refactor(federation): consolidate inbound S2S-auth preamble into one helper (#11)
Six S2S-HMAC endpoints repeated the same inbound-auth preamble verbatim
(parse federation headers -> resolve active peer -> optional per-peer rate
limit -> verify HMAC signature -> nonce replay protection). Extract it into
authenticateS2SPeer() so the trust boundary has a single, tested definition.
Adopters (preamble only; every post-auth side effect, body validation, and
response is unchanged):
- DELETE /api/federation/identity (no rate limiter; warns on missing nonce)
- POST /api/federation/relay (relay limiter; warns; keeps in-handler
epoch-baseline populate + nonce ratchet)
- POST /api/federation/sync (no limiter; warns with the [sync] tag;
keeps in-handler nonce ratchet)
- POST /api/federation/users/lookup (lookup limiter, Retry-After 60)
- POST /api/federation/users/by-home-id (same)
- POST /api/federation/verify-attach-proof(shares lookup bucket, Retry-After 60)
Deliberate non-adopters, each keeping a load-bearing gate the helper would
flatten (documented at each site + in the helper docstring):
- POST /api/federation/epoch gates status != 'revoked' (peer recovery),
400 on missing headers, no nonce check
- POST /api/federation/peer/rotate active-only but no nonce check
- POST /api/federation/peer/denied awaiting_approval gate (404/409), synthetic
no-grace secret verify
Behavior-preserving. The rate limiter is injected (plain { limited, retryAfter }),
so the limit still fires BEFORE signature verification. The only ordering change:
/relay's opportunistic epoch-baseline populate now runs just after the shared
preamble (i.e. after the nonce check) instead of between signature and nonce.
This is provably equivalent for every reachable honest-peer state (a duplicate
nonce means the baseline is already non-null; a valid-signature-but-no-nonce
request from a nonce-supporting peer is unreachable in transit and carries no
security/correctness consequence) and the populate is documented as not
affecting relay accept/reject.
Adds a dedicated unit test covering the full decision table (headers, peer
status, rate-limit + Retry-After, rate-limit-before-signature ordering,
signature, nonce duplicate/missing, log flag + context suffix, success). Full
server suite green (804 tests).
This commit is contained in:
@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ Source files:
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- `routes/federation/reconciliation.ts` -- DM federated-id reconciliation + dead-incarnation artifact sweeps (worker-facing maintenance)
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- `routes/federation/events/*.ts` -- Inbound relay event processors, grouped by domain: `dmMessages`, `membership`, `friends`, `calls`, `dmState` (presence/read-state/close/reopen/file-rejected), and `dispatch` (`processRelayEvents`, the fan-out entry point shared by the HTTP relay handler and the initial-sync worker)
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- `routes/federation/handlers/*.ts` -- Fastify route registrars, grouped by endpoint concern: `peerHandshake` (initiate/accept/ensure/rotate/denied), `peerAdmin` (peer list/CRUD/reset/recheck/rotate), `approvals` (approval queue + peering subscriptions/notifications + approve/deny helpers), `relay` (identity delete, relay, epoch, sync), `lookup` (user lookups), `attach` (verify-attach-proof, `/api/users/@me/reattach`)
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- `routes/federation/handlers/s2sAuth.ts` -- `authenticateS2SPeer(request, reply, opts?)`: the shared inbound S2S-HMAC auth preamble (parse headers → resolve active peer → optional per-peer rate limit **before** signature → verify HMAC signature → nonce replay). Adopted by the six endpoints whose preamble is byte-identical: `DELETE /identity`, `POST /relay`, `POST /sync` (`relay.ts`), `POST /users/lookup`, `POST /users/by-home-id` (`lookup.ts`), and `POST /verify-attach-proof` (`attach.ts`). Returns `{ ok: true, peer, nonce }` or, having already sent the rejection reply, `{ ok: false }` (caller must `return`). **Intentional non-adopters** (each keeps a load-bearing gate the helper would flatten, documented in its own docstring/comment): `POST /epoch` (revoked-only gate for peer recovery, 400 on missing headers, no nonce check), `POST /peer/rotate` (active-only, no nonce check), `POST /peer/denied` (`awaiting_approval` gate, synthetic no-grace secret verify).
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- `packages/server/src/utils/federationAuth.ts` -- HMAC signing, verification, header parsing, `getOurOrigin()`
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- `packages/server/src/utils/federationOutbox.ts` -- Event queuing, coalescing, relay payload construction, mutation log, participant/target resolution
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- `packages/server/src/utils/federationLookup.ts` -- HMAC-signed remote-user lookups: `lookupRemoteUser` (by username) and `lookupRemoteUserByHomeId` (reverse lookup, used by stub backfill)
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