test(auth): polish register handler — comment, test isolation, +1 coverage
Quality-review polish on Task 11: 1. One-line comment near the federatedRegistrationOpen default behavior noting that the missing-row case is unreachable post-migration but falls federation-closed defensively (asymmetric with registrationOpen which falls back to env config — by design). 2. The "federated gate blocks token registration" test now sets ONLY federatedRegistrationOpen=0, isolating the federated-gate-alone effect rather than a both-gates-closed compound. 3. New test: open registration + revoked token → 201 (silently ignored). Locks the spec §5.7 invariant "no validation when registration is open" against future "let's just validate it for safety" regressions. 4. auth.md prose explicitly notes that federated stub upgrade and new- account paths do NOT enter redeemInvite — surfacing the structural enforcement of spec §1.3 "tokens never unlock federated creation".
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@@ -165,6 +165,8 @@ db.transaction(() => {
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If any step throws (concurrent revoke, last-slot race, username collision against the unique index), the entire transaction rolls back -- `usedCount` is never incremented on a failed registration. The route catches `InviteUnavailableError` from `redeemInvite()` and surfaces it as 403 `"Invalid or expired invite"`.
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- **Federated stub upgrade and federated new-account paths do NOT enter `redeemInvite`.** They are gated only by `federatedRegistrationOpen` and never consume tokens, even if a token is provided in the request body. This is the structural enforcement of the spec §1.3 invariant "tokens never unlock federated creation".
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The `/api/auth/check-invite` debounced UX endpoint pre-validates a token from the register page; the in-txn re-derive inside `redeemInvite()` is the authoritative enforcement point.
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### First-User Admin Promotion
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