diff --git a/docs/systems/auth.md b/docs/systems/auth.md
index fd456080..807e1784 100644
--- a/docs/systems/auth.md
+++ b/docs/systems/auth.md
@@ -264,9 +264,9 @@ Validates format (same rules as local registration: 3-32 chars, `/^[a-z0-9_]+$/`
 2. Look up user by `username` (trimmed, lowercased)
 3. Reject if not found (generic "Invalid username or password")
 4. Reject if `isDeleted === 1` ("This account has been deleted")
-5. **Reject if `federationHomeOrphaned === 1`** (generic "Invalid username or password") — *before* password verification. This freezes any federated account whose home instance was factory-reset (a new incarnation stood up on the same domain), set by the reset quarantine (§6.3 below / `federation.md` "Instance Epoch"). Because it returns first, it blocks both the local-password path AND the self-heal path — nobody, including a new same-name user on the reset home, can authenticate into the dead-incarnation account. Reversible (admin Keep/Remove, or the real user re-registers into a fresh account).
-6. Verify password via bcrypt
-7. **If password invalid AND user is federated:** attempt self-healing (see below)
+5. Verify password via bcrypt. **`federationHomeOrphaned === 1` no longer short-circuits here.** A federated account whose home instance was reset (a new incarnation stood up on the same domain) is now treated as **detached** — a sovereign LOCAL account whose local password hash is the sole authority (detach design §4.1). Local-hash verification proceeds normally: the correct local password logs in. The flag's only login effect is to permanently disable the self-heal path (step 7). *(Historical note: this check was previously a pre-verification freeze that blocked the local-password path too; the detach re-interpretation removed it so the real owner keeps their account instead of being locked out.)*
+6. *(merged into step 5)*
+7. **If password invalid AND user is federated:** if `federationHomeOrphaned === 1` (detached), reject immediately with the generic "Invalid username or password" — **no outbound request to the home domain**: there is no trusted home to consult, and re-hashing on the new incarnation's say-so would hand the account to a stranger. Otherwise attempt self-healing (see below).
 8. **If password invalid AND user is local:** reject
 9. Sign JWT, return `{ token, user }`. **Note:** Login does NOT mutate `users.status`. A successful login does not by itself imply a live connection (the client may never establish a WebSocket due to network failure, mobile background, error path); writing `'online'` here would produce a permanently stuck-online row that no disconnect timer cleans up. The WebSocket auth path (`ws/handler.ts`) is the single source of truth for `status = 'online'`. See `docs/systems/activity-presence.md` "Boot Reset" for the mitigation that runs on server start.
 
@@ -296,7 +296,7 @@ Before re-hashing, the self-heal confirms the home instance is the **same incarn
 - **Baseline on record AND `fetchPeerEpoch` returns `null`** — epoch cannot be determined (peer too old → 404, unreachable, bad/absent response signature, **or the reset peer's desynced secret rejecting our signed request**): **fail closed — refuse self-heal.**
 - **Baseline on record AND the epoch matches:** allow.
 
-Trade-off: the separate authenticated call can fail independently of the login POST, so a transient home outage during a legitimate stale-hash login fails closed. This is security-over-availability on a rare, recoverable path (fallback: a normal password change once the home is reachable); trusting an unauthenticated body would re-open the hijack. A reset peer's `null` result also doubles as a reset signal — the guard is correct even before reset-detection has flagged the peer. The direct-login freeze (step 5 of the Login Flow, `federationHomeOrphaned = 1`) is the post-re-peer complement: once the admin re-peers and the baseline updates to the new epoch, the epoch guard alone would pass again, so the freeze is what keeps the dead-incarnation account locked.
+Trade-off: the separate authenticated call can fail independently of the login POST, so a transient home outage during a legitimate stale-hash login fails closed. This is security-over-availability on a rare, recoverable path (fallback: a normal password change once the home is reachable); trusting an unauthenticated body would re-open the hijack. A reset peer's `null` result also doubles as a reset signal — the guard is correct even before reset-detection has flagged the peer. This epoch guard covers the **undetected-reset window** — non-detached federated accounts whose home was reset but not yet quarantined. Once the quarantine flags an account as **detached** (`federationHomeOrphaned = 1`), the self-heal path is disabled for it entirely (step 7 of the Login Flow): the detached account is no longer a remote identity that can be self-healed at all, so the epoch comparison never runs for it — the local hash is its only authority. Re-peering the new incarnation therefore cannot re-open self-heal into a detached account.
 
