/lookup (HMAC-signed S2S, rate-limited 60/min/peer) { username } → { found, user? } ``` **`POST /api/federation/peer/accept`** — public, IP-rate-limited. Optional `approvalToken` (64-hex) on the request body proves mutual admin approval; required to promote an `awaiting_approval` row to `active` when the receiver has `autoAcceptPeering=0`. The receiver returns it in the 202 body when queueing the request for admin review (`{ queued: true, message, approvalToken }`); the initiator stores it and the receiver's `/approve` later forwards it back. See `federation.md` §1 "Approval Token Verification" for the full lifecycle and threat model. **`POST /api/federation/users/lookup`** — HMAC-authenticated S2S endpoint. Resolves a username on this instance to its canonical `(homeUserId, profile snapshot)`. Used by the cross-instance friend-add flow on the sender's home server before queuing a `friend_request_create` event. Responds to native, non-deleted users only; ignores `discoverable`. Returns `{ found: false, code: 'user_not_found' }` for stubs, tombstoned users, or unknown handles. See `federation.md` §1 "S2S User Lookup" for the full contract. ### Federation Peering Approval Queue Inbound + outbound peering approval queue (`autoAcceptPeering=0`). See [federation.md → Peer Approval Queue](federation.md#peer-approval-queue) and [federation.md → Outbound Peering Gate](federation.md#outbound-peering-gate). ``` GET /federation/approval-requests (admin) → { requests: ApprovalRequestSummary[] } POST /federation/approval-requests/:id/approve (admin) → { success, peerStatus?, peer? } POST /federation/approval-requests/:id/deny (admin) → { success } ``` **`ApprovalRequestSummary` shape:** ```typescript type ApprovalRequestSummary = { id: string; direction: 'inbound' | 'outbound'; origin: string; instanceName: string | null; requestedAt: number; expiresAt: number; // Outbound rows ONLY — inbound rows OMIT this field entirely (it is absent, not null and not []). subscribers?: ApprovalRequestSubscriberSummary[]; }; type ApprovalRequestSubscriberSummary = { id: string; userId: string; username: string; triggerReason: 'friend_add' | 'space_join' | 'direct_message'; triggerTarget: string; createdAt: number; }; ``` **`POST /approval-requests/:id/approve`** — direction-branched. - **Inbound** — existing behavior preserved verbatim (creates / upserts a local `federation_peers` row with status `pending`, sends `/peer/accept` to origin forwarding the stored `approvalToken`, deletes the queue row regardless of whether the result is `active` (200) or `awaiting_approval` (202)). - **Outbound** — generates a fresh HMAC, sends `/peer/accept` to the origin (no token; we are the initiator). - On 200 → peer becomes `active`. `onPeerActivated` runs: fans out `kind='approved'` notifications to subscribers and cascade-deletes the queue row. The handler does NOT duplicate this cleanup. - On 202 → peer transitions to `awaiting_approval`, captures the returned `approvalToken`, and the queue row + subscribers are LEFT INTACT for the eventual remote-admin approval. `onPeerActivated` is NOT called yet. - On 4xx/5xx/network → the peer row is cleaned up; the queue row is LEFT INTACT so the admin can retry. Response status mirrors the wire failure (`502`/`503`/`504`). - **Response body:** `{ success, peerStatus?: 'active' | 'awaiting_approval', peer? }` for outbound; `{ success }` for inbound. **`POST /approval-requests/:id/deny`** — direction-branched. - **Inbound** — existing behavior preserved (sends signed `/peer/denied` to origin, upserts a local `rejected` `federation_peers` row, deletes the queue row). - **Outbound** — fans out `kind='denied'` notifications to all `peer_approval_subscribers` of the queue row, then cascade-deletes the parent (no remote network call). Broadcasts `federation_peers_changed` to admins so the queue UI refreshes. ### Federation Peering Subscriptions (user-facing) ``` GET /federation/peering-subscriptions (auth) → { subscriptions: PeeringSubscriptionSummary[] } DELETE /federation/peering-subscriptions/:id (auth) → { success } ``` User-facing surface for the rows in `peer_approval_subscribers` belonging to the calling user. GET joins the parent `peer_approval_requests` row to include peer origin/instance metadata. ```typescript type PeeringSubscriptionSummary = { id: string; requestId: string; peerOrigin: string; peerInstanceName: string | null; triggerReason: 'friend_add' | 'space_join' | 'direct_message'; triggerTarget: string; createdAt: number; }; ``` **`DELETE /peering-subscriptions/:id`:** - 404 if the subscriber row doesn't exist. - 403 if the row belongs to a different user. - On success: deletes the subscriber row; if it was the last subscriber for the parent, cascade-deletes the parent (admin's queue row disappears too). No `peer_approval_notifications` row is created (the user took the action; they know). - Broadcasts `peering_subscription_changed` to the calling user (multi-tab refresh) and `federation_peers_changed` to admins if the parent was deleted. ### Federation Peering Notifications (user-facing) ``` GET /federation/peering-notifications (auth) ?unread=1? → { notifications: PeeringNotificationSummary[] } POST /federation/peering-notifications/:id/read (auth) → { success } POST /federation/peering-notifications/read-all (auth) → { success, count } ``` User-facing terminal-state notifications for peering events. GET orders DESC by `createdAt`; `?unread=1` filters to `readAt IS NULL`. ```typescript type PeeringNotificationSummary = { id: string; kind: 'approved' | 'denied' | 'expired'; peerOrigin: string; triggerReason: 'friend_add' | 'space_join' | 'direct_message'; triggerTarget: string; createdAt: number; readAt: number | null; }; ``` **`POST /:id/read`** — sets `readAt = Date.now()` for the calling user's notification (404 / 403 on miss / mismatch). **`POST /read-all`** — marks all of the calling user's unread notifications as read; returns `{ success, count }` where `count` is the number of rows updated. ## Utilities (`routes/utils.ts`) — auth required ``` GET /utils/metadata ?url= → { title?, description?, image?, siteName? } GET /health (public) → { status: 'ok', timestamp } ```