 ---
 
diff --git a/packages/server/src/routes/auth.epochGuard.test.ts b/packages/server/src/routes/auth.epochGuard.test.ts
index 5283ab83..97f19e15 100644
--- a/packages/server/src/routes/auth.epochGuard.test.ts
+++ b/packages/server/src/routes/auth.epochGuard.test.ts
@@ -54,13 +54,82 @@ beforeEach(async () => {
   app = await buildApp();
 });
 
-describe('login: federation_home_orphaned freeze', () => {
-  it('rejects login for a frozen (orphaned) federated account even with the correct password', async () => {
-    // Seed a real federated account with a known password, then freeze it.
-    const passwordHash = await hashPassword('correct-horse');
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+// Shared self-heal harness (module scope so both the epoch-guard suite AND the
+// detached-account regression test reuse the exact same arrangement).
+// ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
+
+// Seed a federated user whose LOCAL hash is stale (does not match the test
+// password) plus an active peer row carrying `baselineEpoch` as its recorded
+// baseline (null → no baseline on record). `federationHomeOrphaned` is left at
+// its default 0 — i.e. a NON-detached account for which self-heal stays enabled.
+async function seedStaleUserAndPeer(baselineEpoch: string | null, hmacSecret: string): Promise<void> {
+  const staleHash = await hashPassword('OLD-password-not-this');
+  testDb.insert(schema.users).values({
+    id: 'user-c',
+    username: 'carol@orbit.ddns.net',
+    passwordHash: staleHash,
+    homeInstance: 'orbit.ddns.net',
+    homeUserId: 'hid',
+    avatarColor: '#fff',
+    createdAt: Date.now(),
+  }).run();
+  testDb.insert(schema.federationPeers).values({
+    id: 'peer-k',
+    origin: 'https://orbit.ddns.net',
+    hmacSecret,
+    status: 'active',
+    peerInstanceId: baselineEpoch,
+    createdAt: Date.now(),
+  }).run();
+}
+
+// home-login POST → {ok:true}; /api/federation/epoch → signed {instanceId} (or
+// 404 when `epochToEcho` is null, exercising the fail-closed "cannot determine"
+// branch). The epoch response is HMAC-signed exactly as a real peer would sign
+// it, so it round-trips through fetchPeerEpoch's real signature verification.
+function makeFetchStub(hmacSecret: string, epochToEcho: string | null): typeof globalThis.fetch {
+  return (async (url: string | URL | Request): Promise<Response> => {
+    const u = String(url);
+    if (u.endsWith('/api/auth/login')) {
+      return new Response(JSON.stringify({ token: 't', user: {} }), { status: 200 });
+    }
+    if (u.endsWith('/api/federation/epoch')) {
+      if (epochToEcho === null) return new Response('nope', { status: 404 });
+      const body = JSON.stringify({ instanceId: epochToEcho });
+      const headers = buildFederationHeaders(body, hmacSecret, 'https://our.origin');
+      return new Response(body, { status: 200, headers });
+    }
+    throw new Error(`unexpected fetch ${u}`);
+  }) as typeof globalThis.fetch;
+}
+
+describe('detached account login (federation_home_orphaned)', () => {
+  // A detached account (its home instance was reset → a DIFFERENT incarnation now
+  // owns that domain) is a sovereign LOCAL account: the local password hash is the
+  // only authority. Local-hash login works normally; the hijackable self-heal path
+  // is PERMANENTLY disabled so the new incarnation can never re-hash a stranger's
+  // credentials into this established identity (detach design §4.1).
+  const seededUsername = 'carol@orbit.ddns.net';
+  const seededUserId = 'user-detached-1';
+  let savedFetch: typeof globalThis.fetch;
+  let fetchMock: ReturnType<typeof vi.fn>;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    savedFetch = globalThis.fetch;
+    fetchMock = vi.fn();
+    globalThis.fetch = fetchMock as unknown as typeof globalThis.fetch;
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    globalThis.fetch = savedFetch;
+  });
+
+  async function seedDetached(): Promise<void> {
+    const passwordHash = await hashPassword('correct-pw');
     testDb.insert(schema.users).values({
-      id: 'user-frozen-1',
-      username: 'carol@orbit.ddns.net',
+      id: seededUserId,
+      username: seededUsername,
       passwordHash,
       homeInstance: 'orbit.ddns.net',
       homeUserId: 'old-home-id',
@@ -68,20 +137,46 @@ describe('login: federation_home_orphaned freeze', () => {
       avatarColor: '#fff',
       createdAt: Date.now(),
     }).run();
+  }
 
+  it('allows login with the correct LOCAL password for a detached account', async () => {
+    await seedDetached();
     const res = await app.inject({
-      method: 'POST',
-      url: '/api/auth/login',
-      payload: { username: 'carol@orbit.ddns.net', password: 'correct-horse' },
+      method: 'POST', url: '/api/auth/login',
+      payload: { username: seededUsername, password: 'correct-pw' },
     });
-
-    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
-    expect(res.json().error).toBe('Invalid username or password');
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+    expect(res.json().user.id).toBe(seededUserId);
   });
 
-  it('allows login for a non-frozen federated account with the correct password (freeze is targeted)', async () => {
-    // Control: same shape, but federationHomeOrphaned = 0 must authenticate,
-    // proving the freeze targets the flag rather than all federated accounts.
+  it('rejects a wrong password for a detached account WITHOUT contacting the home domain', async () => {
+    await seedDetached();
+    const res = await app.inject({
+      method: 'POST', url: '/api/auth/login',
+      payload: { username: seededUsername, password: 'wrong-pw' },
+    });
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(401);
+    // The self-heal path must never fire for detached accounts: no fetch at all.
+    expect(fetchMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+  });
+
+  it('still allows self-heal for NON-detached federated accounts (regression)', async () => {
+    // federationHomeOrphaned=0 (seedStaleUserAndPeer default) must NOT take the
+    // new early-401 branch: stale local hash + home accepts + epoch matches the
+    // recorded baseline → self-heal → 200. Reuses the epoch-guard MATCH arrangement.
+    const secret = 'shared-secret-abc';
+    await seedStaleUserAndPeer('EPOCH-A', secret);
+    globalThis.fetch = makeFetchStub(secret, 'EPOCH-A'); // home echoes the SAME epoch
+    const res = await app.inject({
+      method: 'POST', url: '/api/auth/login',
+      payload: { username: 'carol@orbit.ddns.net', password: 'the-real-current-password' },
+    });
+    expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
+  });
+
+  it('allows local-password login for a NON-detached federated account (control)', async () => {
+    // federationHomeOrphaned=0 with a matching local hash authenticates directly,
+    // proving the detach handling targets the flag rather than all federated rows.
     const passwordHash = await hashPassword('correct-horse');
     testDb.insert(schema.users).values({
       id: 'user-ok-1',
@@ -93,13 +188,10 @@ describe('login: federation_home_orphaned freeze', () => {
       avatarColor: '#fff',
       createdAt: Date.now(),
     }).run();
-
     const res = await app.inject({
-      method: 'POST',
-      url: '/api/auth/login',
+      method: 'POST', url: '/api/auth/login',
       payload: { username: 'dave@orbit.ddns.net', password: 'correct-horse' },
     });
-
     expect(res.statusCode).toBe(200);
     expect(res.json().token).toBeTruthy();
   });
@@ -125,50 +217,6 @@ describe('login: self-heal epoch guard', () => {
     globalThis.fetch = savedFetch;
   });
 
-  // Seed a federated user whose LOCAL hash is stale (does not match the test
-  // password) plus an active peer row carrying `baselineEpoch` as its recorded
-  // baseline (null → no baseline on record).
-  async function seedStaleUserAndPeer(baselineEpoch: string | null, hmacSecret: string): Promise<void> {
-    const staleHash = await hashPassword('OLD-password-not-this');
-    testDb.insert(schema.users).values({
-      id: 'user-c',
-      username: 'carol@orbit.ddns.net',
-      passwordHash: staleHash,
-      homeInstance: 'orbit.ddns.net',
-      homeUserId: 'hid',
-      avatarColor: '#fff',
-      createdAt: Date.now(),
-    }).run();
-    testDb.insert(schema.federationPeers).values({
-      id: 'peer-k',
-      origin: 'https://orbit.ddns.net',
-      hmacSecret,
-      status: 'active',
-      peerInstanceId: baselineEpoch,
-      createdAt: Date.now(),
-    }).run();
-  }
-
-  // home-login POST → {ok:true}; /api/federation/epoch → signed {instanceId} (or
-  // 404 when `epochToEcho` is null, exercising the fail-closed "cannot determine"
-  // branch). The epoch response is HMAC-signed exactly as a real peer would sign
-  // it, so it round-trips through fetchPeerEpoch's real signature verification.
-  function makeFetchStub(hmacSecret: string, epochToEcho: string | null): typeof globalThis.fetch {
-    return (async (url: string | URL | Request): Promise<Response> => {
-      const u = String(url);
-      if (u.endsWith('/api/auth/login')) {
-        return new Response(JSON.stringify({ token: 't', user: {} }), { status: 200 });
-      }
-      if (u.endsWith('/api/federation/epoch')) {
-        if (epochToEcho === null) return new Response('nope', { status: 404 });
-        const body = JSON.stringify({ instanceId: epochToEcho });
-        const headers = buildFederationHeaders(body, hmacSecret, 'https://our.origin');
-        return new Response(body, { status: 200, headers });
-      }
-      throw new Error(`unexpected fetch ${u}`);
-    }) as typeof globalThis.fetch;
-  }
-
   it('MATCH → self-heal allowed (login 200)', async () => {
     const secret = 'shared-secret-abc';
     await seedStaleUserAndPeer('EPOCH-A', secret);
diff --git a/packages/server/src/routes/auth.ts b/packages/server/src/routes/auth.ts
index 426109e5..9f732a2e 100644
--- a/packages/server/src/routes/auth.ts
+++ b/packages/server/src/routes/auth.ts
@@ -380,22 +380,21 @@ export async function authRoutes(app: FastifyInstance): Promise<void> {
       return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'This account has been deleted', statusCode: 401 });
     }
 
-    // A federated account whose home instance was reset (a new incarnation stood
-    // up on the same domain) is FROZEN: its identity cannot be cryptographically
-    // proven continuous across the wipe (design §2 non-goal), so we must never let
-    // anyone — including a new same-name user on the reset home — authenticate into
-    // it. Freezing is reversible (admin Keep/Remove, or the real user re-registers
-    // into a fresh account). This is the enforcement half of the §6.3b quarantine;
-    // it blocks the local-password path AND, by returning first, the self-heal path.
-    if (user.federationHomeOrphaned === 1) {
-      return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Invalid username or password', statusCode: 401 });
-    }
-
     const validPassword = await verifyPassword(password, user.passwordHash);
     if (!validPassword) {
       // For federated users, try verifying against the home instance.
       // If the password is valid there but stale here, self-heal the local hash.
       if (user.homeInstance) {
+        // Detached account (§6.3b detach): its home domain now belongs to a
+        // DIFFERENT incarnation — there is no trusted home to consult. The
+        // self-heal path is permanently disabled: re-hashing on the new
+        // incarnation's say-so would hand this established account to a
+        // stranger. Local-hash login above remains the only (and sufficient)
+        // way in — the hash was only ever written by the owner's registration
+        // or an epoch-gated self-heal against the OLD incarnation.
+        if (user.federationHomeOrphaned === 1) {
+          return reply.code(401).send({ error: 'Invalid username or password', statusCode: 401 });
+        }
         try {
           const homeUsername = user.username.includes('@')
             ? user.username.split('@')[0]!